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“This book is urgently needed — it focuses our attention on the historic and crucial 
task of reconnecting humans and the natural world and powerfully explores how a 
movement for the ecological and social commons can tame the destructive forces 
of capitalism.”
— Paul Chatterton, School of Geography, University of Leeds
“The book features some of the very best of the current generation of writers and 
thinkers in the tradition of social ecology.”
— Brian Tokar, author of Toward Climate Justice
“The combination of theory and social movements scholarship within general de-
bates on contemporary political and ecological crises make this book a timely and 
significant contribution.”
— Sutapa Chattopadhyay, University of Windsor
Cities are increasingly a major cause of, but also a potential solution for, environ-
mental and social crises. Across the world, a new wave of urban social movements 
are arising: movements building economic, social, and political alternatives based 
on solidarity, equality, and participation. At the forefront of these, social ecology is 
emerging as a rich body of ideas spanning disciplines as diverse as democracy, eco-
nomics, and urbanism to technology, philosophy, and social development.
This anthology develops the debates that began at the Transnational Institute of 
Social Ecology’s (TRISE) conference in Thessaloniki about the dire need to rebuild 
our cities. It discusses the prospects of current urban movements; examines the 
radical potential of the concept of “the Right to the City”; and looks at how activists, 
scholars, and community movements can work together towards an ecological and 
democratic future. A fruitful conversation between theory and practice, this book 
opens new ground for rethinking systemic urban change in a way that transforms how 
we live, work, and create together.
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“This book is urgently needed — it focuses our attention on the historic and 
crucial task of reconnecting humans and the natural world they are deeply in-
terconnected with. The book powerfully explores how a movement for the 
ecological and social commons can tame the destructive forces of capitalism.” 
— PAUL CHATTERTON, Professor of Urban Futures, School of Geog-
raphy, University of Leeds 
 
“Henri Lefebvre’s ‘Right to the City’ is an important, but nevertheless limited, 
idea, as Lefebvre himself did not pay due attention to the ecological dimension 
of social emancipation. Social Ecology and the Right to the City is a welcome step in 
the right direction, as it provides that motto with a powerful framework: 
Murray Bookchin’s neo-anarchist approach to social ecology.” 
— MARCELO LOPES DE SOUZA, Professor of Environmental Geog-
raphy and Political Ecology, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro 
 
“This book constitutes an important contribution to the elaboration and articu-
lation of the paradigm of social ecology. It could hardly be more timely, with 
the multiple, interconnected crises of capitalist modernity engulfing the world 
in ever-expanding, permanent war and ecological catastrophe. This volume 
provides abundant reason for hope that, as one of the chapters puts it, our ca-
lamitous present is pregnant with a more sustainable, social-ecological future.” 
— THOMAS JEFFREY MILEY, University of Cambridge  
 
“With a majority of the world’s population now living in urban areas, the city 
has re-emerged as a definitive focus for popular struggles and contemporary 
social movements. This book brings us to the epicenter of today’s municipal 
movements, exploring the recent evolution of urban alternatives, together with 
theoretical perspectives on the changing character of urban space. The book 
features some of the very best of the current generation of writers and thinkers 
in the tradition of social ecology, mainly from Europe and the Middle East, to 
critique capitalist false solutions and rekindle the promise of an urban future 
rooted in the commons, a moral economy, and visions of a radically different 
future.” 
— BRIAN TOKAR, author of Toward Climate Justice: Perspectives on 
the Climate Crisis and Social Change 
 
“Not only is the book comprehensive but extremely useful for its interdiscipli-
nary and global analyses. The combination of theory and social movements 
scholarship within general debates on contemporary political and ecological 
crises, due to the rise of hostile and narcissistic policies, make this book a 
timely and significant contribution.” 
— SUTAPA CHATTOPADHYAY, University of Windsor, Department 
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Federico Venturini, Emet Değirmenci, and Inés Morales 
“We have seen the future—and it doesn’t work” 
– Jerome Ross, ROAR Magazine
“We don’t want to manage the inferno, we want to disassemble it and build 
something new” 
– Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar, Pikara Magazine
“The ecological principle of  unity in diversity grades into a richly mediated social 
principle; hence my use of  the term social ecology”  
– Murray Bookchin, The Modern Crisis
About this Book 
This volume arose from proceedings of  the conference The Right to the City 
and Social Ecology—Towards Ecological and Democratic Cities, held in 
Thessaloniki 1–3 September, 2017. The conference was organized by the 
Transnational Institute of  Social Ecology (TRISE). 
TRISE is an association of  activists and intellectuals based in Europe, 
who are concerned with current socio-ecological crises. It was founded in 
Greece in 2013 and focuses on research, education, and training. The asso-
ciation initiates, supports and facilitates research on social ecology, urban 
social movements, and the democratization of  society. Historically, its inspi-
ration can be traced to Vermont, US, where the Institute for Social Ecology 
was co-founded by Murray Bookchin and Dan Chodorkoff  in 1974. 
At the heart of  the organization’s mission lies the theory of  social ecology. 
Multiple definitions of  social ecology exist. However, TRISE largely follows 
the innovative philosophy of  Murray Bookchin, as well as other writers and 
activists who developed his work. TRISE aims to foster and develop social 
ecological analysis and practice that can be adopted for the struggles to 
come. 
This book answers this call, exploring the contemporary discourse 
surrounding urban rights—the right to the city—and presents a selection of  new 
essays on social ecology. This volume seeks to bring the ideas of  social ecology 
into conversation with the worldwide call for the right to the city, thereby 
challenging and extending existing discussions on both topics in a fruitful 
cross-fertilization. Theories and practices need to be discovered, engaged 
with, and transformed in order to build an effective culture of  resistance. 
Getting Started: Understanding Ecological Disasters and 
Inequality 
Social and ecological crises are intertwined and, as becomes more evident 
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every day, they are exacerbated by the dominant social, economic, and po-
litical systems. Human impacts on the planet are so evident and unique that 
more and more commentators are calling the geological time in which we 
live the “Anthropocene” era (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000), from “anthro-
pos” (human) and “-cene”, from kainos (new or recent). The biosphere and 
geological time scale have been fundamentally transformed by human activ-
ity and researchers have identified many processes that regulate the stability 
and resilience of  the Earth’s systems and nine quantitative planetary 
boundaries (Steffen et al. 2015) that must not be crossed if  humanity is to 
continue thriving. These include such trends as stratospheric ozone deple-
tion, loss of  biosphere integrity, chemical pollution and the release of  novel 
entities, climate change, ocean acidification, freshwater consumption and 
the global hydrological cycle, land system change, nitrogen and phosphorus 
flows to the biosphere and oceans, and atmospheric aerosol loading. Cross-
ing these boundaries threatens the existence of  life on this planet as we 
know it, potentially bringing deep or even irreparable change. Of  these 
boundaries, two (biodiversity loss and climate change) have already been 
crossed, while others are in imminent danger of  being crossed. 
Bookchin expressed his concerns for the future of  humanity and 
warned us that “if  we do not do the impossible, we shall be faced with the 
unthinkable” (2005: 107). 
However, more appropriate still is the term “Capitalocene” (Moore 
2016). The causes of  current changes are determined not just simply by 
human intervention, but by the current system that permeates all aspects of  
our societies—capitalism. These pressing planetary environmental problems 
can be addressed only by facing the problems within society. 
Even the United Nations acknowledges that we live in a world of  global 
inequality and poverty (United Nation Development Programme 2005; 
2010). Oxfam (see Hardoon 2017: 2) has also collated some alarming 
statistics on economic inequality: 
x “Since 2015, the richest 1% has owned more wealth than the rest of
the planet’s population.
x Eight men now own the same amount of  wealth as the poorest half
of  the world.
x Over the next 20 years, 500 people will hand over $2.1 trillion to
their heirs—a sum larger than the GDP of  India, a country of  1.3
billion people.
x The incomes of  the poorest 10% increased by less than $3 a year
between 1988 and 2011, while the richest 1% increased their
incomes by 182 times what they earned in 1988.
x A FTSE 100 CEO earns as much as 10,000 garment factory
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workers in Bangladesh. 
x In the US new research by economist Thomas Piketty also shows
that over the last 30 years income growth for the bottom 50% has
been zero, whereas income growth for the top 1% has been 300%.
x In Vietnam the country’s richest man earns more in a day than the
poorest person earns in 10 years.”
Insofar as these data depict a grim picture, economic inequality is just one 
indicator among many that illustrate a widespread social crisis; we could add 
unequal access to resources, gender/racial/class discrimination, widespread 
conflicts, the Global North–South divide, and so on. 
Cities today represent both one of  the major causes of  the aggravation 
of  the ecological and social crises, but also a potential solution to them. 
Many contemporary authors have dealt with the complexity of  cities. Merri-
field (2013) argues that we live in an era of  global urbanization, where the 
majority of  the world population now live in cities, which are at the fore-
front of  the current environmental and social crises (Harvey 2012). The 
world’s population is expected to reach 9.7 billion by 2050; of  this number 
an astonishing 66% will live in urban areas and almost all of  the increase 
will be concentrated in Asian and African cities (United Nations 2014). 
Indeed, cities today represent the main source of  ecological and social 
problems (Low and Gleeson 2005) And 71% of  global energy-related car-
bon emissions are generated in urban areas (Rosenzweig et al. 2010). 
Moreover, they are also the frontier of  the capitalist model of  development, 
being fundamental to the reproduction of  capital, as Harvey (2008) points 
out. Even NATO (2003) recognizes that cities are also likely to be the are-
nas of  highest conflict in the future. In developing countries, cities are 
growing at an unstoppable pace, making clearer every day the unequal ac-
cess to, and distribution of, resources and living conditions, as evident in 
Planet of  Slums (Davis 2006). The increase in pollution, violence, and mar-
ginalization suffered by the urban poor, especially in the Global South 
(Aguirre 2009), constitute the hidden face of  urbanization, and poverty is 
becoming a distinctly urban problem (Pugh 2000). Thus, by examining cities 
and urban crises the contradictions of  capitalism become increasingly evi-
dent (Swyngedouw 2005). 
At the same time, other authors (Hern 2010; Evans 2012; Portugali et al. 
2012) argue that cities are major sites for re-imagining a more ecologically and 
socially resilient future, becoming the locus where the future of  humanity is 
discussed and contested. This is why cities are so central to this volume. 
Changing the World 
By facing the social and environmental crises created by capitalism, social 
movements are key actors for change. From Cairo to Seattle, from Hong 
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Kong to Barcelona, millions of  people are working under the surface of  
oppression to build a different world. Sometimes this work surfaces with 
the eruption of  millions of  people in the street. However, a resurgence of  
populism and right-wing politics seeks to oppose them. In this respect, the 
call for the right to the city is echoing around the world. 
The debate around rights gained extreme relevance after the Second 
World War when, in 1948 the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights was 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. The concept of  the right 
to the city was first introduced by Lefebvre in 1968 in his work Le Droit a la 
Ville, and has since been developed and spread, becoming a key phrase 
within urban social movements (Harvey 2008; Roussopoulos 2017). 
The right to the city calls for a re-appropriation of  the city in all of  its 
aspects from full and equal access to resources to the possibility of  
collectively shaping the city environment. Moreover, it calls for a 
“revolutionary conception of  citizenship” (Lefebvre in Merrifield 2017: 23), 
implying a sea change in society. 
Since its first formulation, the importance of  the right to the city has 
grown to the point that it has been introduced into the United Nations 
agenda (UN Human Settlements Programme 2010) and other international 
bodies, most notably in city charters and statutes. If  we can say that 
speaking of  the right to the city “has become fashionable these days” (Souza 
2010: 315), this notoriety has come with a price. A plurality of  actors now 
use the term to mean different things for different purposes, causing it to 
lose the revolutionary charge of  Lefebvre’s formulation. 
In this volume we wish to critically analyse the mobilizing concept of  
the right to the city, offering new insights and ways forward. To this end, we 
believe that social ecology offers a powerful analytical tool and a theory of  
action for strategies, ethics, and a reconstructive vision for a future society 
based on freedom. To sum up, social ecology understands the relationship 
between ecological and human exploitation and aims to assess and solve the 
current social and environmental crises, conceived as the direct consequences 
of  capitalism and all forms of  domination. 
However, we have to admit that social ecology is often neglected, or 
dismissed, as political theory. Nevertheless, since Bookchin’s death in 2006 
this holistic approach remains of  inestimable value, leading to its revival, 
most visible in its vital influence on the Kurdish resistance in Syria and 
Turkey (Hammy and Finley 2015; Stanchev 2015; Hunt 2017), and the 
municipalist movement worldwide (Mansilla 2017; Rubio-Pueyo 2017). 
We believe that social ecology has much to offer contemporary 
struggles, both as a theory to analyse reality and as a practice to change 
reality. However, we see the necessity of  advancing social ecology, to open 
spaces for debate and organically make the discipline grow. In recent years 
few works have attempted to develop social ecology further; one of  the few 
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exceptions is the collection that Eiglad (2015) edited, Social Ecology and Social 
Change. The aim of  the present work is to continue in the same spirit, going 
even further in a critical re-assessment of  social ecology, offering ideas and 
reflections to use for social change, combatting the trend of  dehumanizing 
urbanization, and moving towards active and revolutionary citizenship. 
The Role of  the Activist-Researcher 
This book showcases the work of  a vast array of  authors with different 
cultural backgrounds, coming from different disciplines—some with 
academic experience, others with more activist sensibilities—but all united by 
a common aim: to change the current system that is based on exploitation 
and domination. 
As people committed to social change, we believe it is important to 
share some overarching beliefs that have pushed us while working on this 
book and in our daily efforts. As Conti expresses it, “the goal of  research is 
not the interpretation of  the world but the organisation of  transformation” 
(2005: np). We hope that this book will not be simply relegated to academia 
but will appeal to activists and thinkers interested in social change. 
We agree that research and knowledge production is fundamental to the 
advancement of  social and political struggles. But it needs to be free of  the 
interference of  capitalist interests in order to help political groups and 
revolutionary social movements. The distinction between activism1 and 
research should be blurred because researchers should, first and foremost, 
be committed to social change. Research and knowledge production are key 
for social movements that aim to change social relations in today’s 
dominant capitalist system. 
Through research, critical reflection is realized, endowing the aim of  
specific and general knowledge to understand the society in which we live and 
at the same time develop mechanisms that help in its transformation. Re-
search organizes and systematizes knowledge and allows the development of  
methods and analytical tools to support and improve the performance of  
groups and movements. In addition, research involves the possibility of  so-
cializing the knowledge produced. Indeed, knowledge should both be 
collectively produced and shared. Research should not be restricted to one 
group; it is not the sole responsibility of  some technicians or specialists, de-
spite the importance of  technical and specialized study. Social movements 
themselves should be the subject of  knowledge production, geared to the 
needs of  their struggles and addressing societal problems. What we learn in 
university, in life, in the street, and at work should be used to fight, to help 
better understand the world, its conflicts and contradictions, and at the same 
time think through and prepare the most effective strategies for building a 
new society. 
Research is not only for achieving new results, but it is a dynamic proc-
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ess of  education, training, and collective growth. The research presented here 
is based on the principle of  active participation, which starts from a collective 
formulation of  objectives, then develops dynamically, involving all partici-
pants, and aims to produce useful knowledge to be incorporated into daily 
revolutionary practice. 
From this perspective, we proudly call this volume an undisciplined 
production. As critical scholar Raman wrote: 
The call to be “undisciplined” is both a way of  exceeding the limits of  
disciplinary borders, and a refusal to conform to the requirements of  
neoliberal academia. It can open up new possibilities for radical research. 
(Raman 2017: vi) 
On the one hand, reality is so complex that we need to engage with multiple 
knowledge realms. We wish to break down the wall of  a compartmentalized 
knowledge, so often reproduced in universities. Limiting our approach to one 
discipline or perspective is, indeed, limiting. Society is complex and social 
change needs a holistic approach in which knowledge production is a collec-
tive effort, not just something that emerges from designated researchers. 
On the other hand, not only are all the contributors to this volume 
committed to social change but, given their backgrounds, they have not fol-
lowed the classical academic/research path. We are undisciplined. We do 
not exhibit good behaviour—not even self-control. Certainly not regarding 
this system that is bringing us towards sociological catastrophe and ever-
expanding social inequality. We believe in the right to resist tyranny, oppres-
sion, and domination. We hope that this work stimulates debates, fosters a 
culture of  resistance, and helps to inspire action. In order to facilitate this 
knowledge exchange, we have agreed with the contributors and the pub-
lisher to publish this book under a Creative Commons license. As St. 
Columba said in 561 CE: 
The knowledge in books should be available to anybody who wants to 
read them and has the skills or is worthy to do so; and it is wrong to hide 
such knowledge away or to attempt to extinguish the divine things that 
books contain. (Columba in Pollock 2018: 111) 
We believe that information and research should be freely shared in order 
for new ideas and practices to flourish and thrive. This collective book is an 
example that we hope will be followed. 
Contributions to this Volume 
The book is comprised of  a series of  different chapters, grouped into five 
parts. The wide diversity of  contributions is a consequence of  the rich and 
vibrant presentations at the 2017 TRISE conference. We see this as an 
Introduction 
7 
opportunity to explore our world, giving voice to different actors to portray 
the complex mosaic of  reality. The contributions span from political theory 
to grassroots experience, from UK-based examples to the Kurdish 
revolution, from social ecology to the right to the city. 
In the first section, Discovering Social Ecology, the concept of  social 
ecology is introduced, highlighting the key points. 
For over 50 years, American radical scholar and activist Murray Book-
chin produced a steady stream of  impressive essays, political tracts, and 
substantive books on the ecological crisis, the culture of  cities, libertarian 
political movements, and social ecology. Brian Morris’ essay outlines and re-
affirm Bookchin’s enduring legacy, focusing on his philosophy of  dialectical 
naturalism and his radical politics with respect to his thoughts on direct 
democracy within the context of  the city. 
In the following chapter, Dan Chodorkoff  presents an overview of  
social ecology and explores a political ideology within social ecology called 
“communalism” or “libertarian municipalism”. He argues that we must 
change the underlying political and economic structures that govern us and 
create a new sensibility if  we are to achieve an ecological society. 
In her chapter, Emet Değirmenci analyses the limits to growth from the 
perspective of  critics of  social ecology. This contribution underlines that a 
steady-state economy is possible through de-growth strategies based on 
libertarian municipalism and revolutionary institutions. 
In Part 2, Engaging with the Right to the City, authors introduce the concept 
of  the right to the city and problematize it. Magali Fricaudet first explores 
the actual resonances of  the right to the city as an emancipatory narrative 
and social practice, treating cities as centres of  capitalist accumulation 
processes that commodify life in all its aspects. The right to the city should 
be based on the use-value of  the city, rather than its exchange value, as a 
way of  freeing citizens from private property and space-based class 
relations. This perspective has influenced a diversity of  interpretations and 
practices that have in common the aim of  taking back the city as a common 
good, a place for collective emancipation and freedom. 
Theodoros Karyotis then juxtaposes urban commoning and the right to 
the city as two different vocabularies for making sense of  urban struggles. 
The two narratives give rise to different conceptualizations of  social con-
flict, different tactics and objectives, and ultimately different antagonistic 
subjects. The author offers examples from the past decade in Greece to 
show that commoning is not necessarily an alternative to “rights talk”, but 
rather a way in which rights may be fleshed out, and tethered to contentious 
politics waged by concrete communities. 
In the final paper of  Part 2, Federico Venturini explores the relations 
between the right to the city, spatial justice, and social ecology. He claims 
that the more general concept of  challenging all forms of  power that 
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oppress freedom can be developed as a unifying concept to include and 
amplify the agendas of  both the right to the city and spatial justice. 
In Part 3, The Kurdish Answer, the experiences of  the Kurdish movement 
are introduced. In her piece, Havin Guneser explains the “Molotov 
cocktail” of  historical conditions which drove the Kurdish freedom 
movement to break with the old orthodoxies. Guneser shows how 
Abdullah Öcalan and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) question what is 
handed down as truth in an ongoing process of  self-transformation. 
In their contribution, two ecology activists from the Mesopotamia Ecol-
ogy Movement, Ercan Ayboga and Egit Pale, then analyse the development 
of  cities in North Kurdistan in the twentieth century. However, they focus 
on the social, cultural, and economic changes that have accompanied the 
growth of  the Kurdish freedom movement and the takeover of  municipali-
ties. Against a neoliberal framework and political pressure, the Kurdish 
freedom movement is challenged to develop a social and ecological city 
with an emphasis on popular participation in decision-making processes. 
In the fourth part, Transforming Social Theory, an array of  theoretical top-
ics is presented. Metin Güven’s analysis includes the transition from a US-
dominated world system to a new one, varieties in the evolution of  the 
State, and the cultural differences between states during the Axial Age. The 
chapter then focuses on state capitalism in China and explains why a new 
theory of  the State is needed to tackle upcoming struggles against domina-
tion as China develops its authoritarian capitalism state model. 
The purpose of  Alexandros Schismenos’ work is to correlate central 
aspects of  the crisis of  established signification in order to highlight the 
opportunities for social emancipation that emerge through collective forms 
of  direct democracy. Inspiration is drawn from social ecology, which calls 
for a “free” public time. The main point of  this chapter is that creating a 
free public time implies the creation of  a democratic collective. 
In his contribution, Olli Tammilehto attempts to understand how rapid 
and profound societal change is possible. He develops a theory of  a 
“shadow society” and a “shadow personality” that come to the fore when 
societies undergo deep structural transformations. This chapter also 
explores the relevance of  this theory for social movements. 
The fifth and final section, Walking with the Right to the City, presents two 
different experiences of  groups working with the right to the city. Diana 
Bogado, Noel Manzano, and Marta Solanas focus on the phenomenon of  
squatting and occupying, showing how it currently constitutes a global way of  
resisting the “neoliberal” dynamic of  the global metropolis. By comparing 
experiences in Spain and Brazil, they attempt to explain how cities have 
menaced the popular classes in both countries, transforming the city to 
attract speculative financial capital. They observe how local populations 
reacted to maintain their rights to the city. 
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Finally, Jemma Neville offers a short story from her street in Edinburgh, 
Scotland. As much as human rights are universal, indivisible, and interde-
pendent, neighbours living side by side must still negotiate and share 
common ground. This piece explores how academic theory and social ecol-
ogy activist practices can be blended in everyday interaction. 
As stated in the essay opening this book, building a lasting culture of  
resistance that can operate within all societies requires discourse that not 
only explores the negative effects of  capitalism, but also offers a 
reconstructive and revolutionary vision. Contributing to building this vision 
is the aim of  this book. Let us implement it and transform our societies! 
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The Legacy of  Murray Bookchin 
Brian Morris 
Introduction 
Although Murray Bookchin has been described as one of  the most 
provocative, exciting, and original political thinkers of  the twentieth century, 
it is worth noting that he is singularly ignored by many academic scholars 
writing on green philosophy or the history of  the ecology movement (e.g. 
Scruton 2012; Radkau 2014), while he is invariably caricatured or reduced to 
a negative stereotype by anarcho-primitivists and spiritual ecologists (e.g. 
Black 1997; Curry 2011: 64; cf. Price 2012). 
In this essay I aim, therefore, to outline and re-affirm Bookchin’s 
enduring legacy as an important scholar, both in terms of  his philosophy of  
nature—dialectical or evolutionary naturalism, and in terms of  his radical 
politics—libertarian socialism or communalism. For Bookchin’s political 
legacy offers the only real solution to the immense social and ecological 
problems that now confront us, as neither communing with the spirit world 
(mysticism), nor the technocratic solutions offered within the current 
capitalist system will suffice (Roussopoulos 2015). 
In a recent widely acclaimed text, Facing the Anthropocene, Ian Angus 
writes, with respect to the present crisis of  the earth system, particularly 
global warming, that it is “a challenge to everyone who cares about human-
ity’s future to face up to the fact that survival in the Anthropocene requires 
radical social change, replacing fossil capitalism with an ecological civiliza-
tion, eco-socialism” (Angus 2016: 20). 
Angus neglects to mention, of  course, that this is something that Murray 
Bookchin extolled over 40 years ago, although, for Bookchin, this did not 
entail that “we need governments” (op. cit. 197) in order to create an 
ecological society. Bookchin, following Bakunin and Kropotkin, always felt 
that Marxist politics, specifically the “conquest” of  state power, would lead 
to either reformism, or, as in Russia and China, to state capitalism and 
political tyranny.  
Both a radical activist and an important radical scholar, for over 50 years 
Murray Bookchin (1921–2006) produced a steady stream of  essays, political 
tracts, and books on environmental issues, the culture of  cities, libertarian 
political movements, and social ecology that are truly impressive and path-
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breaking. Yet he remained one of  the few key figures in the ecology move-
ment not to succumb either to religious mysticism or to fashionable 
postmodernism, but remained true to the rationalist tradition of  the radical 
Enlightenment. Throughout his life, Bookchin was an evolutionary natural-
ist, as well as a libertarian socialist—a leftist and a revolutionary. (For his 
biography, appropriately titled Ecology or Catastrophe, see Biehl 2015.) 
The notion that in his last years Bookchin became a “grumpy old man”, 
that he abandoned his earlier ecological vision and attempted to “trash” his 
own political legacy (Black 1997; McKay 2007; Clark 2013), seems to me 
highly misleading. Granted, given his polemical writings, Bookchin was 
assailed on all sides—by deep ecologists, political liberals, technophobes, 
anarcho-primitivists, spiritual ecologists, neo-Marxists, and Stirnerite egoists, 
as well as by the acolytes of  Nietzsche and Heidegger. In many ways 
Bookchin became an isolated figure. Yet in an important sense he remained 
throughout his life a committed and passionate evolutionary naturalist and a 
revolutionary anarchist—that is, a libertarian socialist. The situationists 
mockingly described Bookchin as “Smokey the Bear”. In many ways this is 
a fitting depiction—for Bookchin was gruff, solid, down to earth, and 
enraged at the present state of  the world, and committed to doing 
something about it. 
He was a coherent thinker, and all aspects of  his work are closely 
interrelated. I shall focus in this essay on some of  his key ideas, and outline 
his legacy in terms of  four themes—namely: the modern crisis, social 
ecology, dialectical naturalism and ethics, and, finally, Bookchin’s libertarian 
socialism. 
 
The Modern Crisis 
Along with Rachel Carson, Barry Commoner, and Rene Dubos, Murray 
Bookchin was one of  the key figures in the rise of  the ecology movement 
around 1970 (Carson 1962; Dubos 1968; Commoner 1972). There is no 
doubt that when I first became involved in environmental issues in the 
1960s ecology was seen as a radical movement. Indeed, the biologist Paul 
Sears described ecology as “the subversive science”. Bookchin’s writings, 
along with the Marxist Barry Commoner’s (1972), emphasized that we were 
confronting a severe ecological crisis unprecedented in human history, and 
that its roots lay with an economic system—capitalism—that is geared not 
to human well-being but to the generation of  profit, and envisages no limit 
to industrial progress and technology. Ultimately, Bookchin felt that capital-
ism was destructive not only to ourselves but to the whole fabric of  life on 
earth. For the underlying ethic of  capitalism was indeed the technological 
domination of  nature, an anthropocentric ethic that viewed the biosphere 
as having no intrinsic value; it was simply a resource to be exploited. In his 
pioneering ecological study, Our Synthetic Environment (1962), and in various 
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other writings, Bookchin graphically outlines the social and ecological crisis 
that emerged following the expansion of  global capitalism at the end of  the 
Second World War (Bookchin 1971; 1980). 
Apart from die-hard neo-conservatives, many people now recognize that 
the world is in a sorry state and that there is a lot to be angry about. Long 
ago, Bookchin outlined what he described as the “modern crisis”, 
highlighting that both global capitalism and the modern liberal state are in 
dire straits (Bookchin 1986). This crisis, for Bookchin, was indeed manifold; 
at once social, economic, political, and ecological. For under global 
capitalism there has been a growing concentration of  economic power, and 
the continuous expansion of  economic inequality. It is now estimated that 
the 400 richest people in the world have a combined wealth greater than 
that of  45% of  the world’s population. No wonder rampant poverty exists 
throughout the world. Out of  a world population of  seven billion people, 
nearly a billion (15%) are estimated to be severely undernourished—that is, 
unable to obtain the basic conditions of  human existence (Tudge 2016: 16). 
Such poverty is not integral to the human condition but, as Bookchin 
emphasized, directly related to “development”—to the global expansion of  
capitalism. 
Equally significant is that across the world we find a “dialectic of  
violence”—reflected in the widespread existence of  weapons of  mass 
destruction, both chemical and nuclear, and the stockpiling of  conventional 
weapons. This can hardly be said to have kept the peace, for since the 
Second World War there have been hundreds of  armed conflicts, killing 
millions of  people (Roser 2019). This dialectic has led to the disintegration 
of  local communities, the denial of  human rights, widespread genocide and 
political oppression—usually by governments. Along with Bookchin, many 
scholars have emphasized that the impact of  free-market capitalism has 
been socially devastating, not only leading to economic inequality and 
widespread poverty, but also to political instability, religious fundamentalism, 
racial and ethnic conflict, and family and community breakdown (Ekins 
1992; Morris 2004: 15–17). Finally, there is an ecological crisis. As Bookchin 
outlines, this is clearly manifested in the degradation of  the natural 
environment under industrial capitalism:  
 
x the polluting of  the atmosphere and of  the seas, lakes, and rivers;  
x widespread deforestation;  
x the impact of  industrial agriculture, which, as Bookchin expresses 
it, is “simplifying” the landscape, while giving rise to the adverse 
effects of  toxic pesticides and soil erosion;  
x the creation of  toxic wastelands; the loss of  biodiversity with many 
species now facing extinction; the problem of  chemical additives in 
food; and  
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x a serious decline in the quality of  urban life through over-crowding, 
poverty, and traffic congestion. 
 
Equally important for Bookchin is that capitalism has ceased to be simply 
an economic system, for the market economy has come to “penetrate” 
every aspect of  social life and culture. Wealthy celebrities are now extolled 
by many, and greed and self-aggrandisement has come to seem virtuous. 
For Bookchin, of  course, it was not simply that there were too many 
people on earth, or that technology itself  (rather than the mechanistic 
Cartesian world-view) had brought about the “modern crisis” and the 
degradation of  the natural environment. Rather, the roots of  the ecological 
crisis lay firmly with global capitalism, which was continually “plundering 
the earth” in the search for profit. Bookchin felt that the capitalist market 
economy had become a “terrifying menace” to the very integrity of  life on 
earth. Industrial capitalism, he argued, was fundamentally anti-ecological 
and—over 40 years ago, long before Al Gore, George Monbiot, and Bruno 
Latour—he stressed with some prescience that the burning of  fossil fuels 
(specifically coal and oil) had created a “blanket of  carbon dioxide” that 
would lead to destructive storm patterns and eventually the melting of  the 
ice caps and rising sea levels (Bookchin 1971: 60–67; 1982: 19; Morris 2012: 
180–187; Kovel 2002; Monbiot 2006; Gore 2009; Latour 2017). 
It is important to emphasize that, while Bookchin recognized that 
humans often degraded the natural environment in which they lived, in the 
past this had been essentially a local phenomenon and a local problem. But, 
he argued, since around 1950, with the expansion of  global capitalism, 
humanity had come to place severe ecological burdens on planet earth that 
were global in extent, with “no precedent in human history”. Two issues 
particularly troubled Bookchin: the possibility of  a worldwide 
thermonuclear war, given the “balance of  terror” strategies of  Russia and 
the United States, and the climatic changes that had been induced by the 
widespread burning of  fossil fuels. Both, he felt, could have a catastrophic 
negative impact upon organic life—the biosphere. What concerned 
Bookchin, therefore, was both “our destiny as a life form and the future of  
the biosphere itself ”. Contrary to the opinions of  his critics—both the 
anarcho-primitivists and the mystical (deep) ecologists—Bookchin was 
concerned not only with the survival and well-being of  the human species, 
but also with the flourishing of  other life-forms and the earth itself. We 
need, he argued, to maintain the “restorative powers” of  both nature and 
humanity, and to “reclaim the planet for life and fecundity” (1986: 100–
108). 
In response to the “modern crisis”, especially regarding the social and 
ecological challenges it invoked, Bookchin proposed a re-affirmation and 
re-elaboration of  the revolutionary anarchist tradition that essentially 
Brian Morris 
16 
stemmed from Michael Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, and their nineteenth 
century associates. His tradition emphasized the need to integrate an eco-
logical world-view, a social ecology that Bookchin (1995a) later described as 
“dialectical naturalism”, with the political philosophy offered by anar-
chism—that is, libertarian socialism. 
Ever since I read Post-Scarcity Anarchism (1971) some 40 years ago, I have 
admired Bookchin, in the same way as I have been a fan of  Peter Kropot-
kin, Lewis Mumford, Richard Jefferies, and Ernest Thompson Seton. All 
were pioneer social ecologists. For in his early writings Bookchin sensed 
that human social life must be seen in terms of  a new unity, that the time 
had come to integrate an ecological natural philosophy (social ecology) with 
a social philosophy based on freedom and mutual aid (anarchism or liberal 
socialism). This unity was essential, he argued, if  we were to avoid an eco-
logical catastrophe. What we must therefore do, Bookchin stressed, is to 
“decentralize, restore bioregional forms of  production and food cultivation, 
diversify our technologies, scale them down to human dimensions, and es-
tablish face-to-face forms of  democracy”, as well as foster a “new sensibility 
toward the biosphere” (1980: 27).  
In later years Bookchin became embroiled in acrimonious debates with 
deep ecologists, anarcho-primitivists, and bourgeois individualists, in which 
Bookchin fervently defended his own brand of  social ecology and libertarian 
socialism. He never deviated from the views he expressed in his earlier 
writings. Bookchin’s core ideas about social ecology, libertarian socialism, 
and libertarian municipalism, which he defended and elaborated throughout 
his life, can be found in three key early texts, namely Post-Scarcity Anarchism 
(1971), Toward an Ecological Society (1980), and his magnum opus The Ecology 
of  Freedom (1982). As Tom Cahill (2006) remarks in his generous tribute to 
Bookchin, these books contain the essence of  Bookchin’s thoughts. 
Therefore, Bookchin was not only an important figure in the emergence of  
the ecology movement, but also played an important role, as Peter Marshall 




In the Vatican there is a famous painting by Raphael entitled The School of  
Athens. It depicts Plato as a grey-haired older man pointing to the heavens, 
while the younger Aristotle points to the Earth (Lewis 1962: 50). Plato, of  
course, while holding mathematics in high regard, was fundamentally a 
religious mystic, a scholar who expressed a dualistic spiritualist metaphysics 
and contempt for sensual experience and empirical knowledge. Aristotle, on 
the other hand, was an empirical naturalist, with a deep interest in biology, 
He described himself  as a physikos—one who studies nature. He expressed, 
as Bookchin recognized, an “organic” way of  thinking. 
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It has often been said that western philosophers either side with Plato or 
with Aristotle. Bookchin clearly sided with Aristotle, and was vehemently 
opposed to all mystical or theological interpretations of  the natural world. 
Indeed, Alfred Whitehead famously described western philosophy as merely 
a series of  footnotes to Plato. 
All the major figures of  the western philosophical tradition—Aquinas, 
Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Wittgenstein, and 
Heidegger—were fundamentally religious thinkers, as well as pro-State. 
Bookchin, therefore, belonged to a minority tradition within western 
philosophy—that of  philosophical naturalism.  
But what is significant about Raphael’s painting is that it reflects the 
essential paradox at the heart of  the human condition. For, as scholars as 
different as Lewis Mumford, Edmund Husserl, and Erich Fromm insist, 
humans have, in a sense, a dual existence. On the one hand humans are 
earthly beings and, as organisms, intrinsically a part of  the natural world. 
But on the other, humans are a unique species, having a high degree of  self-
consciousness and sociality, highly complex symbolic systems, and forms of  
technology, leading recent scholars to suggest that, over perhaps the last 50 
years, humans have become a “geological force” within the “earth system” 
itself. (Fromm 1949: 40–41; Mumford 1952: 48; Morris 2014a: 112–113, 
Crutzen 2002; Angus 2016: 27–37). 
What is significant about Bookchin’s philosophical naturalism is that he 
firmly embraced this paradox, emphasizing that humans are a product of, 
and had roots in, organic evolution, while at the same time they are animals 
of  a “very special kind”. As he expressed it: 
 
Human beings are OF the biotic world as organisms, mammals and 
primates, yet they are also APART from it as creatures that produce that 
vast array of  cultural artefacts and associations that we call second nature. 
(1982: xxix; 1995a: xiii) 
 
Bookchin, therefore, expressed, like Michael Bakunin and many other 
scholars, a triadic ontology of  the human subject, recognizing that humans 
are intrinsically both natural and social beings, as well as having, like other 
organisms, a special sense of  self-identity and personhood. Bookchin found 
deplorable the notion that humans are “aliens” or “parasites” on earth, as 
suggested by some deep ecologists and the acolytes of  Friedrich Nietzsche. 
It implies, he argued, the “denaturing” of  humanity, and denies the fact that 
humans are rooted in biology and are the products of  organic evolution 
(Bookchin 2007: 27). 
Bookchin’s own metaphysics of  nature is a form of  evolutionary 
naturalism, akin to that of  Darwin, Marx, and Kropotkin. Therefore, he 
fervently rejected the two dominant world-views that have long 
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characterized western philosophy and culture, namely religion and 
mechanistic philosophy (Morris 1996: 25–36). 
The first of  these are the various religious (or mystical) cosmologies; this 
world-view has taken a variety of  forms. These include (with their respective 
adherents), tribal animism (or polytheism) (Watson 1999), Christian theism 
and goddess religion (Starhawk 1979; Berry 1988), pantheism (or 
theosophy)—which conceives of  God as both a transcendental creator and 
manifested in natural phenomena (Nasr 1996) and, finally, various types of  
mystical pantheism (Naess 1989). 
The second form of  cosmology that has been dominant in western 
culture is the mechanistic world-view, invariably identified with René 
Descartes. This cosmology expresses a dualistic metaphysic—a radical 
opposition between humans and nature—an atomistic epistemology, an 
anthropocentric ethic that validates the technological domination of  nature, 
and a conception of  nature simply as a resource for human use. 
Rejecting both ecological mysticism and the mechanistic approach of  
Cartesian philosophy, Bookchin, in contrast, advocated an organic or 
evolutionary way of  thinking—an ecological world-view that he described 
as dialectical naturalism (see below). 
Although in the broadest sense the term “nature” implies everything 
that exists, and although this materialist definition may be valid in some 
respects, Bookchin suggests that the term is too limiting. Nature, from a 
social ecological perspective, refers to an evolutionary process or 
development. Bookchin thus defines nature as “a cumulative evolutionary 
process from the inanimate to the animate and ultimately, the social, 
however differentiated this process may be” (1982: xx). 
There is a widespread tendency within western culture, Bookchin argues, 
to view nature as a realm that is opposed to human freedom and human 
well-being, one characterized as “stringy”, “intractable”, “cruel” and 
“competitive.”. It was an image of  nature expressed not only by Cartesian 
philosophy, social Darwinism, and the ideology of  capitalism, (neo-classical 
economics in particular) but also, Bookchin contends, by Karl Marx. For 
Marx conceived of  nature as a “realm of  necessity” which must be subdued 
in order to engender a “realm of  freedom” (Bookchin 1986: 50; 1995a: 72; 
but cf. Foster 2000 on Marx’s ecology). 
As an evolutionary naturalist and realist, Bookchin of  course found the 
idea that nature is simply a social construction facile and obscurantist. In 
contrast, Bookchin conceives of  nature not as an inert or recalcitrant 
material realm, but as a graded, self-developing evolutionary process. 
Nature, therefore, is not some divine cosmos nor a lifeless machine, nor 
could it be equated, as deep ecologists have tried, with a pristine wilderness. 
It is rather an evolutionary process of  graded and phased development that 
indicates increasing fecundity, diversity, and complexity, and is characterized 
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by the developing and ever-expanding activities of  self-consciousness, 
subjectivity, creativity, and freedom. Following important studies by 
Kropotkin (1902) and Lynn Margulis (1981), Bookchin also contended that 
nature is characterized not only by conflict and competition, but also by co-
operation, mutual aid (mutualism), and symbiosis, even between diverse 
organisms (such as lichen). Life, therefore, is inter-active, procreative, 
relational, and contextual (Bookchin 1986: 57). 
All life-forms, for Bookchin, even bacteria, exhibit a sense of  self-
identity and self-maintenance, however germinal and nascent. Therefore, 
they have in varying degrees, subjectivity (choice), self-consciousness, 
agency, and freedom, and are active participants in their own evolution 
(1995a: 81). Bookchin was critical of  fashionable neo-Darwinian theories 
that unduly emphasized the impact of  the external environment (adaptation) 
and advocated a gene-centred approach to biology (e.g. Dawkins 1976). This 
approach, Bookchin argued, tends to completely bypass the subjectivity and 
agency of  the organism. Like Brian Goodwin (1994), and even Darwin, 
Bookchin advocated an approach to biology that affirms the organism as 
the fundamental unit of  life (Bookchin 1995b: 137–43). 
Bookchin, therefore, concluded that within organic evolution there is a 
striving for greater complexity and increasing degrees of  subjectivity (or 
selfhood) which constitutes “the immanent impulse of  evolution towards 
growing self-awareness” (1995a: 128). 
Bookchin consistently argued that mutualism (co-operation), self-
consciousness, subjectivity, and freedom are inherent tendencies in the 
natural world. They may, therefore, be realized as potentialities in human 
social life, specifically in the creation of  an alternative ecological society 
(Bookchin 1995a: 127–128). 
Following a long tradition going back to the beginnings of  western 
philosophy, and which was well expressed by the Roman scholar Cicero, 
Bookchin makes a clear distinction (not a dichotomy) between “first nature”, 
the realm of  non-human nature that pre-exists the emergence of  humans, 
and “second nature”, the realm of  human artefacts, cultural landscapes, and 
social and symbolic life (Bookchin 1989: 25). But he insists that human 
social life is “within the realm of  nature”, thus always has a naturalistic 
dimension. The emergence of  humans as a life-form and of  human socio-
cultural and symbolic life is, therefore, for Bookchin, a “natural fact”, 
having its roots in biology. (Bookchin 1989: 26). 
Not just an emergent materialist, Bookchin was fundamentally a social 
ecologist, and he continually emphasized the integrity of  both nature as an 
objective reality, and human social life. The relationship between nature and 
human social life is, therefore, one of  continuity, a dialectical relationship, not 
one of  opposition. Nature is a realm of  potentiality for the emergence of  
human life—in terms of  technics, social labour, language, subjectivity—as 
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well as a precondition for the development of  society. Bookchin was fond 
of  describing the relationship between humans and first nature in terms of  
a concept derived from Hegel, namely that it is a dynamic “unity in 
diversity” (1982: 24; 1980: 59). 
In an important sense, Bookchin, like Mumford and Dubois, was an 
ecological humanist, offering a creative synthesis of  humanism and 
naturalism. By “humanism”, of  course, Bookchin meant a shift “in vision 
from the skies to the earth, from superstition to reason, from deities to 
people” (1987: 246), thereby emphasizing the agency and cultural creativity 
of  the human subject, both individually and collectively. Equating humanism 
with Cartesian philosophy and anthropocentrism, as do many deep 
ecologists and postmodernists. (e.g. Manes 1990; Braidotti 2013), was for 
Bookchin stultifying and obscurantist. Needless to say, secular humanists 
from Ludwig Feuerbach to Fromm and Mumford long critiqued Cartesian 
metaphysics, emphasizing that humans are fundamentally “earthly beings” 
(Lamont 1949; Morris, 2012). 
In contrast to much social theory and ecological thought, Bookchin 
stressed both natural and social evolution, on nature and the integrity of  the 
human species. He was, therefore, opposed to all dualistic theories that tend 
to radically bifurcate or separate nature from the social (and spiritual) 
aspects of  human life—as reflected in Platonism, Cartesian theism, and 
other religious cosmologies, as well as much sociological theory and the 
humanities. Bookchin was especially critical of  postmodernism, which tends 
to ignore biology entirely, although he was mainly concerned with the 
relativism, misanthropy, ahistoricism, and the ultimate nihilism of  the likes 
of  Nietzsche and Heidegger (Bookchin 1995b: 112–201). 
But Bookchin was equally critical of  all forms of  reductionism. He was 
critical of  socio-biology, which tends to reduce social life to biology or even 
to genetics, and of  many mystical deep ecologists who tended to oblate the 
integrity of  the human subject with reference to a universal spiritual “one-
ness”. This was akin, he felt, to the “night in which all cows are black”, 
Bookchin being fond of  quoting Hegel’s joke about Schelling’s mystical 
idealism (Bookchin 1982: 22). Bookchin, in fact, became a rather maligned 
figure among many academic philosophers for his trenchant critique of  
deep ecology (Bookchin 1987), even though the substance of  this critique is 
quite compelling. For Bookchin was critical not only of  the eclecticism of  
the deep ecologists and their tendency to embrace mystical theology—as 
expressed in Devall and Session’s seminal text (1985)—but also of  their 
neo-Malthusian tendencies and their emphasis on “biospherical equality” 
(biocentrism) which tended, Bookchin argued, to lapse too easily into mis-
anthropy. In fact, Bookchin was particularly critical of  two prominent deep 
ecologists, Dave Foreman of  Earth First and Christopher Manes who ex-
tolled famine in Africa and the AIDS epidemic as acceptable ways of  
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controlling the human population. Such notions deeply disturbed Book-
chin, hence the stridency of  his polemic. But Bookchin was also critical of  
the deep ecologists for holding an undifferentiated humanity responsible 
for the ecological crisis, when the crisis had its roots in social problems—
specifically with regard to the capitalist market economy—thus requiring 
fundamental social changes and the “remaking” of  society (Chase 1991: 
32). Bookchin’s harsh critique of  deep ecology (1997) generated a heated 
debate, although the critical responses to Bookchin’s own critique and his 
advocacy of  social ecology tend to verge on caricature (Price 2012: 49–61). 
 
Dialectical Naturalism and Ethics 
To understand the natural world as an evolutionary process, and the place 
of  humans in the cosmos, Bookchin argued that we need to develop an 
organic way of  thinking, one that is dialectical and processual rather than 
instrumental, mechanistic, and analytical. Such a way of  thinking avoids the 
extremes of  both anthropocentrism, exemplified by Cartesian metaphysics and 
the ideology of  capitalism which radically separates humans from nature, 
and biocentrism, a naïve form of  biological reductionism expressed by 
mystical deep ecologists. Both approaches, Bookchin felt, express a logic of  
domination, and a hierarchical mind-set. 
As a philosophy of  social ecology, Bookchin, therefore, advocated a 
dialectical or evolutionary form of  naturalism, one that combined and 
integrated an ecological world-view (naturalism) as a metaphysic of  nature 
with dialectics as a relational epistemology. To develop a sense of  dialectics, 
Bookchin seems to have immersed himself  in three classical texts on 
dialectics, namely Aristotle’s “Metaphysics”, Hegel’s “Science of  Logic”, and 
Engels’ “Dialectics of  Nature”. Bookchin fully embraced their dialectical 
sensibility, but he rejected the theological and teleological aspects of  
Aristotle’s and Hegel’s philosophy, emphasizing that they lacked an 
evolutionary perspective, while he felt that Engels was still deeply entrenched 
in mechanistic materialism, Engels emphasizing not development but matter 
in motion. Bookchin aimed to develop a dialectical naturalism by “ecologizing 
the dialectic”, as he put it (Bookchin 1995a: 119–133). 
A good deal has been written on dialectics. Some, like Kropotkin, 
identifying dialectics with Hegel’s pantheistic mysticism, found the concept 
unhelpful; others have dismissed it as mystical mumbo-jumbo. “What have 
Galileo’s laws of  motion and the life-history of  an insect to do with 
dialectics?” asked Sidney Hock (1971: 75–76), whose early writing on Hegel 
appealed to Bookchin. Following Karl Popper, anarcho-primitivist Bob 
Black dismissed dialectics as “mystical gibberish” and, embracing the 
nihilism of  postmodernist theory, dismisses Bookchin as a naïve positivist 
(1997: 90–97). Black thus has a rather facile understanding of  Bookchin’s 
work, and even less understanding of  dialectics, Popper, or positivism. 
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Neither Popper, a critical rationalist, nor Bookchin, a dialectical naturalist, 
were positivists. Bookchin emphasized that “reality is not simply what we 
experience” (1995a: 21). Hardly a positivist sentiment! 
What then is dialectics? Following Engels (1940), three aspects of  the 
principles of  dialectics may be briefly indicated. 
The first principle to understand in dialectics is the idea that both the 
natural world and human social life are in a constant state of  flux, and that 
the historical sciences have made the “immutable” concepts of  Newton, 
Descartes, and Linnaeus redundant. 
The second principle of  dialectics emphasizes the notion of  totality 
(holism). This is the idea that all the seemingly disparate entities that make 
up the material world are interconnected, and that no phenomenon 
(whether natural or social) can be understood in isolation. As many have 
expressed it, nature is a complex interactive web. 
The final principle of  dialectics is expressed by the terms “paradox”, 
“contradiction” and “unity of  opposites”. Engels and Bookchin contend 
that ordinary common-sense understandings, traditional logic, conventional 
(or instrumental) reason, and metaphysical philosophy (especially the kind 
expressed by Descartes and Kant) tend to think in terms of  “oppositions”, 
rather than dialectically in terms of  development into a “unity of  
opposites”. 
As Engels succinctly described the limitations of  metaphysical (non-
dialectical) thinking: 
 
In the contemplation of  individual things, it forgets the connection 
between them; in the contemplation of  their existence, it forgets the 
beginning and end of  that existence; of  their repose, it forgets their 
motion. (Engels 1969: 32) 
 
As Bookchin conceived of  it, dialectics is not a form of  logic, nor is it a 
method, and it certainly is not “mystical gibberish”; it is rather a “way of  
reasoning about reality” (1995a: 15). It is a mode of  understanding the 
world that posits an “emergent” rather than a mechanistic form of  causality, 
expressing an organic rather than a religious (mystical) or mechanistic way 
of  thinking, emphasizing process and development—not simply change or 
motion. And finally, it stresses the unity and agency of  organisms, as well as 
their complex relationships or inter-actions (mutualism) (Bookchin 1995a). 
The conception of  nature that Bookchin expressed in many contexts fo-
cusses around a number of  key concepts: holism (complexity); differentiation 
(diversity); freedom (subjectivity); fecundity (creativity), and participation 
(mutualism). For Bookchin, nature constitutes “a participatory realm of  inter-
active life-forms whose outstanding attributes are fecundity, creativity, and 
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directness, marked by a complementarity that renders the natural world the 
grounding for an ethics of  freedom rather than domination” (1986: 55). 
As ethics, for Bookchin, is an eminently human creation, in that human 
beings can derive a sense of  meaning and value first from nature by virtue of  
their interpretive powers, he suggested that humanity is “the very embodiment 
of  value in nature as a whole”. He goes on to advocate an “ethics of  
complementarity”, which “opposes any claim that human beings have a 
‘right’ to dominate first nature, assuming that they can do so in the first 
place, much less any claim that first nature has been ‘created’ to serve 
human need” (1982: xxxvii). 
Following Aristotle, Bookchin sought to promote an ethical naturalism 
that was consistent with ecological principles and an ecological sensibility. 
Arguing against the fact/value of  the positivists. Bookchin held that first 
nature may be reasonably regarded as the ground for an ecological ethic. But 
the natural world itself  is not ethical; it is never “cruel” or “kind” or 
“caring”, nor good or bad. Bookchin affirmed that, from our knowledge of  
the natural world and the place of  humans within first nature, humans 
could thereby derive ethical principles—to guide human conduct and to 
establish an ecological community based on the values of  co-operation, 
self-organization, freedom, and diversity. 
As an ethical naturalist, like Spinoza and Kropotkin, Bookchin explicitly 
rejected ethical theories that based moral value simply on tradition or 
custom (cultural relativism), on subjective whims and individual emotions 
(as per the logical positivists), or on a denatured conception of  the human 
subject (as per Kant). He was equally critical of  all transcendental or 
absolutist forms of  ethics, those which derive moral edicts either from the 
holy scriptures of  Oriental religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and 
Hinduism, mediated, of  course, by the clerics), or from the emanations of  
shamans, charismatic priests, or religious gurus, whether enlightened 
visionaries or messengers of  God. 
As Bookchin wrote of  humans as “the embodiment of  nature rendered 
self-conscious and self-reflective”, and advocated the human “stewardship” 
of  the earth, stressing the need to go beyond the present dichotomy or rift 
between first and second nature to create a “free nature” (1995a: 131–36), 
he has been widely denounced by mystical deep ecologists, anarcho-
primitivists, and liberal philosophers alike. He has been accused of  being 
“anthropocentric” and “utilitarian”, advocating a Faustian domination of  
nature, and expressing “humanistic arrogance” (e.g. Manes 1990: 160; 
Marshall 1992: 618; Black 1997: 98; Curry 2011: 64). These critiques seem 
to wilfully misinterpret the meanings that Bookchin himself  gave to these 
concepts. 
By “stewardship” of  the earth, Bookchin certainly did not intend to 
imply that humans should take complete control of  nature or steer organic 
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evolution—Bookchin was an ontological realist, holding that first nature 
has an independence and integrity quite separate from the human species. 
What he implied by “stewardship” was the development of  an ecological 
sensibility that “respects other forms of  life for their own sake and 
responds actively in the form of  creative loving and supportive symbiosis” 
(Chase 1991: 34). 
Likewise, the concept of  “free nature” did not imply the “mastery of  
nature but rather the opposite: the freeing of  the natural world from the 
plundering of  the capitalist system, and the creation of  an ecological society 
in which the relationship between humans and the natural world would be 
one that was co-operative, harmonious and mutualist—a “creative inter-
action”. It would be a society that enhanced the flourishing and well-being 
of  both the human species and other life forms along with the nature itself, 
a mutuality “between first and second nature that enriched both natures” 
(1995a: 120). Bookchin always advocated and stressed an “ethics of  
complementarity” that is lost on his numerous critics. 
Neither indifference nor the technocratic management of  problems 
within the capitalist system (environmentalism) are viable options to the 
present social and ecological crisis (Roussopoulus 2015). 
 
The Politics of  Libertarian Socialism 
In response to the social and ecological crisis, Bookchin not only insisted 
on the need to develop a philosophy of  dialectical naturalism (a form of  
ecological humanism), and an ecological sensibility or ethic. He also stressed 
the need to create—as a radical alternative to liberal capitalism—an 
ecological society. He envisaged a rational society based on anarchist 
principles—libertarian, socialist, ecological, and democratic. 
Around 2002, at the age of  81, Bookchin announced that he had ceased 
to define himself  as an anarchist—leading Ian McKay (2007: 39) to suggest 
that Bookchin in his final years attempted to “trash his own legacy”. 
But it is important to recognize that the anarchism that Bookchin 
abandoned was what he had earlier rejected, in a harsh polemic (1995c), as 
“life-style” anarchism. This kind of  anarchism, otherwise known as “post-
Left anarchy”, or (by academics) as the “new anarchism”, consists of  a 
motley collection of  several distinctive strands, among them Stirnerite 
egoism (Jason McQuinn), Nietzschean aesthetic individualism, otherwise 
known as poetic terrorism (Hakin Bey), anarcho-primitivism (John Zerzan 
et al.), postmodernism and, at extremes, the anarcho-capitalism of  Ayn 
Rand and Murray Rothbard (Morris 2014b:133–148). 
As a political tradition, anarchism has usually been defined in two ways. 
The first, well exemplified by Peter Marshall’s (1992) history of  anarchism, 
conceives of  anarchism in terms of  an opposition to coercive authority, 
specifically as “anti-State”. Thus a wide variety of  philosophers and 
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individuals have been described as anarchists—Godwin, Stirner, religious 
mystics such as Tolstoy and Gandhi, radical libertarians (Spencer and 
Whitman), mutualists, anarcho-capitalists as well as many anarcho-
communists (Kropotkin, Malatesta, Goldman, Rocker, et al.). Even 
Margaret Thatcher and the authoritarian-Marxist Che Guevara, an icon in 
the 1960s, find a place in Marshall’s important survey of  anarchism. This 
has enabled liberal and Marxist scholars to dismiss anarchism as a 
completely incoherent philosophy.  
But it is not. There is another way of  understanding anarchism. That is, 
to view it as a fundamentally historical social movement and political tradi-
tion that emerged around 1870, mainly among working class members of  
the First International. This form of  anarchism, as many scholars have em-
phasized, combined the best of  both radical liberalism, with its emphasis on 
liberty and individual freedom, and socialism (or communism), with its em-
phasis on equality, voluntary associations, mutual aid, and direct action. This 
unity, which defines anarchism as libertarian socialism, was most succinctly 
expressed in the well-known adage of  Michael Bakunin that “liberty with-
out socialism is privilege and injustice; and that socialism without liberty is 
slavery and brutality” (Lehning 1973: 110; Morris 2014b: 204–207). 
In his polemic Listen, Marxist! Bookchin critiqued Marxism for its lack 
of  a libertarian perspective, while in his later polemic Social Anarchism or 
Lifestyle Anarchism he criticised a wide variety of  contemporary anarchists for 
their bourgeois individualism and lack of  a socialist perspective (Bookchin 
1971: 173–220; 1995c). Thus anarcho-communism, social anarchism, 
libertarian socialism, and communalism are virtual synonyms. That is, 
different expressions of  Bookchin’s political philosophy of  anarchism. 
Thus it is important to recognize that, throughout his life and even in his 
last years, Bookchin remained true to the legacy of  St. Imier—a committed 
and strident libertarian socialist. 
Lifestyle anarchists, as Bookchin described them—Nietzschean 
aesthetes, Stirnerite egoists, and, especially, anarcho-primitivists—not only 
rejected socialism (and society) but went to extremes and rejected 
civilization (even agriculture and human language), technology and city life. 
What is important about Bookchin was that he attempted to avoid these 
extremes, and, like Mumford, was never anti-civilization, anti-technology, or 
anti-urban. On the contrary, he affirmed all three as vital creative aspects of  
the human spirit.  
Alive to the achievement of  human civilization, Bookchin rejected 
anarcho-primitivism. 
In Ecology of  Freedom, Bookchin devotes a chapter to what he described 
as “organic society”, the early hunter-gatherers and tribal societies. He 
ascribes the following features to such tribal societies: a primordial equality 
and an absence of  coercive and domineering values; a feeling of  unity 
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between the individual and the kin community; a sense of  communal 
property with an emphasis on mutual aid and usufruct rights and, finally, an 
ecological sensibility, involving a relationship with the world that was one 
of  “reciprocal harmony, not of  domination” (Bookchin 1982: 43–61). 
But like Kropotkin, Bookchin was only too aware of  the limitations of  
tribal life, and concerned that we draw inspiration and lessons from the past 
and from tribal cultures, rather than romanticizing them. Still less should we 
try to emulate them. Given the present human population, the “future 
primitive” of  John Zerzan is simply not a political option (Morris 2014b: 
141–42). 
While Bookchin was always a harsh critic of  anarcho-primitivism, he 
was not an obsessive technocrat as David Watson (1996) portrays him. Nor 
was he besotted with civilization. He certainly emphasized the importance 
of  city life, especially given its introducing the idea of  a common humanity, 
a universal humanitas (2007: 61), but like Kropotkin and Mumford, both im-
portant influences on Bookchin—and unlike the anarcho-primitivists—
Bookchin had a much more nuanced approach to technology and civiliza-
tion. As he put it in defending his pro-technology stand: 
 
[This] is not to deny that many technologies are inherently domineering 
and ecologically dangerous or to assert that civilization has been an 
unmitigated blessing. Nuclear reactors, huge dams, highly centralized 
industrial complexes, the factory system, and the arms industry—like 
bureaucracy urban blight and contemporary media—have been pernicious 
almost from their conception. (1995c: 34). 
 
Technology, Bookchin felt, had to become “liberatory”, and to be reduced 
to a “human scale” and, through the Institute of  Social Ecology co-
founded with Dan Chodorkoff, he pioneered the use of  renewable energy 
sources and promoted organic farming (Biehl 2015: 159). 
Following Kropotkin, Bookchin emphasized two sides of  human 
history—the legacy of  domination reflected in the emergence of  hierarchy, 
state power, and capitalism, and the legacy of  freedom, reflected in the 
history of  ever-expanding struggles for emancipation (1999: 278). 
Eager to develop libertarian municipalism as an integral part or strategy 
of  anarchism (communalism), Bookchin detailed the many forms of  
popular assembly that have emerged in the course of  European history, 
particularly during times of  social revolution. Bookchin was particularly 
enthusiastic with respect to the Athenian polis and the system of  direct 
democracy, while recognizing its historical context and limitations. But 
forms of  popular democracy have occurred throughout history: popular 
assembles in medieval towns; neighbourhood sections during the French 
Revolution; the Paris Commune of  1871; workers’ soviets during the 
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Russian Revolution; New England town meetings; and anarchist collectives 
during the Spanish Civil War. Bookchin refers to them all (1992; 2007: 49). 
In his later essays Bookchin came to explicitly distinguish between four 
radical political traditions, namely Marxism, anarcho-syndicalism, anarchism 
(equated with lifestyle anarchism), and communalism or libertarian 
socialism. 
Always critical of  Marxism, or what is termed “proletarian socialism”, 
Bookchin rejected the notion that the individual proletariat could any longer 
be conceived as the “hegemonic historical agent” in the struggle against 
capitalism, given the fundamental social and technological changes that 
were taking place within global capitalism during the second half  of  the 
twentieth century. He was equally critical of  the Marxist emphasis on the 
State, whether this implied the bourgeois democratic State or Bolshevik 
strategies of  state control during the Russian Revolution (2007: 88–89; 
2015: 155–160). 
Bookchin was also critical of  revolutionary zeal, with its strategic focus 
on the industrial worker and the factory system. While acknowledging their 
libertarian bias, Bookchin rejects the “workerist” (ouvrierist) emphasis of  the 
anarcho-syndicalists, and laments their lack of  a coherent theory—
especially evident in the summer of  1936 during the Spanish Civil War 
(2007: 93). 
It has been suggested by many scholars that Bookchin ignored the 
importance of  class, and that the concept of  labour virtually disappears 
from his social ecology, even though the workplace still remains a critical 
site of  capitalist exploitation. But Bookchin never repudiated the concept 
of  class, nor the importance of  class analysis. As a fervent anti-capitalist, he 
always acknowledged the crucial importance of  the working class in 
achieving any form of  social revolution, and categorically affirmed the 
importance of  the class struggle (1999: 264). But given the emphasis on 
advancing the “communalist project” as the socialism of  the twenty-first 
century, class issues nevertheless seem to be side-tracked in his writings. 
As indicated earlier, Bookchin’s polemical essay Social Anarchism or 
Lifestyle Anarchism (1995c) was essentially a defence of  libertarian socialism, 
offering a trenchant critique of  several anarchist tendencies that were 
prominent in the 1990s, specifically so-called Nietzschean poetic terrorism, 
anarcho-primitivism, and Stirnerite egoism. Labelling them together as 
“life-style anarchism”, what linked these various tendencies for Bookchin 
was their affirmation of  a radical individualism that gives absolute priority 
to the unfettered, autonomous ego (Bookchin 2007: 91; 2015: 160–61). 
For Bookchin, none of  these currents of  thought—Marxism, anarcho-
syndicalism, and lifestyle anarchism—articulated an authentic political 
theory that was based on democratic self-management of  the municipality.  
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Unlike Nietzschean “free spirits” and Stirnerite individualists, who, in 
elitist fashion, rely on other mortals to provide them with the basic 
necessities of  life, Bookchin recognizes that throughout human history 
some form of  social organization has always been evident. For humans are 
intrinsically social beings, not autonomous possessive egos. Some kind of  
organization has, therefore, always been essential not only in terms of  
human survival, but specifically in terms of  child care (kinship), food 
production and distribution, shelter, clothing, the basic necessities of  social 
life (the social economy), and the management of  human affairs as they 
relate to community decisions and the resolution of  conflicts (politics). 
Bookchin, therefore, was always keen to distinguish between ordinary social 
life—focussed around family life and kinship, affinity groups, various 
cultural associations, and productive activities—and the political life of  a 
community, focussed around local assemblies. 
Bookchin equally insisted on distinguishing between politics, which he de-
fined as a theory relating to the public realm and those social institutions by 
which people democratically manage their community affairs, and what he 
called “statecraft”. The latter focuses on the State as a form of  government 
that also serves as an instrument for class exploitation, oppression, and 
control. 
Thus Bookchin came to emphasise the need to establish popular de-
mocratic assemblies based on the municipality, on neighbourhoods, towns, 
or villages. Such local assemblies rely on face-to-face democracy to make 
policy decisions relating to the management of  community affairs. He ar-
gued consistently that such decisions should be made by majority vote, 
although Bookchin does not advocate majority rule, and emphasized that a 
free society could only be one that fosters the fullest degree of  dissent and 
liberty. Municipalities would be linked through a confederate political sys-
tem. He warned, however, of  the dangers of  the assembly becoming an 
“incipient state” (Bookchin 1971: 168; 2007: 101–110). 
Bookchin summed up his own conception of  anarchist politics in terms 
of  four basic tenets: (1) a confederation of  decentralized municipalities; (2) 
an unwavering opposition to Statism; (3) a belief  in direct democracy; and 
(4) a vision of  a libertarian communist society (1995c: 60; see also Biehl 
1998 and Eiglad 2014). 
Of  course, Bookchin did not provide us with all the answers to our cur-
rent problems. On the contrary, he left us with many unresolved issues. 
Exactly what kind of  technology do we need to sustain or develop? What 
exactly is involved in decentralizing the urban landscape? And what pre-
cisely is the relationship between community politics and class struggle 
focussed on the workplace? These are all unresolved issues for contempo-
rary radicals.  
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But, alongside his focus on nature, what is truly significant about 
Bookchin is his critique of  urbanization, especially given the fact that 
roughly half  of  the human population now live in cities. He had a vision of  
greening and decentralizing the city and, by establishing truly democratic 
institutions to manage the municipality, restoring people’s “right to the city.” 
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Social Ecology: A Philosophy for the Future 
Dan Chodorkoff 
 
Theory and Practice 
I am going to try to offer some thoughts on how we might move forward 
from here. I think this is an important discussion. I will refer to familiar 
themes that we have raised this weekend. Overall, I believe the connection 
between theory and practice has been an essential part of  social ecology 
and certainly of  Bookchin’s thought. Although he was a scholar and did 
incredible research and produced very important works, he was at heart an 
activist. For Bookchin, the real soul of  social ecology is praxis—an ongoing 
process of  putting our ideas into practice, analyzing our experience of  
putting them into practice, revising our ideas in relation to that analysis, and 
taking those revised ideas and applying them again in the real world. That is 
an overall framework that we should keep in mind. It is very easy, given the 
sense of  urgency that I am sure we all share, considering the time of  crisis 
we are experiencing, to believe that it is time to act. And it is time to act, 
certainly, but the action that we take has to be informed, thoughtful, 
considered, and I believe should be taken within a framework of  ideas that 
are developed and consequently examined and re-examined. What I am 
going to try to do today is lay out some broad ideas that I think will help us 
moving forward and enable us to develop effective praxis.  
I wish I could offer a prescription or a mathematical formula or mantra 
that we can all chant that will get us to where we need to go, but I cannot. I 
will offer some concepts and ideas but I think each of  us in our own 
particular community are going to have to determine how these ideas are 
applied in the world because the conditions in our communities differ. 
Cultural traditions and histories, the ecological areas in which we live, and 
the particular issues that we are facing vary. Certainly, there is an urgency 
here in Greece, that may not be felt in other parts of  Europe or the US; the 
economic crisis is a particular concern here. But there is a crisis that is 
universal—the climate crisis and it is unprecedented. The threat is evident 
to us all. It has transcended issues of  local pollution or development and 
has taken on a truly global nature, something that Bookchin was aware of  in 
the 1960s but most people chose to ignore, and certain segments of  society 
are still choosing to ignore. Furthermore, we are now seeing a resurgence 
of  fascism, which I personally find terrifying, and there is no question that 
we may not in the future have an opportunity to act. So now is the time for 
action but, once again, let us make sure that our actions are actually 
informed by ideas.  
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The Role of  Education 
I offer a quote from Murray Bookchin: “Every revolutionary project is an 
educational project.” I believe this is a crucial insight. We need to educate 
ourselves no matter who we are, no matter how widely we have read. There 
is an awful lot that we need to learn and think through. And I want to 
emphasize that education happens on many different levels and in many 
ways. I am not simply talking about education in a classroom or education 
through conferences such as this, as important as that kind of  learning is. 
But education also occurs by acting on ideas. Education occurs when you 
learn how to act with others in a democratic fashion, when you begin to 
reshape your understanding and relationships between yourself  and others 
and the environment in which you live. Education occurs when you 
organize a cooperative, when you organize a demonstration. We have to 
acknowledge this and we accept too that people learn in different ways, that 
some people will be reached by an academic treatise, some will be touched 
by a polemic, others may be reached by a novel or a song or a work of  art; 
these all need to be incorporated into our educational process. We have to 
be holistic and multi-dimensional in the way that we approach the issue of  
education. And perhaps we must abandon our preconceptions about what 
constitutes education. We have a role to educate ourselves and then educate 
others, to take these ideas out into the world, to not be cautious about 
proposing what we believe, and be able to do so in a coherent and convincing 
fashion so as to allow others to enter into this new world that we are 
beginning to conceptualize and actualize. I think this is a really critical 
moment and an educational process has to progress.  
I say this because what I envision in order to bring about the kinds of  
change I think are necessary is a process which is analogous to the 
Enlightenment. We need a new Enlightenment, not necessarily in terms of  
the content but in terms of  the process. We have to remember that the 
Enlightenment began with just a tiny handful of  radical thinkers who 
challenged all the beliefs of  their day—the idea that a king had divine rights, 
the idea that the masses were incapable of  learning or incapable of  
governing themselves. All of  this flew in the face of  history and tradition. 
And it took about 100 years for those ideas to percolate throughout the 
population. Bear in mind that levels of  literacy were much lower than we 
have today, no radio, social media, no TV, so these ideas were popularized 
by those who read. People passed books and pamphlets hand-to-hand and 
discussed ideas over kitchen tables and in taverns. The process took 100 
years but these ideas did spread and resulted in the democratic revolutions 
which set the stage for today. So it is an analogous process, except we don’t 
have 100 years because our crisis is in fact so dire and compelling that we 
need to act now, we need to act soon. But it will not take 100 years because 
in fact these ideas, the ideas that we’ve been discussing this weekend, are 
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already shared by millions of  people around the world and it is important 
for us to keep that in mind, to not feel isolated, to not feel marginalized, 
because in fact these ideas are at the center of  the kind of  change that has 
to occur if  we are going to create a new world. I contend that the notion of  
education, both self-education and the education of  others, is critical. It is 
not going to take 100 years; we are already partway there. We need to take 
advantage of  our access to technology and our literacy. We need to educate 
using all of  these media and means, re-conceptualize education as something 
that occurs not only in formal settings like this, but also in informal settings. 
 
Utopian Thinking 
The second idea that I want to emphasize is that I used the term “revolu-
tion” earlier. I am surprised that I have not heard that word used much here 
this weekend. The kind of  change that we are seeking really is revolutionary 
change. I am not talking about the classic notion of  revolution—
insurrection, going to the barricades with guns—although there may be 
settings in which that is necessary and appropriate to defend these ideas. 
Rather, I am talking about a revolution which transforms the underlying 
structures of  our society, the economic and political structures that govern 
our lives. In order for us to achieve that, we need to develop not just revolu-
tionary movements, but a revolutionary sensibility. The Italian anarchist 
Errico Malatesta said, “Everything depends on what people are capable of  
wanting.” I have to agree with this. If  we cannot develop the imagination to 
conceptualize a qualitatively different world, we are doomed. The situation 
we are in is taking us down the path of  destruction. Bookchin used to wear 
a button with a quote from Bakunin: “I will continue to be an impossible 
person as long as those who are now possible remain possible”. I think that 
is worth thinking about. We need this new sensibility to reconceptualize our 
relationships with each other and our relationship with the natural world. 
And this is not a simple task. It is not simply an intellectual exercise. We 
need to incorporate this new understanding and this new sense of  self  and 
relationship to others into our very being. We need to transform ourselves, 
and this is a process that will only occur through practice. In the crucible of  
thought and action we can begin to see the outlines of  the new world that 
we want to create. I would also suggest that this new sensibility needs to 
stem from a utopian perspective. One of  the problems I see facing move-
ments today is the lack of  a truly revolutionary imaginary. Certainly, we are 
facing pressing issues in the here and now which require our attention (e.g. 
in the US, the Black Lives Matter impulse). It is crucial, because black peo-
ple, particularly young men, are killed by the police on a regular basis. Civil 
rights have been denied to a whole segment of  the population who are sub-
jected to all kinds of  degradation and their struggle is crucial. It is 
absolutely necessary and it is not sufficient.  
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We cannot simply stop at civil rights—the core concern for Black Lives 
Matter, for people in the black community, or in any other community. That 
struggle needs to be incorporated into a larger transformative struggle that 
recognizes the need to transform underlying structures. I know that 
intersectionality is a very popular concept today. We have used the term a 
“holistic” movement or a “revolutionary” movement, but we did not really 
talk about intersectionality back in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. 
Nevertheless, I believe we can recognize that all of  the issues that people 
are dealing with, be they Black Lives Matter or stopping pipelines, or 
stopping the development of  a gold mine here in Greece, are really one 
struggle. They are struggles against the dominant culture which has no 
respect for human life, which puts profits before people, and is responsible 
for the kind of  rapacious treatment of  the earth which will ultimately lead 
to the decline of  the human species and our ability to inhabit this planet. 
Bookchin thought about this back in the 1960s, wrote about global 
warming in 1964 and was ridiculed, and at that point he said maybe in 200 
years we will begin to see the greenhouse effect take shape and influence 
our environment. He was prescient in understanding this issue, as in so 
many others.  
We need to be utopian and think beyond the given and understand that 
there are, within our current situation, potentialities that can be actualized 
that will take us to a qualitatively different place. So when I use the term 
“utopian”, I mean it in the positive sense. I do not think I have to lecture 
the Greeks here about the roots of  the word “utopia” but it was coined in 
1515 by Sir Thomas More and he indicated it had two roots, both from 
ancient Greek. One was the word οὐτόπος (comprised of  οὐ (ou, “no”) + 
τόπος (tópos, “place, region”), and the other word was “u-topia”, which means 
the good place. It is in this second sense that I use the term. Unfortunately, 
utopian thinking has largely fallen by the wayside. We are dismissively told, 
“Oh, that’s utopian”, or as a pejorative; “that’s cloud cuckoo-land; it’s 
unachievable; it can never happen.” But from our understanding of  
anthropology and history we know that, in fact, what is defined for us as a 
very narrow human nature—greedy, competitive, violent, and acquisitive—
seems to define humanity in a way that fits beautifully as the rationale for 
capitalism. We know that previous cultures existed in very different ways 
with qualitatively different relationships with each other and with the 
natural world. Not that we can return to these cultures, but rather they 
represent certain principles that are part of  our legacy as human beings. 
Rather than talking about a narrowly defined human nature, anthropologists 
discuss a continuum of  human possibilities. Among these possibilities, and 
we know they exist because they have been actualized in other cultures, are 
the ability to function through mutual aid, to live and create an economic 
Dan Chodorkoff 
36 
system that does not depend on the market, to make decisions in non-
hierarchical ways, to live an egalitarian life, and to achieve a degree of  self-
reliance in humanly scaled communities in which relationships are based on 
face-to-face ties rather than the bureaucratized, atomized, and alienated 
forms of  social life that predominate today. In short, the re-harmonization 
of  people with nature and people with people.  
I think it is very important that we begin to articulate our utopian vision 
and once again there is no universal here. It is going to vary from community 
to community, to grow out of  our own cultures and experiences, be located 
in a particular environment, but nonetheless it needs to be based on a set of  
broad principles on which we find agreement. We began the weekend by 
talking about the idea of  rights or a constitution or a set of  ethical 
principles on which we can find broad agreement, even ultimately a global 
agreement. Such principles will be actualized in different ways in different 
places and this is how we find that elusive balance between the universal 
and the particular that was one of  the themes that we addressed in our first 
conference.  
 
The Principles of  Social Ecology 
Now where do we find those principles? Social ecology has some concrete 
suggestions. Brian Morris did a marvelous job describing Bookchin’s 
concept of  dialectical naturalism and I think dialectical naturalism gives us 
insight into what those principles might be. I would like to lay them out 
briefly here. First, I would emphasize that these are tendencies in nature, 
not immutable natural laws but possibilities that find expression at various 
times in various places and they are crucial to the whole process of  
evolution, a model which unfortunately has been misinterpreted and 
abused. We know the concept of  natural law was one of  the axioms that 
the social Darwinists used to classify people and cultures into various levels 
and hierarchical schemas. Herbert Spencer wrote of  the primitive savage 
and the civilized, a schema which provided a marvelous rationale for 
colonialism and materialism, because, of  course, the West “brought 
civilization” to these benighted savages, the “primitives” who could barely 
speak, according to the western view, who were barely human. We also saw 
the abuse of  the theory of  natural law in Nazi Germany. So I will talk about 
certain tendencies and principles of  nature. Undeniably, competition plays a 
role, mutations occur through a process that sorts out winners and losers in 
terms of  species, not individuals, but there are other aspects of  natural 
evolution that have not been emphasized but, in fact, have been largely 
ignored. I would also add that Bookchin tried to elucidate these principles 
because he believed we must incorporate them into society if  we are to re-
harmonize humanity and nature, which is ultimately the goal of  social 
ecology—the integration of  first nature and second nature, which leads to a 
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third nature. So if  we are going to do that we have to understand how these 
principles that are at work in natural evolution can be transformed and 
applied in society.  
First among them is the understanding that in nature there is no hierar-
chy. When we talk of  the lion, king of  beasts, or the lowly ant, we are 
anthropomorphizing. We are taking our particular social structure and look-
ing at the rest of  nature and saying that is what it is. But this thesis is not 
correct. Ecologists know that; they understand that in fact there is not a 
food chain in which the big carnivores sit on top, but rather a food web in 
which interdependency is the rule. The ant, of  which there are 40 or so 
species on the floor of  the rainforest, plays a crucial role in decomposing 
the organic matter, which then feeds the plants, which feed the herbivores, 
which feed the carnivores. Without the carnivores the herbivores would 
destroy the plant matter. The carnivores help keep that population in check, 
and without the herbivores the carnivores could not exist, and the lowly ant 
provides the nutrition that allows all of  those relationships to exist, and the 
micro-organisms in the soil play a crucial role as well. So nature is not hier-
archical and, by extension, society should not be. Once again, the 
anthropological record shows us that for the most of  human history people 
existed without formal hierarchies. And here I am using “hierarchy” in the 
technical sense—as a system of  command and control that ultimately has 
recourse to physical coercion. A hierarchical society is a fairly recent inven-
tion. To use the old anthropological saw in which the whole of  human 
history becomes a clock, for about 95% of  our time on the planet, it is only 
the last five minutes or so that hierarchies emerge. We lived without hierar-
chies before that, which indicates that we have the capacity to live without 
hierarchies in the present. Social relations are shaped by our sensibility and 
the kinds of  social structure under which we choose to live or under which 
we are forced to live. 
We can decide how to organize our own society and we must. According 
to Bookchin, people are part of  nature. There is first nature which is non-
human nature and then there is second nature and we are organic beings, an 
outgrowth of  the process of  natural evolution and the same principles that 
have carried us through that process need to be applied in human society. If  
our goal is to achieve a re-harmonization of  first and second nature, that is 
a project of  social ecology. In relation to hierarchies within species, bear in 
mind the technical definition I offer of  hierarchy, an institutionalized 
relationship of  command and control that ultimately has recourse to 
physical coercion. People often ask, “Well, what about the alpha males in 
the gorilla troops?” What you see there is not a hierarchy but a form of  
situational dominance and, in fact, ethologists who have observed the 
gorilla troops in the wild have noted that the silverback gorilla alpha male 
beats his chest to scare off  the other males and gain exclusive access to the 
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females of  the troop for breeding purposes, while a younger male will sneak 
into the woods with a female, so it is not even an effective form of  
situational dominance. I would maintain that there truly is no hierarchy in 
the technical sense in first nature.  
I look at anthropology to understand what qualitatively different forms 
of  leadership look like. When Western society encountered, say, Native 
Americans they immediately looked for the chief. And they could not find 
the chief, so often they would assume someone was a chief, or they 
appointed a chief. In fact, what happened in those societies was that 
leadership existed but it was also situational. There was no permanent 
leader and situational leaders could not coerce others to follow their will. 
Leaders depended on their ability to persuade others through logic or 
rhetoric. They were admired because of  their experience, their knowledge, 
their insight. One would lead a hunt because of  their proven ability to find 
the game that was necessary for the survival of  the group. But they could 
not force anyone to follow their instructions. They suggested or they 
exhorted, they tried to inspire, maybe they manipulated sometimes. But they 
lacked that coercive ability that the kind of  leadership in our societies 
entails. Virtually every individual in a hunting and gathering band eventually 
plays a leadership role in one activity or another. One individual may lead 
the hunt, another give the dance, another makes gathering activities. Even 
the gender division of  labor between men and women was very fluid. We 
are told that men are the hunters and women are the gatherers, but the 
Marshals, who lived among the San people, observed that when women 
were out gathering they sought game, and they would hunt it. And if  the 
men saw something that could be gathered in the wild they gathered it. 
Women were even observed hunting with the men. So these hard and fast 
categories that have emerged in our time are not really an essential part of  
our humanity. There are alternative arrangements that have existed for 
millennia, for most of  our time on the planet. We have lost sight of  that. 
Once again, I am not a primitivist. I am not suggesting going back to 
hunting and gathering, but I am suggesting that the relationships that 
existed in those societies represent certain principles that we can extract and 
dialectically transform and apply in our own society. We have a lot to learn 
from these people. 
The second principle that I would suggest we need to derive from our 
understanding of  the natural world, which may inform our actions, our 
movements, and our utopian vision, is the fact that nature is mutualistic. 
Mutual aid plays a crucial role in natural evolution. This was brought up by 
Kropotkin and re-emphasized by Bookchin and others thinkers. In first 
nature life is interdependent, just as individuals are interdependent, which is 
why humanity created societies. So mutualism also has to be incorporated 
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into our utopian vision and into the vision of  the new society that we wish 
to create. 
Another principle is the notion of  unity and diversity. When we look at 
natural history in ecosystems, we see that the most stable ecosystems, those 
which last, are those that have the greatest number of  species interacting at 
various trophic levels. Hence, even though there may be great fluctuations 
in individual species, even the elimination or extinction of  a particular 
species, there are other species to fill that niche and as a result the 
ecosystem derives some stability. It is not static, it is homeostatic. It is a 
dynamic balance, but a balance nevertheless. And this balance is dependent 
on diversity. Unity is only achieved through diversity, and clearly this is 
another principle that needs to inform our thinking and our action, our 
vision, and our movements. We need to strive for diversity and find within 
such diversity strength, resilience, and unity. 
Another principle that we derive from our understanding of  the natural 
world is the idea of  homeostasis. Bookchin understood, as biologists 
understand, that nature is not static; it is constantly changing. Yet in the 
midst of  that constant change, healthy ecosystems are able to maintain a 
dynamic balance. This is the very definition of  sustainability, the ability to 
maintain balance in the midst of  constant change. 
Finally, natural history is the process of  evolution and in that process we 
see a development. It is not a steady process of  ascension, there are peaks 
and valleys, there is fluorescence and extinction but over time the process 
of  natural evolution has moved towards ever greater diversity, complexity, 
and degrees of  freedom. It is undeniable because, if  you agree with Darwin, 
life on earth began as single-celled organisms and those organisms became 
more and more complex: they came together to form various species and, 
as a result, we moved from single-celled organisms to a multitude of  highly 
complex life forms. Over that process we have seen greater and greater 
degrees of  consciousness and self-consciousness—the ability to make 
choices and, ultimately, the ability to choose freedom.  
So, once again, we see principles that we can extract from the natural 
world and apply in the specific situations in which we find ourselves to 
move towards ever greater degrees of  freedom. Regarding freedom and 
utopia, we will never achieve them. They will always hover on the horizon 
and, as we approach them, will recede into the distance. But that is as it 
should be, because natural evolution is dynamic, constantly changing, 
constantly moving, constantly developing, and we have to acknowledge 
that, learn to live with it and embrace it. And we have to learn how to live 
with ambiguity. For me, paradox, ambiguity, and ambivalence is inherent in 
the human condition, and we need to accept that. Nevertheless, we need to 
embrace our freedom to make choices so I suggest that these are some 
basic principles on which we need to find agreement, whether this takes the 
Dan Chodorkoff 
40 
form of  some kind of  a constitution or a set of  ethics on which we can 
agree. It has to be a basis on which we can begin to create our free 
communities because these communities cannot exist in isolation. We live in 
a global world, globalization of  course in its current form is an extremely 
destructive process, but there is the opportunity to create an alternative 
form of  globalization in which free self-reliant communities confederate, 
offer each other mutual support and exchange, and create a richer and fuller 
life for all of  us. And I believe that has to be our goal.  
 
Opposition 
This is all very abstract and theoretical and I realize that ideas are most 
important when they arise from the theoretical and move to the concrete. I 
am not going to be prescriptive, I am not going offer easy answers or 
solutions, but I do want to suggest some arenas in which I think we need to 
begin to work effectively. The first would be to recognize the need for 
oppositional movements. Let us not fool ourselves. We are in the midst of  a 
deep crisis, something unprecedented in human history, and I do not 
believe it is overly dramatic to suggest that the future of  humanity on the 
planet is at stake today. The decisions that we make and the actions that we 
take over the next few years are going to determine the course of  human 
life. This is a big responsibility and what we are seeing is an increasing pace 
of  exploitation and domination, as expressed in capitalism, a system which 
is rationalizing control of  every aspect of  our lives, which has expanded 
dramatically and functions not only in the economic sphere, but has actually 
colonized our consciousness—so these are pressing problems. And we need 
to oppose it; we need to protest, we need to stop the goldmine, stop the 
pipeline, stop the murder of  black people, stop the imprisonment of  
people, and so on. We need to do all of  these things, and protest is a very 
powerful weapon in that process. Protest and opposition is absolutely 
necessary, but not sufficient. It will not get us to where we need to go 
because protest is about negation. We do need to stop those who are now 
in power; we need to remain impossible as long as those who are possible 
remain possible. But it is not enough. I think those of  us who have been 
active have seen the limitations of  protest. We have been able to gain 
certain rights for certain groups, we have been able to prevent a dam from 
being built here or there, but we are fighting a holding action. While it is 
necessary to stop these exploitative moments from destroying the things 
that we hold dear, we also need to move beyond protest.  
 
Reconstruction 
We need to move beyond opposition to reconstruction. Once again, this is 
not something new and I am sure many of  you are actively engaged. By 
“reconstruction”, I refer to the Wobbly slogan. The IWW (International 
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Workers of  the World) was an American anarcho-syndicalist movement at 
the turn of  the twentieth century, whose slogan was “we have to build the 
new world in the shell of  the old”. I refer to it because we need to begin to 
create new relationships, new ways of  being together, and we need to 
institutionalize them. This means creating cooperatives, creating community 
gardens, creating community housing, moving towards the forms of  mutual 
aid and cooperation that this society tends to ignore. And we need to 
propose such measures as a way of  showing people that another world is 
possible, that we can build a new world in the shell of  the old. These 
experiences, these reconstructive projects, also serve as a form of  education 
because through them we learn how to come together and make decisions 
democratically—horizontally. We learn how to accept and create new forms 
of  leadership. When I talk about a non-hierarchical society, I am not 
suggesting there is a lack of  influential, experienced, wise, knowledgeable, 
or brilliant people who can offer us insights and lead us forward. But it will 
be a process in which leadership is redefined. It is no longer defined 
hierarchically—it is not power over, it is power with. We need to educate 
ourselves and others and learn how to function in these horizontal and 
democratic ways. 
I think that this reconstructive process begins to show us ways that we 
can begin to actualize our utopian vision. I had incredible experiences in the 
1970s working in the Puerto Rican community in New York City where 
people were living in a ghetto consisting of  40% city-owned property, 
abandoned buildings, vacant lots. Through direct action, I saw that 
neighborhood act and claim as their own the abandoned properties and 
reshape them according to a very concrete utopian vision which emerged 
through a series of  community planning fora, where everyone in the 
neighborhood came together and developed the blueprint for their 
neighborhood. They planned how to use the buildings: some for elder 
housing; some for artists; a vacant lot to become a garden, and another a 
park. Block by block, building by building, lot by lot, they put together a 
plan. And then they began to implement it through direct action, initially 
squatting in abandoned buildings and reclaiming vacant lots without any 
legal recourse, but through their own will and the development of  
particular kinds of  political pressure, through protest with direct action, 
they were able to begin to transform the neighborhood. We became 
involved because, at that time, the Institute for Social Ecology was doing a 
lot of  work where we were looking at alternative technologies.  
In the early 1970s we were working with solar and wind power, which 
we saw as crucial to the development of  an ecological society, although of  
course we applied these technologies in communities that are human-scaled, 
where people democratically control them, far from the kind of  
corporatization of  alternative technologies that has occurred today. The 
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point being that this kind of  direct action is as important as the type that 
we use in our opposition and we need to begin to actualize and create 
models for what society might look like and within those physical changes 
we can begin to make social changes. That is, organize the community to 
enable participation in this transformative process. Controlled by the people 
on the block, people can begin to take actions where they live today. I find it 
very heartening that people have talked about this over the weekend. We 
must recognize that different people have different skills and aptitudes and 
some people may be very effective at organizing street demonstrations, 
while others may be more effective organizing a community garden. The 
crisis is so dire and so compelling, and is occurring on so many levels that 
there are many different ways in which we can enter into this process of  
opposition and reconstruction. 
However, I think we have to recognize that, as important and necessary 
as these reconstructive actions are, they are not sufficient. It is very easy for 
cooperatives to be co-opted right into the capitalist system, for our 
community gardens to fall prey to the developer’s bulldozer, so we need to 
develop within our communities and ourselves the sensibilities I argue for, 
and we need to be very conscious of  the ambiguities inherent in human life. 
The best intentions can be turned against us, so we constantly need to be 
aware of  how powerful and insidious the forces arrayed against us are, in 
the sense that we have internalized so many of  the basic frameworks that 
capitalism presents to us because we have all been acculturated by that same 
system. It is a question of  purging ourselves of  these old beliefs and 
creating new ways of  living together, and new ways of  organizing.  
 
Politics 
Finally, the political realm, the realm of  political action, is all-important. By 
this I mean a redefinition of  politics, not politics as statecraft, not politics 
of  Washington or London, but rather politics on the most basic level—
developed and applied where we live, right outside our doors in our 
neighborhoods, and our towns and our villages. And in order to realize this 
we need to create fora for directly democratic decision-making and 
institutionalize them. I have a big problem with anarchism as it developed 
in the late twentieth century because there is so much emphasis on 
individualism, so much misunderstanding of  the very nature of  society, and 
politics was rejected. Ultimately, anarchists say, “we don’t want power, we 
want to do away with power.” But you cannot do away with power. Power 
exists, and the question is how we structure it. Are we going to accept power 
over or are we going to create power with? And in order to exercise power 
with, we need to develop politics. And this means we need to create 
neighborhood assemblies, town meetings, all kinds of  fora, a kind of  
democratic confederalism. Rojava is the most inspiring example that I have 
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seen and it proves that it is possible. My personal experience also proves 
that it is possible.  
I come from the State of  Vermont. It is a small rural state. I live in a tiny 
town of  1,300 people, but for the past 200 years the town has been 
governed through a direct democracy, through town meetings. We get 
together as citizens face-to-face, we discuss the issues, and we make 
decisions as to how we intend to carry out our business over the next year. 
It works, and this is not a town made up of  anarchists or hippies. This is a 
town with a progressive element, but also a very conservative element. And 
yet, we are able to come together as neighbors, not as Democrats or 
Republicans, and find a common interest through respectful dialogue. We 
disagree. We even get angry at each other but we walk into that room as 
neighbors and we leave as neighbors. In the process of  making these 
decisions, we work through a whole series of  issues and you might say, 
“Well, that’s easy because it’s a town of  1,300, it’s tiny, it’s humanly scaled, 
that’s no problem.” However, I had a similar experience working on the 
Lower East Side of  New York, with 30,000 people, where people have 
town meetings as well. They come together and they go through this whole 
planning process. They have created a vision for the neighborhoods in their 
community, they have contested the official plans of  the city, and achieved a 
degree of  success. So I have seen it happen in larger urban settings as well.  
But it is not enough to simply create these small-scale face-to-face 
democratic fora. We need to use them as a vehicle to contest for power with 
the State. We need to use them to redefine politics, create situations in 
which there is true accountability, in which everyone has a voice about 
decisions that will affect them—a direct voice, not a mediated voice. And, 
in order to do this we need the flip side of  decentralization, the idea of  
confederation. We need to create a confederation between our local 
democracies based on a set of  common principles or ethics. I believe this is 
the ethics that social ecology endorses.  
This is the framework in which we need to move forward in these three 
interrelated areas, and no single one area, as necessary as it may be, is 
sufficient. If  we can holistically bring together these different levels of  
action and coordination and institutionalize them, we can achieve an 
ecological society. Anarchists tend to be anti-institution, but human society 
is based on institutions. There are institutions. The question is what is the 
quality of  the institution. I have been frustrated because I see many people 
embrace the idea that a new society will form spontaneously. I saw this in 
Occupy Wall Street, for example—this notion of  temporary autonomous 
zones. It is as if  that is the best we can do: a temporary autonomous 
zone—a “festival of  the oppressed”, as Marx called them. These festivals 
may last weeks, they may last months, but ultimately they dissipate because 
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we are unable to institutionalize them. We want permanent autonomous 
zones, not temporary autonomous zones. 
Clearly, there is an urgency to our situation and there is a very strong 
tendency to look to the existing means of  power in order to ameliorate the 
immediate suffering and destruction that is taking place today, and I think 
that has a certain value. But it has to be framed within a much more radical 
program. Bookchin proposed beginning with minimum demands which 
might be something that would express itself  through existing political 
channels and then you move to transitional demands. You are constantly 
pushing, and from there you move to your maximum demands. And in 
terms of  where to begin, each of  us has to determine where we can work 
most effectively, and enter into this with whatever energy we can bring to it 
and whatever generosity of  spirit, and we just need to keep pushing and 
working and recognizing. That it is not going to happen overnight, although 
there are moments where these ideas come to the fore. Then we have to be 
ready to act and institutionalize; we cannot allow them to be temporary. It is 
really a matter of  where people feel they can contribute the most, and 
where they can work most efficiently. This is where we begin.  
Thanks to Donald Trump we are facing the same problems in the US 
today as in many European countries: the rise of  fascism. I don’t know if  
people in Europe followed the events in Charlottesville last week or the 
week before, but the media reported only the fascists marching with 
torches, but there were right-wing militias that had automatic weapons and 
they out-gunned the police, which is why the police stood down. This is 
serious and I cannot offer an answer, but we have to oppose it on every 
level. We have to confront them; we have to be oppositional; we have to 
shut down the fascists. I believe this can be done non-violently, and we 
need to be ready to propose real solutions that address the root cause, 
systems based on hierarchy and domination. However, I must caution that 
moving to implement direct democracy in the US tomorrow would be a 
disaster because the consciousness is not there to support the kind of  
humanistic direct democracy that I think we all want to see. Therefore, 
education in various forms is the key. We need to change consciousness, we 
need to develop a new sensibility, and we will do that in different ways, by 
working in different groups. 
Clearly, deep divisions exist. However, my experience has been that 
when decisions are being made in a considered way by a community, some 
of  those distinctions and identities begin to break down and people find 
common ground. I think we need distance, we need to look for that 
common ground and at the same time we have to recognize that there will 
be those who oppose it. Then we need to create counter power, counter 
institutions. At the same time, we need to work to mitigate the worst 
excesses of  what is. So it happens on many different levels simultaneously. 
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It is only by moving forward in a self-conscious fashion informed by the 
kind of  theoretical framework I propose that we can begin to learn our way 




A Critique of  The Limits of  Growth from a 
Social Ecology Perspective 
Emet Değirmenci 
 
“Simplicity is the ultimate form of  sophistication” – Leonardo da Vinci 
 
The Limits to Growth was commissioned by the Club of  Rome and published 
in 1972. The cautionary message of  the report (Meadows et al., 1972) was 
intended to signal the need for reforms that would ensure the survival of  
capitalism. We are now already seeing the greening of  capitalism through 
the supply of  so-called environmentally friendly products and the “sustain-
able growth” agenda as pushed by the United Nations. But is long-term 
sustainability compatible with Capitalism’s need for growth and accumula-
tion? The report did not address the question of  the fundamentally political 
nature of  these limits, and how they challenge capitalistic notions of  quality 
of  life and development. In response to the gap, the degrowth movement 
has sought to politicize these limits in order to fundamentally challenge 
capitalist assumptions of  a “good life” and economic growth, as degrowth 
is based on creating and implementing a culture that prevents unnecessary 
consumption and production. This is possible through an open, connected 
local economy and real democratic participation through striving for a con-
vivial quality of  life. To do this it is obvious that human needs and wants 
should be reviewed radically in this so-called Anthropocene epoch. 
Today, not only is the decline in biodiversity an issue owing to global 
climate change, but many types of  ecosystem are declining and even 
collapsing. Climate statistics show that 71% of  greenhouse emissions are due 
to fossil fuel companies and their investors (Riley, 2017: 39). I am considering 
that if  we take into account that 60–70% of  the world’s population live in 
cities that are dependent on fossil fuels, then the problem becomes more 
visible in urban settings due to their dependence and modern consumption 
patterns. At the same time, cities are where the accumulation of  money, 
assets, and investment occurs. And yet, despite this, Murray Bookchin, the 
founder of  the philosophy of  social ecology, emphasizes that cities have also 
been sites of  culture and “liberatory” politics (Bookchin 1996). That is why 
cities (ideally with socially and ecologically responsible citizens) also exhibit 
the potential to bring the degrowth issue into focus in the context of  the 
“right to the city” (Harvey, 2008). 
Social ecology provides us with a framework to understand how an 
ecological crisis is closely linked to social crises. As Bookchin explores, 
unequal power relationships in society are based on human domination of  
nature and humanity itself  (Bookchin, 2005).  
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The aim of  this paper is to explore limits to growth and degrowth from 
a social ecological standpoint. I will first look at how sustainability has been 
framed in terms of  green growth. Second, I will discuss one of  my own 
initiatives as a case study about space-making in the context of  the right to 
the city in Wellington, Aotearoa (New Zealand). Third, I link the concept 
of  the commons to the proposal for a steady-state moral economy. In 
conclusion, I will focus on what sort of  growth would be appropriate from 
a social ecological perspective. As an ecofeminist, I also tie in issues of  
gender throughout the paper.  
 
A Green Growth Economy  
Many terms in the language of  sustainable development and green growth 
continue to frame nature in terms of  ownership. For instance, “natural capi-
tal”, “carbon trading”, and “polluters pay” all have materialistic and 
opportunistic meanings that serve capitalist ideologies. If  we view nature as 
capital, it does not matter how many wind turbines or solar panels are 
placed on green roofs. Putting a price on nature through “carbon trading” 
also has a false meaning. For example, pine trees are toxic to Australia’s en-
vironment. But when mining companies cease activities, they prefer to plant 
pine trees because they grow fast and their seedlings are cheap. Carbon off-
setting assumes the replicability and commensurability of  totally different 
forms of  natural value and services. “Polluters pay” is another arguable 
term. First, it gives the rich the power and opportunity to pollute. Second, it 
is difficult to identify who the polluters are and how much damage they 
have done. How would you calculate, for example, the damage to large and 
widely accessed rivers such as the Nile, the Rhine, or the Mekong? 
The growth economy also fosters polarization, as well as scarcity. 
Bookchin emphasized hierarchies and polarization in this context: “Material 
scarcity provided the historic rationale for the development of  the 
patriarchal family, private property, class domination and the state; it 
nourished the great divisions in hierarchical society that pitted town against 
country, mind against sensuousness, work against play, individual against 
society, and, finally, the individual against himself ” (Bookchin 2004: 182).  
All the disparities serve to generate insecurity in individuals and promote 
further consumption. A consumer society based on scarcity tactics aims to 
sell a variety of  products rather than looking at the issues from a holistic 
perspective.  
Sustainable development does not seem to bring any solutions at the 
grassroots level either. The Club of  Rome’s influential text emphasizes that 
the state of  global equilibrium could be designed so that the basic material 
needs of  each person on earth are satisfied and each person has an equal 
opportunity to realize his individual human potential (Meadows, 1972: 24). 
However, this raises the question: how can the individual’s basic material 
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needs be measured when living standards such as access to land and 
ownership are different from North to South? In this way, proposed 
avenues of  action remain technical and do not address the political and 
ideological nature of  the limits to growth outlined in the report.  
This presents a deep contrast to indigenous approaches to the natural 
world, since indigenous communities see themselves as belonging to nature 
as a whole, not in anthropocentric terms. Since 1998, I have observed and 
worked with some indigenous and local communities in Australia, Aotearoa 
(New Zealand), and North America through environmental campaigns and 
ecological restoration projects. These cultures do not view nature as a 
separate entity. Even so-called “non-living” features such as rocks, 
mountains, and rivers are important components in everyday life. They 
believe all living and non-living beings feed each other in a mutual way. 
Rivers, mountains, and minerals are seen as quotidian experience. They 
value the ecosystem as a whole. Furthermore, many indigenous cultures 
pass on ethics of  guardianship, not stewardship, from generation to 
generation. We should learn from them and implement their practices 
accordingly. This is the only way to reconnect with nature and repair the 
damage done in Anthropocene times.  
In the next section, I move on from the debate on “limits” to reflect on 
what a different vision of  grassroots politics may look like, inspired by my 
own experiences. 
 
The Right to the City and Space-Making  
The World Charter for the Right to the City highlights the rights that 
inhabitants of  cities can claim, including democratic management of  a city 
and equality. The UNESCO UN-HABITAT project lists five themes: 
inclusion, governance, human rights/rights-based approaches, participation 
and urban planning (Brown and Kristiansen, 2009). However, almost all 
cities feature injustice. According to current city zoning requirements, it 
seems that the need for land to build housing and grow food are the top 
priorities among various class, race, ethnic, and sexual orientation groups. 
The lower classes live on the peripheries or are pushed out of  the city 
through gentrification, because they cannot afford to live close to the city 
centre. The authorities often do not want marginalized people, such as 
ethnic minorities, people of  colour, LGBTQI communities, or the 
homeless, to be visible. 
I witnessed this when I sought to initiate a social ecological food justice 
project through women’s leadership for refugees and new migrants in 
Wellington, in 2006. We claimed a piece of  public land and education space 
for our multicultural group, which was made up of  people from eleven 
different nationalities in the central part of  the city. The city of  Wellington, 
however, insisted that we accept land at least one hour away from the city 
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centre. That neighbourhood was not only far, it was also predominantly 
inhabited by poor and marginalized communities—suggesting that the city 
seemed more comfortable if  our project appeared in more peripheral, 
marginalized areas than in the economic and cultural centre. And yet, a 
perfect spot with a building was available for us in the middle of  the city on 
a brownfield site. It was a sort of  abandoned site about two acres in size 
with an existing building. Also the soil was contaminated with DDT since it 
was an old bowling club. We were happy to clean it up. It took us three 
years to convince the city council and the predominantly white residents 
who opposed us that the project was worthwhile. Some of  them even asked 
us if  we were going to bring seeds from our home countries to invade the 
native environment. It was sad to hear that sort of  prejudice, despite the 
fact that we were working with the Maoris and some academics. It required 
energy to explain our genuine desire to help restore the natural 
environment, as well as enriching and contributing to the city’s social 
diversity. We were persistent in bringing the various groups into the city and 
meeting with the city council. After struggling with the council and the 
dominant white culture, our Innermost Gardens project was able to put its 
roots down in the fourth year. Now, the project has become one of  the 
most respected regenerative edible landscape projects in the Green Belt 
section of  Wellington. 
This experience highlighted to me the relevance of  the right to the city 
concept, as first defined by Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey. If  we 
consider the right to the city in the context of  space-making, Grégory 
Busquet elaborates Lefebvre’s work on space and justice: 
 
Space is a crucial dimension of  human societies and reflects social facts 
and influences social relations. Consequently, both justice and injustice 
become visible in space. Therefore, the analysis of  the interactions 
between space and society is necessary to understand social injustices and 
to formulate territorial policies aiming at tackling them. Planning policies 
that aims to reduce them. …However, the diversity of  definitions of  
“Justice” (and of  the possible “social contracts” that legitimate them), is 
high and the political objectives of  regional planning or urban planning 
can be quite different and even contradictory. (Busquet, 2012: 2) 
 
Busquet here points out that planning and policy-making regarding public 
spaces can be either inclusive or exclusive for different disadvantaged 
groups. If  we recall the Innermost Gardens project, unless Wellington city 
drafts a policy to offer a diversity of  cultural, ecological, and social spaces in 
the city, new groups like us will have similar difficulties in future. 
Historian and city planner Lewis Mumford emphasized the city as a 
community in which everyone is responsible for their everyday activity 
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(Mumford, 1970: 89). As shown by Bookchin, this requires active 
citizenship. In The Limits of  The City Bookchin wrote: 
 
For all its collectivism and strong bonds of  solidarity, tribal society was 
surprisingly patriarchal. Based on kinship, however fictitious its reality, the 
tribe rooted its affiliations in lineage ties or what I call the “blood oath”. 
(Bookchin, 1986: 52) 
 
Since there are not many matrilineal communities in the world, tribal roots 
often pass through male links. Men maintain authority for the sake of  the 
tribe. Hence Bookchin’s term “blood oath” recalls violence and exclusion. 
Bookchin envisions a city with its cosmopolitan potential where people can 
mingle: 
 
The city corresponded to the creation of  spaces where “insiders” and 
“outsiders” met and decided their affairs together, spaces where 
citizenship was a constantly reworked, dynamic and organic process. In 
this way, at best, political decision-making in cities was independent of  
ties of  kinship or ethnicity. Accordingly, “the city” is a type of  settlement 
where “people advance beyond the kinship bond to share, create, and 
develop the means for life, culturally as well as economically, as human 
beings”. (Bookchin, 1992: 173) 
 
In a city, citizenship extends beyond kinship ties to create spaces of  social 
justice that go beyond kinship. It can be based on citizenship and 
responsibilities of  space to create a shared justice concept like in Portland city 
in Oregon, US, where it is easy for all citizens to intermingle regardless of  
ethnicity, class, race, and sexual orientation. The project is called City Repair1. 
The project not only encourages conversation and connection between 
neighbours via the circular street intersections, but it is also building a lively 
living space with ecological and social principles for hundreds of  homeless 
people as well. If  there was any blood-related or ethno-centric agenda during 
the city-wide transformation, the project would not have been possible. Rigid 
boundaries, such as defining insiders as blood-related, can create fragile 
situations that can easily lead to conflict. 
Finally, Harvey claims that transforming cities towards social justice is a 
common process: “The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty 
to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. 
It is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this transformation 
inevitably depends upon the exercise of  a collective power to reshape the processes of  
urbanization” (Harvey, 2008: 25). In the Innermost Gardens project, for 
instance, we have attempted to change our concept of  multiculturalism 
instead of  integration, which is a false tabloid concept. Multiculturalism is 
not only food, music, and dancing girls. Multiculturalism can use actual 
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voices and ideas to contribute to a city’s biodiversity, as well as its cultural 
diversity. This makes a local culture resilient and strong, as though it was a 
kind of  ecosystem. I believe that an edible landscape project such as 
Innermost Gardens has the potential to contribute to local transformation in a 
positive way socially and culturally. There is no need to be afraid of  the sort 
of  complexity that is recognizable in healthy ecological systems. 
 
Commons for a “Steady-State Economy” 
Although it’s root can be traced to Herman Daly (1973), the phrase “steady-
state economy” brought to our attention the concept of  sustainable 
economics from an ecological point of  view. According to the Center for 
the Advancement of  the Steady-State Economy (CASSE) site:  
 
The term typically refers to a national economy, but it can also be applied 
to a local, regional, or global economy. An economy can reach a steady 
state after a period of  growth or after a period of  downsizing or 
degrowth. To be sustainable, a steady-state economy may not exceed 
ecological limits. (CASSE, 2019) 
 
Gathering resources in a common pool and sharing them in a village-sized 
community is not a transformative practice in itself. Before the advent of  
capitalism in the eighteenth century, it was the most common form of  land 
management. Let us explore how commoning may help to transform a 
society. The commons are spaces of  social reproduction accessed equally by 
all, without intervention by the State or the market. Production takes place 
under collective labour and equal access to resources of  production. The 
idea of  the commons also refers to collective activities of  production and 
reproduction. It means inclusiveness, belonging, and sharing the outcome 
together as a group or as a community. 
Commons may fail when privately owned. This is called the “tragedy of  
the commons”, a term coined by Garrett Hardin (1968) to define the eight-
eenth century land-grabbing and enclosure movement in England. Hardin 
emphasized that commons can fail from over-exhaustion caused by taking 
too many resources. Elinor Ostrom, on the other side, analysed tragedy of  
the commons from a political economy point of  view, particularly self-
organizing and self-governing institutions. She pointed out that mutuality 
and reciprocity are essential for the success of  common pool resources 
(CPRs). Individuals using CPRs are viewed as if  they are capable of  short-
term maximization, but not of  long-term reflection about joint strategies to 
improve joint outcomes (Ostrom, 1990: 216). It is true that, a commons 
may fail if  the community does not bring a continuous reinvigorating energy 
and joy to the common space for the common good, or the commons is 
not managed in a self-governing way. The exhaustion of  ecosystems can be 
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seen in any former commons. I observed such a tragedy in my own village 
in the Aegean region of  Turkey during the 1970s. A parcel of  common land 
was allocated for grazing village animals. The herd was comprised of  ani-
mals from every household with one person taking care of  the herd every 
day. Even the job did not invoke gender politics. Villagers were flexible in 
giving the responsibility to a different man or a woman every day. While a 
mature woman’s appearance was not acceptable in public spaces, this job of  
sharing for the commons made them free in public spaces. The problem 
began when people decided to keep a number of  animals in their own indi-
vidual pastures. The common lands gave them extra benefits without 
putting any effort or minimum effort in. When individual plot pastures 
were exhausted the people took advantage of  the common lands. This 
brought about exhaustion in both common land and in the community’s 
capacity to organize the common property. After a couple of  years, the 
common lands were privatized. However, Hardin’s view and my example 
may not be valid in some cases, because there are many successful examples 
of  surviving commons around the world. Traditional communities are creat-
ing local commons by tracing their ecological practices back in time. For 
example, there is a successful example in Rajasthan, India. They recharged 
groundwater and restored a large irrigation system by creating small dams 
through women’s leadership in 1989. Even the engineering and fundraising 
was done through women’s leadership. They are known as “Rajasthan’s wa-
ter warriors”. Thousands of  old earthen dams called johads were replenished 
with underground water as well. This was a 10-year effort led by village 
committees. They practiced direct democracy. This is a good example of  
the struggle against drought: “Close to 10,000 johad systems and other water 
collecting and conserving structures [were created] in approximately 1,200 
villages and 19 districts of  Rajasthan during the past 28 years” (Suutari and 
Marten, 2005: np). Since the irrigation issue was resolved, their well-being 
increased and crime and violence reduced significantly, because some pro-
gressive cooperatives were built. This also helped economic justice, and 
collective abundance is the result. Another example is from Rojava, in north-
ern Syria, where a women’s cooperative called Jinwar lays mud bricks. They 
have engineered an ecovillage project, and say “this will be the first women’s 
village and the most radical response to the male-dominant mindset in the 
Middle East” (Cooperative Economy, 2017). 
In a degrowth strategy, a moral economy is the answer for a self-
governing institution. Let us bear in mind that degrowth requires voluntary 
simplicity to reduce consumption for material needs. Rather than GDP as 
measurement of  growth, ecological economics becomes the implementation 
of  regenerative and restorative practices. 
Commoning is an alternative to the growth economy because it means 
voluntarily limiting the extraction of  natural resources. It helps reduce 
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carbon emissions by saving energy and water. However, the examples above 
show that commoning is a dynamic collective activity, which requires 
continuous attention to keep going in the right direction. There is still a risk 
of  reversal through privatization. Any community trying to recreate the 
commons should be careful about the potential for this to occur. 
In a degrowth strategy, a stable-state moral economy would fit well with 
this commoning process. Degrowth strategy should be based on a moral 
economy with ecological restoration, rather than extraction from nature, and 
have a social and economic justice dimension. Recall that degrowth requires 
voluntary simplicity to reduce consumption for material needs. Rather than 
GDP as a measurement of  growth, the Index of  Sustainable Welfare can be used 
as the indication of  a stable-state moral economy.  
This is why the moral economy embodies norms and sentiments 
regarding the responsibilities and rights of  individuals and institutions with 
respect to others. These norms and sentiments go beyond matters of  
justice and equality to conceptions of  the good, for example, regarding the 
needs and ends of  economic activity. They might also be extended further 
to include treatment of  the environment (Sayer, 2004: 6). 
For a steady-state moral economy in the context of  ecological economics, 
biophysical and social indicators seem appropriate for a regenerative and 
restorative transition, as opposed to the “extractivist” behaviour of  the 
capitalist growth economy: “The great challenge of  degrowth is how to 
maintain (or even enhance) the well-being of  the planet’s citizens while global 
resource use and waste production are being reduced to within ecological 
limits. Social indicators are needed to ensure that quality of  life is maintained 
or improved by degrowth and not diminished by it” (O’Neill, 2011). Indeed, 
waste reduction for a healthy environment must be the main focus since the 
growth economy produces an enormous amount of  waste, including toxic 
types. Quality of  life could be measured from many different perspectives, 
such as happiness. When a system reaches a stable stage, that point could 
indicate the achievement of  stability. While society should have a new way of  
living, it is possible to keep the equilibrium at a stable state at a global level. 
 
What Sorts of  Growth do We Want?  
There is no doubt that Limits to Growth brought us green consumerist 
literature. In other words, Limits to Growth neither helps to create a 
vocabulary to limit consumption nor does it prevent the declining natural 
resources which, we all agree, are limited. This is because most green 
developments are, in the end, based on growth in capitalist society. It means 
that consumerism is just replacing so-called “green” products—recall the 
shopping bags that are made of  GMO corn which are coming into vogue.  
The reality of  nature’s limits requires clear ethics to reassess human 
needs, wants, and desires. As ecofeminist and social ecologist Chaia Heller 
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underlines, “Our new ways of  desiring nature entail changes not only in 
personal life-style and outlook, but changes in social institutions as well” 
(Heller, 1999: 102). The feminist movement contributed an important 
phrase to social movements: “the personal is political”. Hence, personal 
lifestyles are interconnected with social life. This applies to institutions as 
well. We can follow a path in which our needs, wants, and desires serve to 
regenerate nature and repair the social relations that help to revolutionize 
social institutions.  
Bookchin distinguished human evolution in regards to the relationship 
with nature as “first nature” and “second nature”. He named nature as “first 
nature”, which becomes “second nature” through human intervention 
(Bookchin, 2005). Through the relationship between these two arise dynamics 
of  domination over nature and domination over human (and between gen-
ders). As human beings, we have created social ecosystems and many sorts of  
hierarchy, such as men’s domination of  woman, the boss’s domination of  
labour, white people’s domination of  people of  colour, dominant cultures’ 
domination of  ethnics, and so on. However, all these hierarchies can be re-
solved by learning from nature. Nature cooperates rather than competes. For 
instance, from my long-term observation during my landscape management 
practices, most trees cooperate to reach sunlight and share the minerals in the 
root system. Of  course, there are also some opportunistic invasive plants that 
are not native to the local environments. This process makes them a part of  
natural evolution. That is why from second nature evolution comes third na-
ture which brings social diversity and ecological complexity. Democratic and 
participatory technological development plays a vital role in the social eco-
logical realization of  an emancipated society. Bookchin emphasizes the 
hierarchical concept: “Organic societies are not yet divided into the classes 
and bureaucracies based on exploitation that we find in hierarchical society” 
(Bookchin, 2004: 167).  
From a true ecological design perspective, if  a city is designed in an eco-
logical way it does not generate waste. Of  course, municipal education, 
voluntary practices and incorporation of  citizens are significant compo-
nents here. In this way, a city is considered a big ecosystem. I can draw on 
my ecological design experience, in which every element is linked to serve 
not only mutual support, but also to provide multiple functions at the 
neighbourhood level. Since all human activities are supposed to be circu-
lated in the closed system, one system’s output can be an input for the 
following system. This is how chickens gain protein from a compost pile, 
and produce eggs and feathers as well as resolving the compost problem. 
Transformation in everyday life through genuine ecological society is 
necessary by consuming less and by building radical commons. Environ-
mental scientist, degrowth activist, and writer Giorgos Kallis, who is critical 
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to utilitarianism, explains how degrowth and welfare is possible through 
alternative economics:  
 
First, reconstructing the commons; second, reclaiming state decoupling 
well-being such as basic income, public money, work-sharing, carbon caps 
and taxes; third, political organizing (Kallis 2015: 31’40”).  
 
I agree that adjusting the economy to cap carbon, rather than allowing car-
bon trading, is important for the reasons outlined above in the section on 
green development. The carbon economy only assists the greening of  capi-
talism. The point is how to reorganize society in a non-hierarchical way. 
Also I prefer to say government instead of  the State as a criticism to Kallis. 
I believe that we need to reorganize institutions in a degrowth economy, but 
not through the State. If  we want to transform cities into organic eco-
communities, as Lefebvre and Bookchin proposed, reorganizing institutions 
accordingly will bring a lot of  chaos. For social ecologists, challenging po-
litical and economic power and creating alternatives through municipalism 
is strategically important. Chaia Heller explains Bookchin’s municipalism 
concept with a community spirit:  
 
We must develop a new understanding of  citizenship that is not defined 
in relation to capital or the nation-state but instead, defined in opposition 
to capital and the nation-state. We may become revolutionary citizens 
defined in relation to local communities that are part of  a larger 
confederation of  self-governing bodies. We may become “a community 
of  communities”. This new way of  thinking about political regeneration is 
called libertarian municipalism. (Heller, 1999: 12) 
 
Heller here also criticises the Nation-State, which we do not need. Instead, 
we need to revolutioneer the institutions that create and serve equity and 
well-being. 
Democratic and participatory technological development plays a vital 
role in the social ecological realization of  an emancipated society. Further-
more, a socially and ecologically diverse society keeps its roots strong. A 
decentralized city requires a municipal level of  non-hierarchical governance. 
This can be applied to degrowth for self-determination and active citizen-
ship as social ecology brings self-determination by opposing any form of  
domination. When people begin to enjoy helping to resolve their problems 
through direct democracy, as happened in the autonomous Syrian region of  
Rojava, it is possible to create alternatives in a social ecological way—even 
in a war zone. 
In the end, yes, we need to limit growth, re-assess our real needs, and 
simplify life, as well as restore natural so-called “resources” because it has 
gone beyond saving resources now. We need to concentrate on how to 
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clean up the soil, air, and recharge underground water. Here is my view of  
utopia. I dream of  a city that is more regenerative and self-reliant via its 
local resources and self-sufficiency through direct democracy principles. I 
dream of  a city, that is connected to surrounding towns at a bioregional 
level and resources locally managed. I dream of  engaging public spaces 
such as community gardens, urban agricultural sites, wildlife zones, spaces 
for art and craft activities—also to share stories. I also dream of  an 
inclusive city—along ethical, racial, economic, and gender lines. I dream of  
a city economy no longer subservient to capitalism’s “grow or die” 
dilemma. Material accumulation will no longer hold as much social kudos, 
since the radical commons will play vital roles. I want a city of  conviviality 
and frugality, a harmonious place for its own citizens. I want a “convivial” 
(Ilych 1973) city which is continuously evolving with its commons through 
the joy of  politics in everyday life. I want a city that serves its citizens with 
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Is the Right to the City a Right or a Revolution? 
Magali Fricaudet 
 
From a catastrophist point of  view, we could probably say that the 
unprecedented rate of  urbanization that the world is currently experiencing 
is a realization of  the more destructive tendencies of  capitalism, where life 
is at serious stake. Indeed, urbanization seems to have no end, as the 
ideology of  growth predominates. In 1920, urban centres represented just 
30 per cent of  the world population; the proportion of  urban dwellers over 
rural ones will be inverted around 2030—rising to 66 per cent according to 
the UN Human Settlement Programme, UN-Habitat.1 In that context, since 
the late 1990s, Henri Lefebvre’s “right to the city” has appeared as a claim 
among a diversity of  voices—from neighbourhood struggles to local 
government calls for local democracy—that denounces the “competitive 
city model”.  
As cities increasingly represent centres of  capital accumulation, and the 
commodification of  life in all its aspects, Lefebvre’s The Right to the City is all 
the more poignant as an inspiration for the “urban revolution” that he 
called for as a social practice. Conceiving the right to the city based on its 
use value, instead of  its exchange value, as a way to free citizens from private 
property and spatialized class relations, has influenced a diversity of  
interpretations and practices that share the goal to take back the city as a 
common good—a place for collective emancipation and freedom. At the 
same time, the exercise of  municipal power inspired by the right to the city, 
in the case of  municipalist experiences in Spain since 2014, have also shown 
the limits of  realizing such rights at the local level, as well as the 
contradictions in exercising institutional power in the hegemonic capitalist 
city model.  
 
The Paradigm of  the Urban Miracle, or How Global Capitalism 
Has Reached Massive Consent  
The preamble of  the “New Urban Agenda”, adopted by UN-Habitat 
member States at Quito in October 2016, enshrines the blindness of  the so-
called “international community” through describing urbanization as an 
unprecedented opportunity for humanity, and cities as great engines of  growth.  
PART 2: 
ENGAGING WITH THE RIGHT TO THE CITY 
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The current hegemonic view of  cities corresponds to what Bookchin 
denounced as a poor “spatial and demographic” conception, “viewing the 
city as an area occupied by a closely interlocked, densely populated human 
community”—a definition in “quantitative terms”. That is, totally in 
contradiction with his view on the city, which he considered to be a 
“uniquely human, ethical and ecological community whose members often 
lived in balance with nature and created institutional forms that sharpened 
human self-awareness, fostered rationality, created a secularized culture, 
enhanced individuality and established institutional forms of  freedom” 
(Bookchin, Urbanization against Cities, Black Rose Books, 1992, Introduction, 
p. XIV). In Bookchin’s perception, citification does not mean an opposition 
between nature and human beings. Referring to what Cicero called a 
“second nature”, that is “a humanly made nature that exists in balance with 
the first nature” (ibid, Introduction, p. X), citification is a realization of  the 
natural mutualist tendency of  humans to gather and form freely consenting 
communities. This is why Bookchin denounced urbanization as a result of  
the accumulation of  power by some elites, based on individualism and 
endless consumption as a “cancerous phenomenon”.  
Today, cities are where 80 per cent of  global GDP is produced and, 
although cities are responsible for 70 per cent of  greenhouse gas emissions 
and inequalities at city levels have grown faster than at national levels in the 
past two decades,2 UN-Habitat affirms that “good management and 
planning processes” could counter these negative externalities.  
Megacities have grown at an unprecedented rate; in 2015, there were 503 
cities of  more than one million inhabitants, compared with 162 in 1975. 
Large metropolitan areas are key hubs of  value in the international 
economy, representing huge markets and extremely rapid flows of  capital. 
They are strategic places of  specialization within the international division 
of  work, as some cities in the global south, such as Dhaka, Bangladesh, 
host a very cheap workforce with limited labour rights, while others, such as 
London, New York or Tokyo, compete to be centres of  high-level decision-
making within the markets and where elites are concentrated. Cities are 
central to the capitalist economy as they also represent huge markets, where 
“consumption” patterns belie high levels of  inequality. Most of  the time, 
the mass of  “urban poor” settled in the “informal neighbourhoods” of  
peripheral areas are compelled to pay higher prices for basic services, which 
the public sector does not provide.  
With 1 billion people living in slums among over 3 billion urban dwellers, 
cities have become the only viable option for a large number of  internal and 
external migrants, pushed around by global climate change, and free trade 
agreements imposed by the European Union, Canada and United States on 
their countries, devastating their agriculture. Most people move to urban areas 
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with the hope of  accessing the kinds of  services and opportunities concen-
trated in cities.  
As David Harvey (2003) writes, city economies are also largely based on 
a process of  “accumulation by dispossession”, meaning that in front of  the 
high demand for urban land and housing, the unregulated real estate market 
is realizing huge profits on people’s homes, creating massive segregation 
processes. Indeed, the real estate market was so high in the global markets 
during the subprime crisis of  2008 that it marked the beginning of  a global 
financial and economic crisis, unprecedented since the 1930s. According to 
Saskia Sassen (2016), the huge flows of  international capital onto real estate 
markets in some metropolises, such as London, are now provoking much 
further consequences than gentrification: they replace traditional elites with 
international ones (Sassen, 2016)—the famous 1 per cent that controls 82 
per cent of  the wealth (Oxfam, 2018). The UN Special Rapporteur on 
housing rights, in her report of  February 2017, commented: 
 
The value of  global real estate is about US$ 217 trillion, nearly 60 per cent 
of  the value of  all global assets, with residential real estate comprising 75 
per cent of  the total. … Housing is at the centre of  an historic structural 
transformation in global investment and the economies of  the 
industrialized world with profound consequences for those in need of  
adequate housing. (Report of  the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a 
component of  the right to an adequate standard of  living, and on the right to non-
discrimination in this context A/HRC/34/51, p. 3) 
 
At the same time, fierce urbanization has led to a progressive concentration 
of  power in some decentralized metropolitan areas, and resistance move-
ments have developed locally and globally.  
 
Lefebvre and the Philosophy of  Urban Revolution  
In the late 1960s, from the radical urban sociologist, the “Marxian” Henri 
Lefebvre, The Right to the City called for “the right to urban life, to a renewed 
centrality, to places of  meetings and exchanges, to a rhythm of  life that 
allows the full and entire use of  these moments and places”. 3 For Lefebvre, 
the right to the city refers both to a social practice of  the working class that 
defends the use value of  the city, instead of  its exchange value, and to a 
narrative that he calls “urban revolution”. Lefebvre refers to a post-modern 
acceptation of  the working class as the “dispossessed of  the city”. Lefebvre 
writes, “As one hundred years ago,4 although in new conditions, the 
working class gather the interests (beyond time and superficiality) of  the 
whole society and first of  all, of  those who inhabit” (Ibid, p. 108).5  
He refers to the inhabitants as suffering the misery of  “everydayness”, 
as managed by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie leading the city. The 
everydayness of  the students, of  the intellectuals, of  the workers, of  the 
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colonized who go every day from their house to the station to take a 
crowded train or bus to go to the office and go back home to begin again 
the day after. He pictures the generalized misery of  the masses that escape 
or dissimulate the poorness of  everyday life through the satisfactions of  
urban society, such as commodified culture, hobbies and even nature.  
Lefebvre denounces urbanism and the functionalist approach of  cities as 
a political process that underpins the financial sector, which together 
produces space and alienated time, thus producing power. The technocratic 
approach of  capitalist power to produce the city and space separates the 
functions of  life originally gathered in cities in order to produce and 
reproduce class relations.  
In Marxist theory, social classes are defined as a function of  their posi-
tion in the relations of  production between capital and work in industrial 
society. The modern urbanization phenomenon makes this frame of  analy-
sis burst. Lefebvre introduces space and the production of  space as the 
centre of  the production of  social relations and of  the reproduction of  the 
relations of  production, because of  the increasing exchange value of  space. 
In that regard, western cities, from the political cities of  antiquity and the 
commercial cities of  the middle ages have suffered from the increase of  
exchange relations created by capitalist elites. The critical turning point of  
the city is the process of  industrialization–urbanization at the end of  the 
eighteenth century, which made the city burst, leading to its expansion in a 
dialectic phenomenon of  explosion–implosion. So space and inertia ex-
plains the survival of  capitalism and the eternally renewed expectation of  
the final crisis.  
Rational planning of  the production, organization of  the territory, in-
dustrialization and urbanization are essential features of  the “socialization 
of  society”, which fix predetermined functions in the space of  the city and 
allow it to maintain order. In that regard, urban struggles, through re-
owning the city, are strategic in the struggle against capital (Claire Revol, 
2017).  
Thus the space of  cities depends on class strategies that produce a seg-
regation of  urban spaces, demolishing the idea of  cities as shared common 
spaces, and of  the centrality of  the notion of  the social form of  the city—
one of  gathering and coexistence. In that sense, as Bookchin does, Lefebvre 
shows that throughout history, cities have been the work of  societies, 
spaces that relate to usage and urban life instead of  the product of  an ex-
change value. The right to the city is a claim for transforming life through 
transforming cities, creating them as collective pieces of  work. Hence, the 
praxis of  the right to the city refers to the ideas of  struggle and celebration 
at the same time. Lefebvre used to refer to the creative dimension of  the 
Commune of  Paris as a way for the working classes to take back the city 
that Haussman’s work had spoilt from people. Against the functionalist city 
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that separates the diverse dimensions of  life in the space, he invites us to 
take back citizenship through creativity, spontaneity and self-organization 
processes of  re-owning the city. In that sense, he is in tune with the May 68 
movement.  
Indeed, Lefebvre was a researcher and teacher at the University of  
Nanterre, a newly built campus located between the slums of  the Parisian 
working class periphery. The May 68 movement really began on 22 March 
1968 in the University of  Nanterre when a group of  students occupied the 
administration tower of  the campus, denouncing the arbitrary authority of  
the so-called “Mandarin”, the omnipotent administrative council of  the 
university led by professors. His group of  researchers from the philosophy 
department of  Nanterre inspired the 68 movement. When referring to the 
idea of  celebration and enjoyment of  the city, his thought is situated in an 
insurrectional and creative movement, strongly marked by leftist ideals that 
demand freedom and new models against the class domination of  work and 
consumption.  
 
The Emergence of  the Right to the City as a Global Claim for 
Socio-Spatial Justice  
Since the 1970s, Lefebvre’s ideas have acted as a reference for diverse forms 
of  insurgent citizenship that claims ownership of  the city—in front of  
massive investments that evict people from cities, in front of  gentrification 
processes. They also constitute a theoretical basis for movements that oc-
cupy public space against its privatization. The South African movement 
Abahlali baseMjondolo,6 inspired by Lefebvre, defends the legitimacy of  
squatters to occupy urban space. They argue against the interpretation by 
the government of  the World Bank’s slogan “cities without slums”, which 
has led to evictions through entitling the owners of  shacks (but not dwell-
ers) as land tenants and through privatizing the management of  services in 
renewed neighbourhoods. In Durban, 2006, this movement assembled 
50,000 shack dwellers from across the country to fight for land reforms and 
dignity. They occupy land as a way of  reclaiming the dispossession–
urbanization process, and denounce the accumulation of  land by elites, as 
well as the inaction of  the South African State to fulfil social housing pro-
grammes. The anti-State7 process approach of  this movement clearly fits 
within Lefebvre’s vision (Marianne Morange, 2017).  
At the same time, Lefebvre insisted that the most revolutionary princi-
ples of  the right to the city would include land reform, as this would have 
occurred during revolutions of  the agrarian age, where the tenancy of  land 
was key to freeing peasants and agrarian workers from landlords. For 
Lefebvre, the collective tenure of  land in cities against private property, 
which maintains the monopoly of  production of  space under financial 
interests, is one of  the key issues of  the urban revolution.8  
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The social function of  land and the city as a strong feature of  the right 
to the city has inspired the claim of  many unentitled occupants, mainly in 
Latin America where urban rights and human rights have a long common 
history. Supported by NGOs such as Habitat International Coalition (HIC) 
in their struggle to stay in the city and be recognized as city producers, the 
right to the city became a more holistic claim than the right to housing in 
the late 1990s. Promoted through the World Inhabitants Assembly during 
the Earth Summit of  Rio in 1992 under the banner “cities for life, not for 
profit”, HIC developed a “World Charter for the Right to the City”, later 
adopted by social movements in the World Social Forum in 2005. The 
Charter was developed as an instrument to promote the recognition and 
legislation of  human rights in an urban context and to change the narrative 
around the “urban poor” as beneficiaries of  tiny neighbourhood improve-
ment programmes. In the context of  the Charter, the right to the city is 
defined as: 
 
the equitable usufruct of  cities within the principles of  sustainability, 
democracy, equity, and social justice. It is the collective right of  the 
inhabitants of  cities, in particular of  the vulnerable and marginalized 
groups, that confers upon them legitimacy of  action and organization, 
based on their uses and customs, with the objective to achieve full exercise 
of  the right to free self-determination and an adequate standard of  living. The 
Right to the City is interdependent of  all internationally recognized and integrally 
conceived human rights, and therefore includes all the civil, political, 
economic, social, cultural and environmental rights which are already 
regulated in the international human rights treaties. (World Charter for the 
Right to the City, Art. 2 )  
 
The World Charter is a compromise, the result of  its institutional purpose 
to serve as an advocacy tool aimed at introducing the right to the city in 
international, national and local legislation as an urban component of  the 
“right to development” and as a way to protect people from the arbitrary 
power of  city developers. This claim has received strong opposition from 
governments, mainly in international negotiations around the so-called 
“New Urban Agenda”, The Declaration of  Quito (2016) where the inclu-
sion of  the right to the city and some of  its principles, such as the social value 
of  land and the city or the prevention of  forced evictions, in the international 
document crystallized tense discussions between the richest countries (led by 
the US and the EU) and some Latin American countries, such as Mexico, 
Chile, and Ecuador.  
In the meantime, by the end of  the twentieth century, Lefebvre’s The 
Right to the City had inspired local and national legislations trying to counter-
balance the commodification of  land, housing and, most generally, the city. 
One of  the most famous examples is the Brazilian Constitution of  1988, 
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translated into the City Statute of  2001. The City Statute refers to the “so-
cial function of  property”, introducing tools to control the land, facilitating 
the regularization of  occupying people and establishing financial mecha-
nisms to correct socio-spatial inequalities. In 2008, the Constitution of  
Ecuador enshrines the right to the city in the following words: 
 
Persons have the right to fully enjoy the city and its public spaces, on the 
basis of  principles of  sustainability, social justice, respect for different ur-
ban cultures and a balance between the urban and rural sectors. Exercising 
the right to the city is based on the democratic management of  the city, 
with respect to the social and environmental function of  property and the 
city and with the full exercise of  citizenship. (Art.11). 
 
This institutionalization of  the right to the city also questions the polysemi-
otic notion of  rights that Lefebvre used. A right is essentially attached to all 
human beings as a guarantee against arbitrariness (civil and political rights) and 
a guarantee of  decent life (economic, cultural and environmental rights). Rights 
are instruments protected and guaranteed by nation-states and aim at pro-
tecting people against the arbitrary power of  those same states. Lefebvre’s 
initial conception was probably more performative in the sense of  affirm-
ing a right as a social practice and a perspective for urban revolution. For 
Lefebvre, who was a dialectical thinker, “in difficult conditions, within this 
society that cannot totally oppose them but at the same time block them, 
rights are finding their way, defining civilization (rights are at the same time 
in and against society, through but often against culture.)”,9 he writes. At the 
same time, the polysemiotic nature of  the word right intrinsically connects 
the right to the city with a diversity of  interpretations and that is perhaps 
the more powerful meaning of  the right to the city, although it could also 
be its main weakness as this makes it vulnerable to possible misunderstand-
ings.  
In a rough capitalist urbanization context, the right to the city is an in-
spiration for an approach that protects the use value against the voracious 
appetites of  the markets. Are the experiences of  municipalism relevant for 
the process of  taking back the city against the long-lasting process of  capi-
talist dispossession that the people of  cities have suffered?  
 
Municipalities: At the Forefront of  the Right to the City?  
From the beginning of  the 2000s, under the lead of  Porto Alegre and 
Barcelona City Hall, the locally elected Left took their place in parallel with 
the World Social Forum as a place to renew political views after the collapse 
of  the Soviet bloc.  
In that framework, locally elected representatives of  urban social 
movements and NGOs enabled a dialogue that led to discussions around 
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the narrative of  the right to the city as an alternative to the “competitive 
and smart city” model. As a result of  this process, the “Global Charter 
Agenda for Human Rights in the City”, adopted in 2011 in the framework 
of  the organization United Cities and Local Governments,10 refers to the 
right to the city.  
Later, in 2016, the right to the city became a common claim around the 
preparation of  the Habitat III Summit. Through the Global Platform for 
the Right to the City,11 created by the HIC and Polis Institute (a Brazilian 
NGO that has supported the Brazilian movements of  occupants in the city 
and pushed for the adoption of  the City Statute), NGOs, searchers and 
local governments gathered to advocate for the inclusion of  the right to the 
city in the New Urban Agenda.  
In 2010, the Charter for the Right to the City of  the city of  Mexico, 
driven by social movements, represented a further step in the 
institutionalization of  the right to the city. Without enough binding 
processes to translate it into concrete actions, it defines a framework of  
shared responsibility between the various actors within the city. The right to 
the city rests upon six principles:  
 
1) respect, protection and realisation of  all human rights (civic, 
political, economic, social, cultural and environmental); 
2) the social function of  property, land and the city; 
3) the democratic governance of  villages, towns and metropolitan 
areas, which supposes a strong decentralization framework; 
4) recognition of  the social production of  habitat and of  the 
social and solidarity-based nature of  the economy, as 
supported by the social production of  habitat; 
5) democratic and collective management of  common goods—
environmental and cultural—through a global vision that is not 
limited by administrative boundaries; 
6) the protection and improvement of  public spaces, including 
infrastructure and community facilities, through supporting 
inhabitants’ initiatives and precluding privatization. 
 
This reformist view of  the right to the city has influenced the creation of  
community-based district improvement programmes, initiated by civil 
society organizations and then included as public policy. For example, 
Mexico City is often used as a reference against the World Bank doctrine of  
“cities without slums”. The translation of  the right to the city into local 
public policies underlines the tensions that constitute the city, resulting in a 




Since the 2015 municipal elections in Spain, it seems that other narra-
tives have appeared that affirm the centrality of  the right to the city and the 
ownership of  people before capitalist interests. After the occupations of  
places in 2011, the “indignados” rooted the movement into neighbourhood 
assemblies. In the Spanish municipal elections of  2014, in 60 towns and 
cities, local coalitions comprised of  diverse struggles and movements and 
supported by leftist and ecological parties structured themselves to take the 
city back. Their organization was based on strong ethical codes to prevent 
corruption and to guarantee accountability of  locally elected representa-
tives, and on participatory programmes based on feminized politics in 
contrast to the conception of  a concentrated and competitive exercise of  
power. Cities meant the possibility of  changing everyday life, implementing 
mutualist and community-based solutions, which nation-states (with their 
promiscuous relationships with private interests) are incapable of. Spanish 
municipalism relies on the commons as a necessary alternative to the mar-
ket. It organizes programmes that articulate movements and heterogeneous 
spaces of  struggle, which have thus far acted in parallel (ecologists, activists 
for water as a common good, activists for the right to health and education, 
feminist groups, anti-racist movements, hackers, and supporters of  free cul-
ture and of  the neutrality of  networks, defenders of  social and solidarity 
economy, etc.) (Subirats, 2018).  
Nevertheless, in more than three years of  exercising power—sometimes 
based on weak majorities in the councils—their impact on the disastrous 
effects of  the financialized economy have been limited. The structure of  
the administration based on rigid hierarchies and limited decentralization 
strongly limits their capacity for action. In Barcelona, for instance, the team 
of  Ada Colau (the mayor elected on a municipalist agenda who came from 
a housing rights movement) made strong efforts to take back empty 
buildings and spaces to create housing cooperatives, to negotiate with banks 
to create social housing in the flats left empty by mortgage-related evictions, 
to fine Airbnb and landlords who rent flats without authorisation, to count 
and tax vacant housing, to stop touristic flats and hotel in the city centre, to 
purchase property for social housing, to impose restrictions that every new 
construction or rehabilitation project includes a minimum of  30 per cent of  
affordable housing. Yet, despite all of  these measures, the rental market 
housing speculation process is at a climax in Barcelona. The exercise of  
power in cities, which is intrinsically marked by a diversity of  interests, is 
always inherently contradictory.  
For instance, one of  the more paradoxical aspects of  governing is that 
Barcelona’s administration, in order to fight real estate companies operating 
in connivance with drug dealers, is now closing empty flats and installing 
anti-squatter doors in the popular central neighbourhood of  the Raval. 
Indeed, after the mortgage crisis of  2008, leading to the eviction of  
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thousands of  dwellers from their flats in Barcelona, a high quantity of  
housing was reclaimed by banks and remained vacant. Now that the prices 
of  housing are increasing again under the pressure of  tourism and few 
rental properties are available, real estate companies have been accused of  
collaborating with drug dealers to despoil the district of  the Raval. In 2016, 
a wave of  flat occupations by drug dealers led to the mobilization of  their 
neighbours, denouncing their occupation, and the violence associated with 
drug dealing and the speculative goal of  these occupations. Organizing 
through WhatsApp, and gathering to denounce traffickers in the streets, 
neighbourhood groups prompted the end of  speculative “narco-flats”. In 
front of  the inaction of  international banks and investment funds to evict 
occupying dealers from their properties—despite City Hall demands—the 
elected team had no alternative other than to use police intervention to 
evict dealers from the flats and close them with anti-squatter doors.  
Another contradictory action of  Barcelona’s municipality was also be 
the way that City Hall acted towards the Senegalese street vendors, who 
survive by selling counterfeit goods. Indeed, under pressure from local 
merchants to denounce the unfair competition from street vendors, in the 
summer 2016, Barcelona City Hall launched an anti-counterfeit campaign in 
multiple languages—inviting people not to buy from illegal street vendors 
but to buy from local shops instead. 
Cities are intersected by a diversity of  interests, where certain interests 
clearly predominate. In that context, the pressure to act in favour of  the 
most powerful is high. Although governing according to “the people’s 
wishes” is a commitment, this is somehow difficult to respect. Governance 
as action is a complex exercise. Barcelona’s government asserts that it tries to 
do its best within a very hostile political and media context, and for this 
they need people to stay in the streets and attempt to find a “conflictual 
collaboration” between the street and the institution. 
 
What if  Urban Revolution Meant Permanent Insurrection?  
Fifty years after Lefebvre wrote The Right to the City, where he denounced 
the total absurdity of  the dominant alliance of  bureaucratic and private 
interests, which led the city to fulfil the interests of  elites, neoliberalism has 
increasingly foisted the totalities of  the economic system upon city life. Is it 
possible then, within the current financialized economy, to guarantee the 
right to the city from a municipalist perspective when cities are places where 
so much wealth is generated and which have served the interests of  
production and consumption since times of  industrialization?  
Referring to the progressive concentration of  land into fewer hands, 
Lefebvre spoke about the ruralisation of  cities. From that view, perhaps it is 
time to look to occupying rural areas to prevent their urbanization, and 
then try to citify the rural world—in the sense of  Bookchin’s city as an 
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ecosociety, far away from the necrotic metropolitan way of  life. Worldwide 
mobilizations against megaprojects in the last decades have carved a new 
path for creating ecosocieties.  
In its resistance against Nantes’ new airport in Notre-Dame-des-Landes 
in France, the ZAD movement is a clear example of  this. In French law, 
Zone d’Aménagement Différé (ZAD) means an area owned by public 
authorities to make a project in partnership with business companies. In 
Notre-Dames-des-Landes, a ZAD was created in the 1960s to build a new 
airport in Nantes. Farmers and local residents have resisted this project 
since that time. In 2009, when the project was relaunched by public 
authorities, ecologists and libertarian activists from the Climate Camp 
occupied this land. They renamed the territory ZAD for Zone 
d’Autonomie et de Defense (Zone of  Defence and Autonomy), creating a 
self-organized area based on autonomy from capitalism, radical ecology and 
de-growth. Fighting a high degree of  repression, the movement received 
support from a large part of  leftist and ecologist movements, leading to the 
cancellation of  the project by the French government in 2018. Since the 
airport project was halted, Zadists have continued to fight to live in 
autonomy in the area, free from the capitalist system. The State is denying 
this, declaring it a “no rights zone”.  
Finally, urbanization is probably the last step of  industrial civilization 
based on the exploitation of  nature. Beyond climate change, scientists from 
different disciplines agree that a process of  collapsing ecosystems and 
civilization is in march, threatening entire species. The end of  fossil-based 
energy and the scarcity of  resources that are currently essential to maintain 
the urbanized way of  life of  an increasing number of  human beings has put 
the natural, economic, political and social balance at serious stake. As Pablo 
Servigne writes, “It’s true that the possibility of  collapse closes futures that 
are valuable for us, and this is violent, but it opens some futures that could 
be really happy. What’s at stake is to approach these new futures and make 
them liveable”.12  
In that context, from the perspectives of  both the right to the city and 
of  social ecology, citifying the rural and reaching harmony between the first 
and second natures, building autonomous communities with a real 
possibility of  creating a face-to-face democracy, and preparing ourselves for 
the inevitable end of  the collapse of  the capitalist system is probably the 
kind of  permanent insurrection that we have to make real. 
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Moving Beyond the Right to the City: Urban  
Commoning in Greece 
Theodoros Karyotis 
 
The urban space is the epicentre of  social antagonism. At any historical 
moment, it represents a crystallisation of  power relations. While political 
and economic powers incessantly reform it to better isolate, control and 
exploit its inhabitants, the latter inevitably seek empowerment through 
collective mobilisation. After all, this is the space in which people see their 
social lives unfold, where they form family and community bonds, where 
they seek self-realisation. Resistance, then, is not the prerogative of  radicals 
or the underprivileged. Most city dwellers are called to confront the 
neoliberal carving up of  urban space if  they are to lead fulfilling lives in 
ecologically sound surroundings. 
It is not a coincidence, then, that modern social struggles erupt as urban 
phenomena with a strong spatial component. While some people may 
lament the concurrent demise of  the workers’ movement, it could be 
argued that the workplace is but one—albeit crucial—of  the domains in 
which capital exploits human labour. The city is common wealth created by 
the collective efforts of  generations; capitalism tries to appropriate this 
wealth, turning the city into a terrain of  accumulation. Capitalization of  
human energies has expanded to all spheres of  social life. Processes of  
“accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2009) are underway in most 
urban contexts: land grabbing, gentrification, privatisation of  shared space, 
cultural appropriation, commodification of  basic human needs such as 
housing, food, water and healthcare, evictions and displacement, not to 
mention increasing racism, militarisation and surveillance. Accordingly, the 
circulation of  struggles extends to all fields of  life where capital imposes its 
logic. Many thinkers have tried to conceptualise this shift by examining the 
relationship between capitalism, urbanism and ecology.1 
City dwellers may define their desire for full participation in the city’s 
socio-political life as a right to the city to be reclaimed against authorities, or 
they may dive right in and self-manage the urban space as a commons, or they 
may do both. In turn, these urban struggles—along with the frameworks 
used to make sense of  them—will constitute them as collective subjects. 
These are, then, some of  the issues this text seeks to raise, exemplified 
in the context of  Greek urban struggles over the past decade. 
 
The Right to the City 
Since its inception by philosopher Henri Lefebvre in the 1960s, the 
discourse of  the right to the city has pervaded struggles against urban 
exclusion, commodification and privatisation. Even when Lefebvre is not 
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overtly referenced, an intuitive grasp of  the right to the city underlies many 
discussions and conflicts over what kind of  cities we desire.  
Lefebvre’s take on the right to the city was a radical one. He never 
conceived the right to the city simply as a legal notion, a juridical defence of  
specific human needs. Rather, he envisioned an active subject that would 
enact and materialise those rights, rather than merely demand their 
implementation. Being a Marxist, he identified this collective subject as the 
working class (Lefebvre 1996a:154). Not the uniform, industrial working 
class of  the Marxian oeuvre, consolidated in the capitalist workplace, but “a 
very different kind of  class formation—fragmented and divided, multiple in 
its aims and needs, more often itinerant, disorganized and fluid rather than 
solidly implanted” (Harvey 2012: xiii). That is to say, a class formed around 
the everyday production and reproduction of  life in the urban space. 
As Harvey (ibid: xvi) suggests, the task of  this collective subject would 
be “to imagine and reconstitute a totally different kind of  city out of  the 
disgusting mess of  a globalising, urbanising capital run amok”. Under this 
light, the idea of  a right to the city becomes genuinely revolutionary, as the 
question of  what kind of  city we desire cannot be separated from questions 
of  what kind of  social relations, what kind of  political organisation or what 
kind of  relationship with nature we desire.  
Lefebvre’s “right to the city” is not reducible to access of  individual 
citizens to urban resources (housing, public spaces, services, facilities, etc.); 
rather, he envisioned the city as managed by its very inhabitants. The radical 
edge of  Lefebvre’s right to the city lies precisely in the implicit conflict 
between the right to the use value of  the city against the right to its exchange 
value. In other words, it is a concept that empowers the users of  the city 
against the proprietors of  the city, who are in most cases not the same 
people. 
Lefebvre’s aim was to rework Marx’s idea of  revolutionary change by 
expanding and enriching the collective subject of  this change, and moving 
the locus of  revolution from the capitalist workplace to the field of  
everyday life. Marx and Marxists, however, had notoriously rejected the 
notion of  “rights” as a limited concept that was too intimately tied to 
capitalist liberalism to be of  any use for revolution. Why, then, did Lefebvre 
employ this concept in his attempt to refashion revolutionary action? It is 
important to note that Lefebvre was writing in the late 1960s, when 
doctrinaire Marxism was coming under fire from many directions. In the 
following years, many Marxists renounced Bolshevism as totalising and 
authoritarian, and some even sought refuge in liberalism. By the late 1970s, 
revolutionary politics was in decline, and the discourse of  “human rights” 
had become dominant in progressive circles as a supposedly “apolitical” 
mechanism of  ensuring for populations a minimum of  protection from 
exclusion and domination, in the absence of  a meaningful plan of  
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profound structural change (McLoughlin 2016). The ensuing collapse of  
the Soviet bloc and the ideological prevalence of  capitalism and liberal 
democracy only served to consolidate “rights talk” as the horizon of  
progressive politics. Lefebvre’s, then, was one of  many attempts at 
navigating that adverse conjuncture without renouncing the prospect of  
revolutionary change.  
However, the “rights” discourse does not come without its complica-
tions. With the resurgence of  radical thought in the 1990s and 2000s, the 
concept of  rights was overwhelmingly criticised by post-Marxist and radical 
thinkers as part and parcel of  a post-political consensus in which political 
spaces are closing, giving way to technocratic solutions to social conflicts 
and demands (ibid.). Most notably, Giorgio Agamben (1998: 126–135) 
criticised human rights as a concept by which state sovereignty extends to 
non-political forms of  life. In this respect, rights legitimise state 
intervention rather than limiting it. Moreover, since the concept of  rights 
rests on a distinction between the political and the social sphere, it aids in 
the de-politicisation of  subjects. As De Souza Santos (2014) argues, a 
“majority of  the world’s inhabitants are not the subjects of  human rights 
[but] rather the objects of  human rights discourses”. 
Often, “the right to the city” takes the form of  a mini-charter of  human 
rights—that is to say, a list of  “commitments” of  municipal authorities 
towards residents, who are entitled to social and economic goods. While 
there is great “propaganda value and mobilising potential” in such tactics, in 
that accusing political opponents of  “violating rights” is a powerful 
rhetorical device (Bond 2018), the mere invocation of  “commitments” of  
authorities towards citizens may lend itself  to assistencialist policies. These 
have been historically shown to perpetuate inequality, as they tend to 
disempower rights holders in front of  rights-granting bodies by treating 
them as passive recipients instead of  active subjects (Freire 2005: 12). 
Undoubtedly, rights can be—and have been—used as a bulwark against 
exploitation and exclusion. However, when social needs are expressed in 
legalese and enter the juridical sphere, they come to form part of  a legal 
system where they are always subordinate to other legal concepts and other 
rights. That is to say, when the “social need as a right” is not anymore an 
instrument of  struggle but a commitment of  a liberal democracy towards 
its subjects, it becomes part of  a hierarchy of  rights, on the top of  which 
lies the right to property. Often, the sanctity of  the rule of  law is little more 
than a fig leaf  to conceal systematic exploitation and plunder (Mattei and 
Nader 2008). The experience of  South Africa (Bond 2018) seems to 
confirm that courts systematically fail to enforce officially sanctioned rights 
to the city when they clash with entrenched interests and property rights. A 
similar situation was experienced in Greece, under the state of  exception 
imposed by austerity policies. 
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It comes as no surprise, then, that the right to the city has been adopted 
wholeheartedly by a host of  organisations, from local NGOs to UN-
Habitat, that not only lack an anti-capitalist orientation but are even an 
accessory to neoliberal expansion (Souza 2010). The right to the city, in this 
sense, loses Lefebvre’s radical edge and is interpreted as the right of  
individual citizens/consumers to a better urban life in the context of  liberal 
democracy. At best, it is translated into rights of  citizen input—so-called 
“participation”—in consultations with predefined agendas. At worst, it is 
used as a pretext for urban segregation policies, as when the authorities 
repress marginalised populations and exclude them from public space in the 
name of  the citizen’s “right to a cleaner and safer environment”.  
“The right to the city”, writes Harvey (2012: xv), “is an empty signifier. 
Everything depends on who gets to fill it with meaning.” However, the 
question we have to ask here is whether this is simply yet another case of  
successful appropriation and reabsorption of  a radical discourse into 
dominant capitalist practices, or whether the concept of  “rights”, by resting 
on a distinction between rights-holders and rights-granters, is inherently 
disempowering. Of  course, whether movements opt for restoring 
Lefebvre’s revolutionary content of  the right to the city or for moving 
beyond it should be entirely up to them. In any case, being aware of  the 
limits and pitfalls of  “rights-talk” is essential. 
 
The Urban Commons 
In recent years we observe the emergence of  a new explanatory framework, 
that of  the commons. The movement of  the urban commons has forcefully 
entered the global spotlight, especially through the practice of  occupation 
of  common space (Tsavdaroglou 2016). 
The concept of  the commons was popularised by the institutional 
school of  Elinor Ostrom, who studied hundreds of  communities forming 
around natural resources (fisheries, irrigation systems, forests, etc.) to self-
regulate extraction and thus prevent the infamous “tragedy of  the com-
mons”, i.e. the depletion of  the resource (Ostrom 2015). While critical of  
Ostrom’s resource-centrism, autonomist Marxist thinkers2 have taken up 
the commons discourse, as it allows them to describe empowered commu-
nities of  struggle that are self-instituted to defend themselves against proc-
esses of  dispossession, commodification and exclusion.  
The commons is an eminently political concept, as its definition includes 
not only a common “resource”, which may be natural (e.g. water) or imma-
terial (e.g. knowledge or any aspect of  social life), but also an active 
community that organises horizontally and decides upon a set of  rules of  
coexistence. A commons, then, consists necessarily of  an active community 
self-instituted around a shared “resource”. This political dimension has 
made the commons a prominent discourse in explaining the activity of  the 
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urban social movements of  the last decade.3 Rather than relying on tradi-
tional tactics of  agitprop or forming around concrete identities or demands, 
urban social movements in recent years tend to erupt as reappropriations of  
public space by horizontal collectives. Participants in the 2011 wave of  pro-
test around the world occupied public squares to form impromptu 
settlements with their own collectively-run facilities and assembleary deci-
sion-making processes. The “square commons” did not dissipate after the 
protest ended but became the blueprint for the creation of  antagonistic 
social structures to promote popular self-sufficiency and resilience, fuelled 
by the conviction that capitalism is unable to ensure the reproduction of  
societies and the planet itself. In recent years, movements have a growing 
propensity to view the urban space as a commons and to propose solutions 
to social ills that favour collective forms of  ownership, direct participation 
and self-management, thus questioning existing forms of  integration in city 
life. 
Of  course, the discourse of  the commons is not immune to 
appropriation. Critics point out that the idea of  the commons is appealing 
to organisations that promote neoliberal globalisation, as the social self-
initiative is compatible with the neoliberal renunciation of  state welfare 
provision, which leaves society to fend for itself. Moreover, commons 
thinkers have repeatedly warned against “distorted” (De Angelis 2009) or 
“pro-capitalist” (Caffentzis 2010) commons, which serve to promote the 
circulation of  capital.  
However, appropriation by capital is not the only problem the commons 
faces. What is the degree of  openness required of  each commons to 
maintain its character without becoming exclusionary? How are effective 
commons practices at the city level transferred to the management of  more 
complex systems, such as entire bio-regions? How can the commons 
become materially self-sustaining without creating dependencies on the 
capitalist market? What are the effective structures through which different 
commons can coordinate their actions towards common goals? These 
issues—access, scalability, viability and coordination—are central in the 
discussion over the commons. The commons, therefore, should not be 
viewed as a set of  structures or processes, but rather as a disposition of  a 
number of  people to define themselves as a group, question their existing 
circumstances, identify their collective and individual needs, and negotiate 
their rules of  coexistence through mutual respect and recognition. That is 
to say, the commons become politics par excellence. 
In any case, my intention here is not to explore the potential of  the 
commons in tracing socio-political alternatives to capitalism, since I have 
done this elsewhere (Karyotis 2018). Here I approach the commons as a 
discourse to make sense of, but also shape, urban struggles. The assumption 
of  initiative by organised society rarely means the renunciation of  
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negotiated rights to healthcare, education, welfare or basic services. The 
commons is not an alternative to “rights talk”, but rather a way in which 
rights may be fleshed out, and tethered to contentious politics waged by 
concrete communities.  
In this light, the right to the city and the urban commons are not mutually 
exclusive strategies of  contestation but rather two different vocabularies, two 
different “grammars of  human dignity”(De Sousa Santos 2014), for making 
sense of  urban struggles. The combined use of  both discourses brings to 
mind what Harvey (2012: 87), describes as a “double-pronged political 
attack, through which the state is forced to supply more and more in the 
way of  public goods for public purposes, along with the self-organization 
of  whole populations to appropriate, use, and supplement those goods in 
ways that extend and enhance the qualities of  the non-commodified 
reproductive and environmental commons”. 
Yet, the two vocabularies give rise to different conceptualisations of  
social conflict, different tactics and objectives, and ultimately different 
antagonistic subjects. While it is very common for movements to engage in 
both rights talk and commons talk, the coexistence of  the two discourses is not 
always as harmonious as Harvey would have us believe. The interplay 
between the two discourses will be made explicit in the ensuing analysis of  
resistance against austerity policies in contemporary Greece. 
 
Urban Struggles in Greece 
Developments in Greece exemplify the concept of  accumulation by 
dispossession, and specifically the tactic of  austerity as an instrument of  wealth 
extraction and upwards redistribution. Austerity is a recipe systematically 
being prescribed to ailing economies. It is ostensibly intended to do away 
with sovereign debt by reducing public expenditure, selling off  public 
assets, raising taxes and slashing labour rights, welfare provision and public-
sector jobs. In effect, it represents a radical reshuffling of  the cards at the 
expense of  the lower and middle classes. 
Other than the fact that for the first time such an ambitious structural 
adjustment program has been implemented in a “developed” country, the 
case of  Greece is nothing new as far as austerity and counter-austerity 
tactics go. I have, therefore, repeatedly argued that the idea of  Greek 
exceptionalism—both in its “corrupt and lazy” version and in its “heroic and 
revolutionary” version—is an orientalist fallacy. Nevertheless, it is true that 
the violent shakeup of  day-to-day normality destabilised established 
identities and thus pushed great parts of  the population to a state of  
liminality (Varvarousis and Kallis 2017; Varvarousis 2018). Liminality is an 
anthropological concept that denotes an intermediate stage in a transition 
(between life stages, between groups or between seasons), where subjects 
have shed their previous identities but have not yet assumed new ones. This 
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state of  uncertainty and fluidity has certainly given rise to resignation, 
depression or regression to reactionary identities, but it has also created 
creative resistances and admirable experiments in social self-organisation.  
To understand modern urban struggles in Greece, we have to look into 
the history of  the urban space. Greek cities were built overnight. In the 
1950s, rural populations started to urbanise. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
constructors took advantage of  lax planning laws—drafted by their political 
patrons—to create densely populated high-rise cities without any provision 
for public space and infrastructure (Makrygianni and Tsavdaroglou 2011). 
That was the initial process of  enclosure that eroded traditional 
communities, commodified housing, and promoted a peculiar sense of  
isolation among the crowd of  others. A manifest absence of  public 
facilities, open spaces, and community centres characterises Greek cities to 
this day.  
In the 1990s and 2000s, the prevalent social imaginary was one of  indivi-
dual social mobility and consumerism. The debt-fuelled affluence drove the 
newly-formed middle classes away from inner-city neighbourhoods, which 
were occupied by working class migrants and natives. Throughout this era, 
urban renewal projects were underway, culminating in a construction frenzy 
leading up to the 2004 Athens Olympic Games. 
In December 2008, the murder of  a teenager by the police sparked the 
first wave of  struggles to reclaim the urban space on the part of  students, 
immigrants and the disenfranchised urban youth. The protests served to 
shed light on the urban alienation, exploitation and exclusion hidden behind 
the veil of  ostensible prosperity. Participants in the protests were fused in 
an anonymous collective subject that actively transformed the city through 
decentralised acts of  re-appropriation of  urban space: public building 
occupations, barricades, marches, spontaneous artistic events, disruption of  
traffic and commerce. Interestingly, there was a complete absence of  formal 
demands; protesters were not struggling for rights or reforms, but were 
actively projecting their collective aspirations onto the urban space. 
That collective “scream”4 was a wake-up call for a dormant and compla-
cent society, and has left a legacy of  social cooperation and a redefined 
public sphere. Thousands of  collectives were born, ranging from political 
groups to art ensembles to grassroots trade unions. A whole new 
generation of  youth was schooled in horizontalism, solidarity and direct 
action tactics, and new spatial practices were adopted by social movements, 
culminating in the propagation of  self-managed squats and social centres. 
Navarinou Park is part of  “December’s” legacy. Only a few months after 
the revolt, an abandoned urban parking lot was occupied by neighbours and 
collectives in Exarcheia; the asphalt was dug up, trees and flowers were 
planted, paths were laid out, benches were installed. The park has since 
been self-managed by an open assembly and has been the site of  political, 
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cultural and social events. Despite attempts at eviction, the park retains its 
character to this day. Even if  the vocabulary of  the commons was not 
widespread at that moment, we have an early instance of  the substitution of  
“public” space with “common” space; of  rigid, aseptic space that serves as 
a neutral ground between isolated individuals with organic space where 
individuals can connect and intertwine their desires in the context of  
community, where they can negotiate the terms of  their co-existence. This 
kind of  urban commoning would go on to become a blueprint for urban 
struggles in the following years. 
The debt crisis that broke out in 2010 and the concomitant structural 
adjustment served to intensify social antagonism and exacerbate conflicts 
over urban space. A defining moment for grassroots spatial practices and 
organisational forms was the 2011 “movement of  the squares”. A multitude 
of  individuals with different origins and agendas participated in the 
mobilisations. This diversity was certainly an advantage as it enabled 
osmosis between different groups and individuals and the emergence of  
innovative practices. While there was extensive rights talk, since the austerity 
program was perceived as a rupture of  the social contract that threatened 
social, labour and human rights, the squares themselves were organised as 
urban commons, with a self-instituted community grouping around the 
occupied common space. Probably, they can be considered an instance of  
“liminal commons” (Varvarousis 2018), as the encampments were fluid 
institutions populated by destabilised identities; the aim of  the squares was 
not long-term resilience as per Ostrom, but experimentation with new 
spatial practices that could lead to a multiplication of  struggles. 
Indeed, in the wake of  the squares, a multitude of  urban commons 
emerged. It was no longer just youthful protesters who occupied public 
spaces to turn them into commons, but mixed collectives of  young and old, 
men and women, families and individuals, immigrants and natives. Two 
examples of  such commons were the urban farming at PERKA (“Peri-
urban Farming”) on the grounds of  an abandoned military base in 
Thessaloniki and the Self-Managed Urban Gardens of  Elliniko in Athens, 
on the site of  the former Athens airport. Both sites were earmarked to be 
privatised and developed into luxury housing and commercial 
infrastructure. In both cases, instead of  demanding that their right of  
access to urban space was respected, citizens’ movements self-enacted this 
right through commoning. 
This “performative”—rather than juridical—reclamation of  rights 
through urban commoning became widespread. The state of  exception 
brought about by the crisis meant that most rights of  the population were 
subordinated to the task of  “salvation” of  the country from debt. Regressive 
legislation was passed, existing juridical guarantees of  human rights remained 
unenforced, and courts ruled consistently against those trying to judicially 
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defend common wealth against appropriation and privatisation. The urgency 
of  the situation made the abstract invocation of  rights seem futile and 
called for direct, often extra-legal, action. 
Local community self-defence initiatives multiplied when the govern-
ment imposed an indiscriminate land ownership tax—mockingly called 
haratsi for its reminiscence of  a despised Ottoman poll tax—arbitrarily 
charged through the electricity bill. Homeowners who failed to pay had 
their power cut; meanwhile, wages had been slashed, and one-third of  the 
workforce was out of  a job. This extortionate measure would have created a 
situation verging on humanitarian catastrophe were it not for the self-
organised anti-haratsi neighbourhood committees, which were on call to 
extra-legally reconnect the power for families that could not afford the tax. 
Food provision was another critical area of  self-defence. In the previous 
decade, oligopolistic, price-fixing intermediaries had come to dominate 
food distribution, making everyday staples unaffordable for the popular 
classes, while squeezing the livelihood of  farmers. The movement to cut 
out the middlemen started with truckloads of  potatoes arriving in central 
city squares to be sold directly to end consumers. The potato movement soon 
evolved into a decentralised guerrilla farmers’ market movement, which 
occupied urban land without permits, trying to bring together farmers and 
consumers despite the threat of  eviction, arrests and confrontation with 
entrenched interests. 
The creation of  urban commons extended to other rights: the right to 
healthcare, with the creation of  an extended network of  self-managed soli-
darity clinics; the right to a livelihood, with the establishment of  alternative 
currencies5 and a multitude of  egalitarian workers’ cooperatives; or the right 
to affordable food, through the operation of  consumer cooperatives6 and 
solidarity kitchens. 
However, the coexistence of  the rights discourse and the commons discourse 
has not always been peaceful. A case in point was the movement against 
water privatisation. Under the terms of  a memorandum, the water company 
of  Thessaloniki—among others—was due to be privatised. Small citizens’ 
initiatives organised an opposition to privatisation by effectively mobilising 
civil society. Within the anti-privatisation block, those conceiving water as a 
right defended state management of  the water company; those conceiving 
water as a commons promoted an alternative model of  social ownership based 
on self-management and citizens’ participation7. Due to diverging 
conceptualisations and tactics, the rift developed into a bitter ideological 
conflict. This was reflected in practical issues, as the first group favoured 
centralised leadership through a committee composed of  politicians and 
trade unionists—unsurprisingly aligned with the Syriza party, which was 
expected to win the upcoming elections—while the second group favoured 
assembleary and participatory organising processes. Despite the inner schism, 
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Thessaloniki’s water movement mobilised thousands of  volunteers to 
organise an unofficial referendum, in which 97 per cent of  the 220,000 
citizens who voted rejected the privatisation. A fragile and defeated right-
wing government was obliged to put the privatisation on hold, until the 
next government (led by Syriza) brought the privatisation back on the table 
a few years later.  
Another field where an unexamined right to the city discourse may prove 
counter-productive is the organisation of  visibility events such as the Gay 
Pride March. To be sure, in a country as pious as Greece, the importance of  
pride marches in reclaiming public space for the full spectrum of  identities 
and practices cannot be overstated; in effect, such events regularly become 
sites of  confrontation with the Orthodox Church and the extreme right. 
Such events, however, face an additional risk. To the extent that they 
promote an individualistic conception of  the right to the city and fail to 
adopt an intersectional view of  social oppression, they may involuntarily 
turn themselves into niche markets in the context of  urban renewal, under 
which diversity is prized as long as the overriding social principle remains 
that of  market exchange. Indeed, diversity, creativity and innovation are core 
concepts of  gentrification processes underway in European cities. These 
exclusionary processes presuppose an individualised recipient of  rights, 
rather than active collectives that affirm their right to self-determine 
everyday life in the city. 
To address the growing commercialisation and co-optation of  Gay Pride 
Marches (see also Ashley Wong 2018; No justice no pride 2018), Radical 
Pride,8 an “alternative” gay pride event that safeguards its autonomy from 
public institutions and corporate sponsors, takes place yearly in 
Thessaloniki since 2017. Radical Pride offers a rich framework to 
understand how gender, race, class, sexual orientation, ethnicity, age or 
ability intersect in the production of  oppression and exclusion. It thus seeks 
to affirm collective action and connect the struggle of  the LGBTQ 
movement with other urban struggles. 
 
The Subject of  Social Mobilisation 
Social change is not just about the transformation of  political and 
economic structures. Most importantly, it is about the transformation of  
subjects, of  humans as social agents. The smooth operation of  capitalism 
presupposes a specific anthropological type—mockingly dubbed homo 
economicus by critics—and thus the dominant structures of  education, family, 
the mass media, public discourse etc. are geared towards the creation of  this 
mindset. Accordingly, social struggles aim to create subjects of  change, an 
anthropological type that questions dominant values to become the social 
agents of  a future liberated society.  
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Struggles are constituted precisely as formative experiences that can 
bring about such subjectifications. The liberated subject is not only a pre-
requisite of  contestation, but also a product of  it, in a dialectic movement. 
Often, sectarian leftists and anarchists disregard the transformative poten-
tial of  struggle per se, and thus tend to dismiss diverse and multitudinous 
mobilisations, such as the squares movement, as “interclass”, “reformist”, 
etc. Of  course, we cannot deny that the occupied squares have been as 
much spaces of  divergence as they have been of  convergence (Simiti 2015). 
In any case, social mobilisation should not be viewed as a closed club re-
served only for the initiated, but rather as a contradictory breeding ground 
for militant subjectivities. 
Indeed, in the liminal period of  destabilisation in Greece previous 
individualistic identities based on consumption, economic rationality, and 
social mobility were dissolved at a grand scale, giving rise to precarious and 
transitory collective identities geared towards social change. 
A certain degree of  abstraction is inevitable when trying to imagine this 
new subject that will spring from a process of  destabilisation to wage the 
struggle for social justice. Different conceptions of  the collective subject 
have been proposed as part of  different liberatory projects: the working class 
as the unitary subject of  Marxian class struggle; the proletariat as a non-
identity, as a class against itself  (Holloway 2009; Nasioka 2018); the multitude 
as a diverse, contradictory, fragmented class of  everyone who contributes to 
the material, affective and cultural reproduction of  society under the rule of  
capital (Hardt and Negri 2004); the citizen as an inclusive territorial identity 
of  those who jointly manage their common affairs in a face-to-face 
democracy (Bookchin 1999, 2002); and the people as a common identity 
constructed out of  a plurality of  demands in the context of  a hegemonic 
project to capture the State (Laclau 2005). 
Even if  they are nothing more than strategic abstractions in the context 
of  specific schemes of  social transformation, all of  the above 
conceptualisations of  the collective subject have had their day in the 
tumultuous years of  crisis in Greece. Each of  the above abstractions presents 
specific challenges and problems. Analysing the ramifications of  each 
conception is beyond the scope of  the present text; what is of  interest is 
that each presents a different relation of  the subject with the political 
sphere, and thus a different avenue of  socio-political transformation. Some 
envision the abolition of  the distinction between the political and the social 
sphere, either through the implosion of  the political or through its 
expansion to include all areas of  life. Others wish to maintain the distinction 
but offer a fuller definition of  the political by bringing disempowered 
identities to the forefront.  
Similarly, the urban commons and the right to the city as two discourses that 
try to shape urban struggles lead to contrasting conceptions of  the political. 
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While both are prone to be appropriated by capitalist forces, the former 
stresses the formation of  a political community, while the latter emphasises 
certain commitments of  the authorities. Hence, while the former favours 
autonomous political organisation, the latter tends to call for top-down and 
state-centric solutions to social ills. 
The above conclusion does not imply that social movements should 
cease demanding the enforcement of  negotiated rights and the expansion 
of  legally recognised rights. After all, “rights” is the way by which social 
conquests of  the past—for inclusion, against exploitation, domination, 
racism or sexism—have been consecrated in the legal system and given 
juridical substance and continuity in the context of  the State. Rights are 
thus a progressive force that is here to stay, and the demand for legal 
reforms that safeguard the commons is an indispensable aspect of  urban 
struggles.9 
Rather, in this text I have tried to point out that when a technical 
juridical conception of  rights becomes the centrepiece and horizon of  
progressive politics, the discourse of  rights tends to ratify existing systems 
of  domination by subordinating lived, contentious politics to impersonal 
juridical constructs, thus legitimising state power rather than curbing it. 
Despite their weaknesses and ambiguities, commoning practices serve to 
empower subjects and revitalise democratic practice beyond the confines of  
liberal parliamentary democracy. 
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Notes 
1. Notably Bookchin 1999; Lefebvre 1996; Harvey 2012. 
2. See, e.g., De Angelis 2017; Hardt and Negri 2009. 
3. See, e.g., Stavridis 2013. 
4. As per Holloway 2002. 
5. Notably, TEM in Volos, Syntagma Time Bank in Athens, Koino in 
Thessaloniki, Faircoin internationally, and a dozen more. 
6. A noteworthy case is Bios Coop in Thessaloniki  
(http://www.bioscoop.gr), which unites some 500 families in “taking food 
in their own hands”. 
7. In particular, Initiative 136 (http://www.136.gr/) promoted a citizen-
funded bid in the public tender, with the aim of  managing 
Thessaloniki’s water company through a socially controlled non-profit 
cooperative that would integrate all water and sanitation users through 
16 local chapters. The bid was controversially rejected by the tender 
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authorities, but mobilisation proved sufficient to freeze the tender 
process altogether. 
8. http://ourpride.gr/ 
9. In this respect the work of  Italian legal scholar Ugo Mattei is invaluable 




Reconceptualising the Right to the City and 
Spatial Justice Through Social Ecology 
Federico Venturini 
 
Introduction: Critically Exploring the Right to the City 
The aim of  this work is to discuss the right to the city, spatial justice and 
social ecology in order to create new tools and understandings at the service 
of  urban social movements aiming towards ecological and democratic cities.1 
This work is divided in five sections. In the first and second sections the 
concepts of  the right2 to the city and spatial justice are introduced, while the 
third highlights a convergence between the two concepts. In the fourth, 
social ecology is used in order to explore key concepts such as citizenship, 
justice and freedom. Building on the previous section, in the fifth the right 
to the city and spatial justice are finally reconceptualised through social 
ecology. The main aim of  this work, in light of  the holistic social change 
approach, is to reframe the concepts of  the right to the city and spatial 
justice in order to strengthen them and make them more complete. 
Since Lefebvre introduced the concept in 1968, the right to the city has 
been used by different actors for different agendas. In this chapter, 
however, I focus on the academic and political discussions around the right 
to the city, avoiding those debates with more institutionalized formulations 
of  the concept. The political philosophy of  the right to the city shares 
many common traits with social ecology, starting with the centrality of  the 
city in discussions of  the urban crisis. 
Attoh (2011: 670) explores the broadness and difficulty of  precisely 
defining the right to the city: the concept is still “vague and radically open” 
and this makes it possible for different actors to use it for different 
purposes. For Lefebvre, the right to the city is “like a cry and a demand” 
(1996: 158). At the same time, it is a necessity to surpass current inequalities 
and fulfil basic needs, and an aspiration for change (Marcuse 2012).  
However, Lefebvre never fully defined the term (Souza 2010; Attoh 
2011). In one of  the more articulated expressions he says that “the right to 
the city, complemented by the right to difference and the right to 
information, should modify, concretize and make more practical the rights 
of  the citizen as a urban dweller (cidatin) and user of  multiple services” 
(Lefebvre 1996: 34). The right to the city is the right to full and equal 
enjoyment of  the resources and services concentrated in cities, something 
that would only be fully possible in another, non-capitalist society (Souza 
2012b). Lefebvre underlines that the right to the city moves towards a 
“transformed and renewed right to urban life” (Lefebvre 1996: 158), 
defined as the possibility for people to shape their own city, where the 
concept of  “autogestion” (self-management) is crucial. In Lefebvre’s work 
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there is a critique of  state power that also resonates with the social ecology 
approach to direct action. Today state policies are blocking the building of  a 
city shaped on citizenship: “The incompatibility between the state and the 
urban is radical in nature. The state can only prevent the urban from taking 
shape” (Lefebvre 2003: 180). This effect of  the State is rooted in its nature, 
which “has to control the urban phenomenon...to retard its development, 
to push it in the direction of  institutions that extend to society as a whole, 
through exchange and the market” (Lefebvre 2003: 180). Self-management 
is thus crucial. Harvey stresses that the right to the city is “the freedom to 
make and remake our cities and ourselves” (Harvey 2008: 23), putting the 
emphasis on the collective aspect of  this right. From a Marxist perspective, 
the right to the city helps in understanding “the necessary connection 
between urbanization and surplus production and use” (Harvey 2008: 40). 
The call for a “real” right to the city comes from the oppressed. As 
Marcuse (2012: 32) points out, from an economic point of  view it comes 
from the “most marginalized and the most underpaid and insecure 
members of  the working class” and from a cultural expression it comes 
from the directly oppressed and alienated. It is thus a unifying call for all 
who have not. 
With this radical (and matching the original Lefebvrian formulation) 
interpretation of  the right to the city, urban social movements around the 
world have started to claim the idea in order to gain access to needs and 
services and to re-shape the city (Hamel, Lustiger-Thaler and Mayer 2000). 
At the same time, they have gained strength from it. As Soja (2010: 109) 
affirms, the right to the city “can help to unite diverse and particularized struggle 
into larger and more powerful movements”. Indeed, as Harvey and Potter (2009: 
48) point out, the right to the city is a process, continuously shaped by our 
desire and new challenges and built around “social solidarities”. In this, 
urban social movements play a crucial role, affirming the right to the city in 
different spatial and social forms: 
 
The inalienable right to the city rests upon the capacity to force open 
spaces of  the city to protest and contention, to create unmediated public 
spaces, so that the cauldron of  urban life can become a catalytic site from 
which new conceptions and configurations of  urban living can be devised 
and out of  which new and less damaging conceptions of  rights can be 
constructed. (Harvey and Potter 2009: 49) 
 
Thus, in this radical interpretation, the right to the city is a protest call to 
enable the opening of  new social paths towards a better kind of  urban 
living.  
However, NGOs, international bodies, and municipal authorities all 
around the globe have assumed a different perspective on the right to the 
city. Activist-scholar D’Souza (2016: 7) pointed out “the rights discourse 
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today is a cacophony of  discordant voices”. This plurality of  actors and 
institutions invoke the notion of  rights, yet adopt different ideological 
orientations that suit other agendas. For example, Kuymulu (2013: 93) 
found that “UN agencies have not only attempted to co-opt the content of  
the notion as established by the existing right to the city movements, but 
have also attempted to rewrite the history of  this concept”. One of  the 
main activities of  NGOs, international bodies and city authorities—under 
the slogan of  the right to the city—is thus based around the development 
and implementation of  charters of  the right to the city. As Mayer (2012; 
2013) points out, this approach presents several issues: (1) it excludes what 
is not in the list; (2) in contrast to the class reference of  the Lefebvrian right 
to the city, it does not acknowledge class and power divisions; and (3) “the 
demands for rights as enumerated merely target particular aspects of  
neoliberal policy” (2012: pp. 74–75), watering down the radical call to 
transform the city.  
Souza (2010: 317) holds a similar position, asserting that the right to the 
city for NGOs and official agencies (as well for some social movements) 
can be summarized as “the right to a better, more ‘human’ life in the 
context of  the capitalist city, the capitalist society and on the basis of  a 
(‘reformed’ and ‘improved’) representative ‘democracy’”, with the aim of  
fixing the current political and economic system, not challenging it. 
 
Critically Exploring Spatial Justice 
Spatial justice is another key concept for current urban social movements. 
Justice is a concept that has been always invoked by social movements, 
especially from the spatial perspective. For example the following quote, 
referring to an American city, dramatically captures the experience of  the 
urban poor:  
 
People in the ghetto know perfectly well it is different in other 
neighbourhoods that are whiter and wealthier. They know that this is not 
accidental. They might be fuzzy on the history and the exact actors, and 
might even have bought into the sizeable efforts to blame the poor for 
their own poverty, but the culpability of  banks, city officials, employers, 
corporations and absentee landlords is widely, if  rather intuitively, 
understood. Which means that people understand that they live in a space 
that is socially produced, and could even tell you how that works though 
they would never articulate it using this kind of  language. (Gibbon 2010: 
619) 
 
The poor have a clear understanding of  the spatial dimension of  inequali-
ties, calling for the end of  them, and for justice. 
The Western concept of  justice originated in ancient Greece and is 
strongly linked to the formation of  citizenship and direct democracy in 
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ancient Athens (Soja 2010: 75). With the creation of  the Nation-State, the 
idea of  justice has been conceptualized as provided by the State, but not as 
part of  the concept of  citizenship. However, justice cannot only be linked 
to the kind of  justice administered by the State. It assumes a broader 
meaning of  just or fair, linked to “the qualities of  a just society: freedom, 
liberty, equality, democracy, [and] civil rights” (Soja 2010: 20). For Soja 
(2010), justice is a concept that should go beyond class, race, and gender. 
Justice and injustice, as concepts, pervade our world on multiple levels and 
are deeply nested in the current socioeconomic system, but they can be 
challenged and changed through social and political action (Soja 2010). As 
Harvey recognises, economic inequality and injustice are both a production 
of  capitalist urban development: 
 
Capital represents itself  in the form of  a physical landscape created in its 
own image, created as use values to enhance the progressive accumulation 
of  capital. The geographical landscape which results is the crowning glory 
of  past capitalist development. (1985: 25) 
 
Subsequently, Soja (2010) also recognised the importance of  looking at the 
spatial dimension of  justice and developed “spatial justice” as a core 
concept. Even without negating the importance of  the historical and 
sociological approaches of  justice, focusing on the spatial helps highlight 
hidden aspects or discover new perspectives for action. In a recent 
discussion on spatial justice, Iveson (2011: 255) affirms that “the attention 
to space can help highlight the spatial relations in which place-based issues 
and actors are enmeshed”. 
Spatial justice, as a concept used in analysing current urban crises, can 
firstly help cast “new light on the processes through which socio-spatial 
injustice is reproduced, perpetuated and sometimes aggravated in our 
times” (Souza 2011: 73). Thus, focusing on the negation of  spatial justice 
can be a powerful tool, both helping to understand how injustice is created 
and highlighting where to act.  
Secondly, a focus on the affirmation of  spatial justice can help reveal 
“the spatial practices by means of  which protagonists of  socio-spatial 
change (above all emancipative social movements) are challenging injustice 
and trying to build alternatives” (ibid). As with the right to the city, spatial 
justice becomes an agenda for urban social movements to follow in order to 
reshape the city. A connection can be made between the two concepts, as I 
will show in the next section. 
 
A Convergence of  Concepts 
The concepts of  right to the city and spatial justice can both be used as 
analytical tools to highlight current urban crises and as proactive slogans 
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upon which to build social struggles. Looking at the intersection between 
the creation of  space, the negation of  rights, and social injustice is crucial to 
understanding the urban crisis and developing strategies for social change. 
In this section I argue that there is a further connection that needs to be 
made between the right to the city and spatial justice. As Uitermark (2012) 
considers, a just city presupposes equity, distribution of  resources and 
democratic control toward the full implementation of  the right to the city. 
The right to the city and spatial justice thus work hand-in-hand towards the 
construction of  a just city. This link is very clear, for example, when Zárate 
(2015) titles an essay The Cities We Want: Right to the City and Social Justice for 
All. In the same vein, Marcuse (2012: 35) stresses that the right to the city is 
not a mere set of  individual rights but connected to the idea of  justice: 
“The right to the city is a moral claim, founded on fundamental principles 
of  justice”. The concept of  rights and justice refer to a similar moral stand. 
Moreover, “a good [and just] city should not be simply a city with 
distributional equity, but one that supports the full development of  each 
individual and of  all individuals” (Marcuse 2009: 2).  
In their positive affirmation, both spatial justice and the right to the city 
are demanding fulfilment for humans in the urban environment. In their 
negation they are also deeply connected: spatial injustice is the negation of  
the right to the city (and vice versa). Moreover, they are determined or 
negated under the same political frame: “Urban rights and justice are 
therefore mediated by the spatial organization of  political powers” (Harvey 
and Potter 2009: 42). It is thus clear that the two concepts of  right to the 
city and spatial justice are strictly interdependent and intertwined (Mitchell 
2003)—one needs the other for its full positive realization. Both concepts 
go beyond class, race, and gender, and should be able to mobilize a large 
part of  the population (Harvey 2003; Soja 2010). Furthermore, they both 
refer to the need to create a true citizenship. However, the concept of  
citizenship is a “multifaceted idea” (Souza 1999: 171) theorized by various 
authors and traditions, depending on specific national and juridical contexts. 
Often, innovations have been implemented under pressure from urban 
social movements, as stressed by Holston: “The right to the city arguments 
of  the urban social movements embodied the struggle of  residents for this 
recognition of  being citizens who bear the right to rights” (2008: 241). 
Citizenship is conceived as a distinction between those who may access rights 
in their daily life in the city and those who cannot. There is a continuous 
struggle for expanding the concept of  citizenship and recognizing the rights 
of  everyone, especially the oppressed. 
Lefebvre explicitly said that a true right to the city “implies nothing less 
than a revolutionary conception of  citizenship” (in Merrifield 2017: 23). 
From this perspective, urban social movements have actively built an 
insurgent citizenship (Holston 1998; 2008), a citizenship that attempts to 
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subvert state agendas and enact real forms of  citizenships based on “civil, 
political, and social rights available to people” (Holston 1998: 50), beyond 
formal forms of  citizenships granted (and restricted) by the State. Insurgent 
citizenship is critical here and its objective is the disruption of  granted 
norms and a transformation of  the city (Holston 1998). 
However, despite the normalised use of  the concept of  citizenship in 
society, contemporary urban social movements remain sceptical about using 
this concept as it indicates “distance, anonymity, and uncommon ground” 
(Holston 2009: 250). Citizenship is commonly used by institutional 
frameworks that do not easily allow for revolutionary usage. Furthermore, 
citizenship, in all its expression, is based on who is a citizen and who is not—
as determined by the Nation-State (Sassen 2002). In this way urban social 
movements continuously struggle with public officials, but also with the 
public, to enlarge the base of  citizenship. 
Moreover, the concept of  the right to the city has also been co-opted 
and distorted (Souza 2010; Kuymulu 2013). One example is the drafting of  
the Brazilian constitution, which actively engaged civil society, but led to a 
depletion and co-optation of  urban social movements (Souza 2001).  
 
Reconceptualising Citizenship, Justice, and Freedom 
The concept of  citizenship, despite its potential role in addressing urban 
crises, is thus deeply contested—social ecology offers a way forward. 
Bookchin’s approach can be illustrated on two levels. On the first, he 
defends a system based on rights (defined alternately as civil rights or 
human rights) and duties.3 They represent a crucial stage of  social 
development, with the move from the uncertainty of  tribal times to the 
introduction of  a justice system based on laws (Bookchin 2005a). Rights 
represent the important achievements of  popular struggles and should be 
preserved and defended (Bookchin 1986; 1999; Bookchin and Biehl 1991). 
The second level is more fully developed and articulated, and addresses 
the core of  the social ecology project, whose aim is to go beyond 
“contemporary citizenship within a depersonalized formal system of  
“rights” and “duties’” (Bookchin 1988: 238).4 Bookchin tries to recover the 
“true” meaning of  citizenship, referring to the Athenian formulation: 
 
The Athenian notion of  arete, the daily practice of  paideia, and the 
institutional structure of  the polis were synthesized into an ideal of  
citizenship that the individual tried to realize as a form of  self-expression, 
not an obligatory burden of  self-denial. Citizenship became an ethos, a 
creative art, indeed, a civic cult rather than a demanding body of  duties 




Citizenship thus needs to be affirmed as a praxis of  citizens’ expression 
towards self-realization. Moreover, Bookchin recognises the need to move 
towards a universal human commonality (Bookchin 2005a), thereby sur-
passing the parochial and non-universal connotation of  citizenship as 
formulated in ancient Athens (Bookchin 1995b). 
The concept of  community, then, is crucial. An authentic community is 
“not merely a structural constellation of  human beings but rather the 
practice of  communizing” (Bookchin 2005a: 349). The expression of  an 
active citizenship is then linked to the final expression of  freedom, where 
citizenship can be conceived as a direct action that expresses itself  in the 
practice of  direct democracy, in the possibility to make decisions for one’s 
own community (Bookchin 2005a).  
Freedom thus also becomes a crucial concept in discussions of  citizenship 
and, most importantly, of  justice. As a concept, freedom is preferable to 
justice, being able to more fully address the problem of  inequality: 
 
Unlike justice, which works with the pretension that all are equal in theory, 
despite their many differences in fact, freedom makes no pretense that all 
are equals but tries to compensate for the inequalities that occur with age, 
physical infirmity, and different abilities. (Bookchin 1995a: 260) 
 
Classically, the concept of  justice was based on the fundamental idea of  
equality of  human beings. The reality, however, is different: 
 
To assume that everyone is “equal” is patently preposterous if  they are 
regarded as “equal” in strength, intellect, training, experience, talent, 
disposition, and opportunities. Such “equality” scoffs at reality and denies 
the commonality and solidarity of  the community by subverting its 
responsibilities to compensate for differences between individuals. 
(Bookchin 2005a: 219) 
 
These differences mean that human beings vary with respect to their poten-
tials and needs. Freedom, for Bookchin, recognises this point and posits the 
basis for a rational society on the idea that “as long as the means exist, they 
must be shared as much as possible according to needs—and needs are un-
equal insofar as they are gauged according to individual abilities and 
responsibilities” (Bookchin 2005a: 219). In social ecology, the concept of  
freedom is thus embedded in the idea of  equality of  unequals, an “unreflec-
tive form of  social behaviour and distribution that compensates inequalities 
and does not yield to the fictive claim…that everyone is equal” (Bookchin 
2005a: 219).  
This is opposed to the use of  justice, which “turns the equality of  
unequals into the inequality of  equals” (Bookchin 2005a: 224). Bookchin 
agrees with the Marxist formulation of  “from each according to his/her 
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ability, to each according to his/her needs” In opposition to a “bourgeois 
right”, which claims “equality of  all,” freedom abandons the very notion of  
“right” as such (Bookchin 2005a: 219). Freedom is thus a crucial pillar for 
an alternative society. 
 
Reconceptualising the Right to the City and Spatial Justice 
Just as we reconceptualised citizenship and justice, highlighting the 
importance of  freedom is thus necessary to reconceptualise the right to the 
city and spatial justice through social ecology. The libertarian or anarchist 
tradition seems to remain impermeable to or suspicious about the idea of  
rights (Turner and Miller 2005); it is uncommon for radical thinkers to use 
this term.5 Contemporary rights are guaranteed and determined by states 
and international bodies, and, despite many significant improvements, their 
track record, from the standpoint of  the libertarian or anarchist tradition, is 
poor and demands a radical change. 
Questions regarding how rights are institutionalized, who guarantees 
them, and by what means can lead to a slippery debate. Fotopoulos (1997: 
231–232), an author close to social ecology, affirms that there are two 
different traditions of  rights. The first meaning is rooted in the “liberal 
conception of  freedom, which is defined negatively as the absence of  
constraints on human activity; these rights are also defined in a negative way 
as ‘freedom from’, their explicit objective being to limit state power”. The 
second meaning, connected to the socialist tradition, opposes the liberal 
one, and affirms instead “social equality, mainly in the form of  an equitable 
participation in the production and distribution of  the social product, 
achieved through state intervention. These rights are therefore “collective” 
in the sense that they belong more to communities or whole societies rather 
than to individuals”. For Fotopoulos, however, both conceptions have 
limitations. Firstly, they are grounded on the reductionist idea that the 
political and economic spheres are always separated, missing a holistic 
approach to human rights. Secondly, and most importantly, both forms of  
rights make sense only in a statist form of  government, and presuppose the 
existence of  “political and economic power...concentrated in the hands of  
elites”, while, “in a non-statist type of  democracy, which by definition 
involves the equal sharing of  power, these rights become meaningless”. 
Bookchin goes in the same direction and, although having explored the 
concept of  rights, he values and elaborates more on the social dimension of  
concepts like cooperation and mutualism, a position that is shared among 
social ecology authors, who have avoided basing their work on the concept 
of  rights.6 
A similar approach is taken with respect to the concept of  justice, as 
seen in the previous section. Social ecology aspires to a broader change 
than the one proposed, for example, within the idea of  a just city “in which 
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public investments and regulation would produce equitable outcomes rather 
than support those already well off ” (Fainstein 2010: 3). Social ecology 
aspires to go beyond a mere fix of  the current problems, aiming at 
affirming the freedom for all to self-determination. 
Moreover, for social ecology it is important to go beyond the distinction 
between right and justice. Even if  we consider the right to the city as a 
different right, the definition remains vague. For example, for Marcuse 
(2014: 5) the right to the city is “not a Right in the sense of  a legal claim 
enforceable through the judicial system, but a moral right, an appeal to the 
highest of  human values”. However, these highest human values remain 
again opaque or vague. Furthermore a radical social change cannot be limited 
only to the full and equal enjoyment of  the resources and services 
concentrated in cities, as instead prescribed by the right to the city. 
According to dialectical naturalism, the crucial point is to consider 
whether rights or justice, or other concepts, are able to foster mutualism, 
differentiation, and development, as proposed by Heller (1999), for the 
creation of  an ecological society. In this way social ecology is able to 
broaden the discussion around those terms and put them at the service of  
social change. For example, in an attempt to go beyond particularism and 
expand the notion of  the right to the city, Souza (2014) proposes the right 
to the planet, bridging it to the experience of  social ecology (and of  
Cornelius Castoriadis). Moreover, the notion of  a right to the planet, which 
is based on the affirmation of  freedom, can help establish who is a citizen 
or not, and move us towards affirming the concept of  world-wide 
citizenship, echoed by the verse “our homeland is the whole world, our law 
is liberty” (from an anarchist song of  the 19th century). 
Lefebvre spoke about a planetary urbanization (2003), echoing a city 
without limits (Bookchin 1986). Indeed, Lefebvre (2013) agrees with 
Bookchin’s claim that today’s cities are creating an amorphous urban 
environment that absorbs all the space, negating nature and the social 
aspects of  the original meaning of  city. Given this kind of  planetary 
urbanization, it is becoming difficult to speak about a right to the city. From 
this perspective, Merrifield (2013) argues that Lefebvre’s right to the city 
may not be useful simply because we no longer have cities.  
Social ecology’s proposal for a new society is, therefore, more articulated 
than the concept of  the right to the city or spatial justice. As suggested by 
Souza (2012a: 24), a grassroots revolution for a new world “should be 
conceived as something even more complex than just the ‘right to the city’ 
in Lefebvre’s sense”. As we struggle, it is necessary to include concepts like 
political decentralisation, economic de-concentration, and “conviviality” 
(Illich 1973), ecological soundness, egalitarian access to resources and 
opportunities of  self-development, and ethno-diversity. And here, it is 
probably accurate to say that Murray Bookchin can help us better than 
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Henri Lefebvre”. Social ecology, with its dialectical naturalism and analysis 
of  freedom and domination, offers powerful tools to carve out new modes 
for society (Venturini forthcoming). 
In any case, rights to the city and spatial justice remain important 
concepts to be used, especially by urban social movements, as mobilizing 
concepts that are able to speak to a broad, transclass and transnational 
audience. Moreover, both concepts focus their attention on the spatiality 
and geography of  the city and its crises. What I propose is a spatial turn for 
social ecology—it should pay greater attention to spatial dynamics and 
processes. For example, the individuation of  the negation or lack of  rights 
to the city and of  spatial justice (for example where the right to the city is 
negated or where there is spatial injustice) would make it possible to 
highlight the urban crisis, and prepare the ground for struggle and the 
construction of  an ecological society. 
Further, both concepts are transformative; they presuppose a sea change 
in the social, economic and political sphere, clearly connecting with the 
power and transformative agenda of  urban social movements. 
However, I agree with Uitermark Nicholls and Loopmans (2012: 2548) 
that “while there certainly are movements claiming a right to the city, it is 
clear that the concept remains much more popular in academic than in 
movement circles”. To break this elite perspective and offer a new 
perspective to urban social movements, the right to the city and spatial 
justice assumes real value only when paired with the concept of  
domination. For example:  
 
Social justice—including in this spatial justice...is, of  course, 
fundamentally a matter of  power, not simply of  ethics. If  injustice is 
supposed to be related to illegitimate, unequal access to resources and 
means of  exercising some rights, it is related to heteronomous power: that 
is, to oppression and domination. (Souza 2011: 73) 
 
The concept of  “fighting against all forms of  domination” towards 
freedom developed in social ecology can be taken as a unifying concept that 
includes and amplifies the agenda of  both right to the city and spatial justice.  
In particular, the use of  the concept of  “domination” allows a more 
holistic vision of  the social issues. Social ecology does not single out 
specific struggles, but moves holistically against domination, with a broader 
understanding of  crises. Social ecology, highlighting the linkages between all 
forms of  domination, not only calls for the coordination of  different 
struggles that urban social movements pursue, in order to reinforce them, 





To conclude, the right to the city and spatial justice are concepts that share 
three principle areas of  common ground. First, they go beyond class, race, 
and gender. Second, each is used in order to mobilize large parts of  the 
population. Finally, they both refer to citizenship. However citizenship is 
not a concept that is commonly used by urban social movements because 
they are suspicious of  a term already co-opted by the State.  
Today we live in a world where we must deal with the State while finding 
a new revolutionary path, in an approach that Souza (2006: 327) called 
“together with the State, despite the State, against the State”. The concept of  
the right to the city is a necessary mobilizing concept, but alone it is not 
sufficient. Indeed, D’Souza (2018: 210) reminds us that: 
 
We have inherited rights-based institutions. Do we need to, for that 
reason, demand rights, struggle for them and place our futures in its 
power of  promise, knowing the promises are empty for most people most 
of  the time? What did the socialists and the freedom fighters in anti-
colonial movements do? They demanded the real thing—food not right to 
food, national independence not right to independence, peace not right to 
peace, debt-repudiation not forgiveness. 
 
If  urban social movements want to recuperate key terms like citizenship, 
rights, and participation for building a truly revolutionary citizenship, they 
could link them to freedom and to the project of  direct democracy—not 
only as a practice, but as a discourse. Linking these key concepts with 
something not yet incorporated into the current dominant system could 
help develop a coherent and resilient project, and gain popular support for 
ecological and democratic cities. 
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Notes 
1. I would like to thank Janet Biehl for advising me on relevant Bookchin’s 
quotes. 
2. For reason of  space, this work does not explore the debates on the 
origin of  rights, individual legal rights and natural rights. 
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3. For Bookchin, rights are a human construction and need to be based 
on objective assumptions. When based on freedom or self–
consciousness, they would better be called “norms” or “ethical 
standards”. These are things that people would ultimately want to 
achieve (Bookchin, in Evanoff  2007). 
4. Although Bookchin seems to side with a natural conception of  rights, 
he sidelined the debate on the origin of  rights. 
5. An interesting exception is the work of  Kropotkin that speaks 
extensively about the right to live, to have food and to resist. His slogan 
is emblematic: “What we proclaim is the Right to Well-Being: Well-
Being for All!” (Kropotkin 2011: 14). 
6. The only exception is the work of  Roussopoulos (2013; 2015; 2017a), 
who explores the use of  the right to the city and its implementation, 
using the creation of  charters as his main example. This 
implementation is for him a way to incrementally address the possibility 
of  citizenship being affirmed. However, this approach cannot clearly 
define the connection between the affirmation of  such rights and the 
social ecology project. Moreover, it is not able to respond to the 







The Evolution of  the Kurdish Paradigm 
Havin Guneser with Eleanor Finley 
 
What sets us apart as humans—especially those who struggle for freedom 
and reject injustice, inequality, oppression, and exploitation—is our 
imagination. We can refuse to accept that which is simply handed over to us 
as truth. Let us begin here in our exploration of  the journey of  the Kurdish 
people in their quest for freedom over the last 45 years. Where are Kurds 
coming from? How can we holistically understand what has happened to 
the PKK and the strategic thinker Abdullah Öcalan and why? Let me briefly 
lead you all through this journey. 
So where are we coming from? This is what I want to get into: to be 
able to holistically understand what happened and why it happened. There’s 
a lot of  contention around that issue.  
 
The Early Years (1970–1989)  
Obviously, struggles for freedom are not unique to Kurdistan or to the 
region. They happen across the world. Many people like to think that 
Öcalan’s thinking changed suddenly in 1999 after his abduction in Kenya. 
In fact, at that time, many people believed that he betrayed the Kurdish 
people’s cause. But when we look at 45 years of  the struggle of  the PKK, 
we can see that the organization has continuously moved forward and 
developed itself. The Kurdish freedom movement has seen many 
movements and struggles emerge and then wither away (for example, real 
socialism, national liberation movements, feminism, and anarchism). The 
PKK’s ability to evolve lies with its analysis of  these movements, deducing 
lessons that it then applies to itself.  
When the PKK was gathering in order to take up the Kurdish issue 
during the 1970s, there was very limited information available about leftism. 
Around the time of  the military coup in Turkey, the first of  which was in 
1960, there were translations of  leftists into Turkish available only from 
Russian and French. There existed a bit of  Marxism, feminism, Leninism, 
Stalinism, and Maoism, but no Gramsci, Bookchin, or other contemporary 
thinkers back in those years. It was not until the 1990s that the work of  
alternative movements began to be translated from English; even those that 
PART 3: 
THE KURDISH ANSWER:  
DEMOCRATIC CONFEDERLISM 
Havin Guneser with Eleanor Finley 
102 
were translated were subsequently censored. For example, The Origin of  the 
Family by Engels went against the traditions of  society, so it was censored. 
Even the history of  the Middle East itself  was suppressed. Throughout 
the region, the nation-states that had formed were interested in completing 
processes of  cultural homogenisation. The information least available of  all 
was Kurdish history. By the 1970s, they had nearly succeeded in getting 
Kurdish people to forget that Kurdistan was divided into four parts. The 
majority of  Kurds knew only the history of  the part in which they lived. In 
this way, it came to be inscribed in the minds of  Kurds themselves that 
Kurdistan was barren, nowhere worth living in, backward, etc. They were 
participating in auto-assimilation. Thus, the founding members of  the PKK 
(and especially Öcalan) gave a great deal of  importance to education, 
reading, and the ability to draw conclusions from different movements and 
great deal of  studying was done during this period. 
The founding members of  the PKK were not all Kurdish and not all 
male. They came not only from one social class. Already within the initial 
group, we see the presence of  students, workers, women, and people of  
different ethnicities. This point is very important to making sense of  how 
and why the group developed the way that it did. If  we were to say that 
Öcalan and the PKK knew what they were doing from day one and that 
they had already arrived at their own paradigm in the 1970s, that would be 
incorrect. However, it would be correct to define Öcalan and the early 
founding members as people in the process of  questioning everything. 
They questioned what was being presented to them—even from the Left.  
The initial group began with a simple premise: Kurdistan is a colony. 
The issue is not simply about Turkey, but also about Iran, Iraq, and Syria, 
and as well about the hegemonic system in which they lived. That’s why 
they started saying that Kurdistan was an inter-state colony, an international 
colony. During this questioning, they established a political party that was 
Marxist–Leninist. To do so at the time of  the Cold War time was like 
creating a Molotov cocktail. One was banned from saying even the words 
“Kurd” or “Kurdistan” and instead people would use the letter “K”. So not 
only were they a political party that demanded freedom for Kurds and their 
homeland, but on top of  that, they were Marxist–Leninist. Of  course, 
people used to say “There’s no proletariat in Kurdistan, so you can’t be 
socialists! You have to first become a proletariat and then become a 
socialist.” There were all sorts of  funny and odd situations like that 
happening in the Middle East at that time. 
The relationship between the PKK and the Turkish left was complex. 
On the one hand, Kurds needed to form a separate movement because the 
issue of  Kurdish colonization would not be taken up by the Turkish left. 
The PKK were also emboldened by national movements around the world, 
such as the Vietnamese liberation movement and the ideas of  Franz Fanon. 
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On the other hand, the PKK was inspired and influenced by the Turkish 
Left and leftists who were killed by the Turkish state. Öcalan and the 
founders saw that in order to unite, first you had to separate and build 
yourself  on your own roots. Today, we’re seeing that there is indeed a re-
emergence of  unity and coming together. Öcalan was also very cautious not 
to become the disciple of  some kind of  centre, which was common in 
those days—either Moscow, Albania, or China. Öcalan refused all that. He 
said that what was needed was to be able to understand Marxism and 
Leninism and to implement the ideas according to the conditions of  
Kurdistan.  
Öcalan was very critical of  so-called “real socialism” at the time. Can 
you imagine the Molotov cocktail here as well? Firstly, you’re Kurdish. 
Secondly, you’re Marxist–Leninist in the 1970s. But then you’re also critical 
of  the Left within the Middle East and in Turkey as well as the mainstream 
Left, including USSR or China. This was a very difficult situation in which 
to stay alive. Apart from the Kurdish people themselves, there really has 
been no support for the Kurdish movement itself. If  the USSR was what it 
was claiming to be, why did it ignore the Kurdish people if  they are also 
Marxist–Leninists? If  the Iranian Left, the Iraqi Left, and the Turkish Left 
are also Marxist–Leninists, why were they doing the same? Although it 
appeared like a negative situation (and in many respects was), the fact that 
they were ignored or excluded from virtually all other political tendencies 
gave them the courage to question all of  these tendencies. Until very 
recently, if  you asked anyone but Kurds about the PKK, you got a very 
negative answer. The left wing would say they’re nationalist. The religious 
wing would say they’re atheist. The Turkish state would say they’re 
Armenian, which is a terrible word to say in Turkey, it’s like a blasphemy. 
You get all these contradictory descriptions about one and the same 
organisation and movement. It means that the Kurdish movement has 
questioned everything that was there. 
 
Soul-Searching within the PKK (1990–2010)  
During the early 1990s, the world witnessed the collapse of  the USSR. 
Although Öcalan was already critical of  the Soviet Union, he saw this 
happening and started to analyse. He didn’t give up on socialism or 
communism, but instead he wrote a book called To Insist on Socialism is to 
Insist upon Being a Human-Being.  
Thus, during this period, there was a great deal of  questioning about 
activities within the PKK. In 1996, his analysis concluded that we need to 
kill the dominant male. I remember very distinctly that from the years 1997 
to 1998, Öcalan spoke about real socialist practices within the PKK. That is 
why this is such a dynamic and non-dogmatic movement. The questioning 
was not only towards the outside, but also towards the inside. The PKK did 
Havin Guneser with Eleanor Finley 
104 
a lot of  doing and thinking, thinking and doing at the same time. And that’s 
something very important for Öcalan, and he continues to say it to date. 
He’s very much of  a dialectical thinker in that way, insisting that you should 
think as you do and do as you think so that you may find different ways of  
doing and different ways of  thinking.  
Öcalan set up a school garden, which he likened to Socrates’ garden. 
There, revolutionaries would discuss the developments of  the organisation, 
the questions that face the movement, and the questions that face 
revolutionary people and humanity in general. He drew many conclusions 
from those discussions. He did not allow himself  to be affected negatively 
by a question or criticism. Instead, he would go and re-question and try to 
understand why things happened the way they did. For example, he said 
that you cannot doubt the intentions of  the people who make revolution. 
Instead, you must go back and interrogate the tools and the meanings that 
were given to do things. He made similar remarks regarding feminism. 
Feminism has been great at making invisible the loss of  women’s freedom, 
but where did this go wrong? How did it become elite and come to lack 
grounding within the people? 
There were pragmatic points as well. From the very beginning, Öcalan 
was looking at the question of  the State. But neither the Left nor the Right 
addressed this problem, apart from anarchism, but even this tendency didn’t 
offer an alternative solution. Perhaps in this we can see why he was later 
inspired by Bookchin. The freedom movement imagined an independent 
and free socialist Kurdistan within a Middle Eastern confederation—there 
was always the hope of  this re-unification at some point. However, in 1993, 
Öcalan said for the very first time that there could be talks with Turkey, that 
there could be a solution within the official borders of  Turkey. Of  course, 
outside observers thought this decision was entirely tactical. Although it was 
arguably more of  a practical than paradigmatic step, it was also the first 
time that Öcalan definitively broke away from the idea of  a separate state. 
At a practical level, he approached the issue so that it could be resolved 
within the borders of  the Turkish state. 
I should emphasise the developments concerning women’s freedom 
during this period. The dimension of  freedom for women had been formed 
as a branch of  the party, just like any other party or national liberation 
movement. In the early 1990s, however, there was a huge influx of  young 
women into the PKK, which represented a hope for freedom not only in 
terms of  ethnic repression on the Kurds, but also regarding social relations. 
Because the PKK was Marxist–Leninist, it rejected feudal relationships and 
ways of  treating women. In fact, before the PKK fought the Turkish state, 
it fought the feudal lords. Early on, it was the feudal lords who showed 
resistance to this movement. As agents of  the State, they prevented the 
PKK from growing, so it could not enter into the rest of  society. 
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Ocalan’s Abduction and Captivity (1999–) 
In 1999 Öcalan was in Kenya and, as a result of  a NATO operation led by 
USA, UK, and Israel, he was handed over to Turkey. All of  these 
discussions lay in the background alongside the ever-present need for 
Öcalan to find a solution to what was happening to the Kurds. Those who 
know Kurdish history know that supressing rebellions is actually about 
capturing the leader, killing the leader, and then massacring the people. The 
Kurds are acutely aware of  this history. There were approximately 20 
rebellions in the recent past of  the Kurds—they have experienced this day 
in and day out. Thus, when Öcalan was abducted, all Kurds were on the 
streets protesting what they knew was coming if  he was killed in the hands 
of  the Turkish state.  
There’s a very strong link between how the Kurds see Öcalan and what 
he represents for the Kurdish people historically and presently. He is of  
course a tested leader who has guided the Kurds in and out of  grave 
situations. Moreover, he has helped Kurds become proud of  who they are 
and helped show them that they have dignity. The Turkish state wrote 
volumes about how Kurds are in fact “mountain Turks”: it is an ideology 
of  the State. They claimed that as Kurds walked in the snowy mountain 
trails, they made the sound of  “kat-kurt-kat-kurt,” and that’s where the 
word Kurd comes from. Can you imagine? This was considered rational 
thinking by university professors in Turkey! Can you imagine?  
Thus, the abduction of  Öcalan in 1999 was a major rupture because of  
what it represented in the history of  the Kurdish freedom movement and 
the history of  the Kurds in general.  
Öcalan’s abduction was also historically significant because of  the way 
he handled this chaotic moment. Many movements within the Middle 
East—especially in Turkey—exclaimed that the PKK’s leader had just 
betrayed them and called upon them to take their weapons and join them. 
Instead, what Öcalan asked for was for countless people to go onto the 
streets around the world in protest. Some even burned themselves alive. 
This direct action by Kurdish people stopped many horrible possibilities, 
including any plans there may have been to harm Öcalan during his 
abduction from Kenya to Turkey. There were many who expected him to 
go on a hunger strike, but instead he asked for calm. 
Öcalan and the movement could foresee the intervention of  the world 
system into the Middle East. In fact, he dates the beginning of  this 
intervention to October 9th, 1998, the day he was pushed out of  Syria. In 
his books, Öcalan recalls that in 1998 Israel sent an envoy to him. They 
wanted him to accept Israel’s patronage regarding the Kurdish question and 
its resolution. Öcalan could neither accept it morally nor politically. As a 
result, his odyssey began, which Kurds call the “international plot”.  
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Öcalan made use of  this rupture quiet positively. In prison, he had more 
time to read. He requested thousands of  books and one of  the authors, of  
course, is Murray Bookchin. One could say that the Kurdish freedom 
movement revitalized Bookchin’s ideas; the Kurdish freedom movement is 
the most influential struggle in the world that has been inspired by him. 
What Bookchin wrote helped Öcalan immensely to find his own questions 
from a philosophical background.  
Just as it was a Molotov cocktail in the 1970s to be Kurdish and 
Marxist–Leninist, in the 2000s—just when people expected something else 
of  him—Öcalan declared, “No, we don’t want a state”. Can you imagine the 
world’s reaction? Some people said it must be out of  personal fear. The 
Kurds thought, “It’s tactical, it must be definitely tactical”. At the time, it was 
thought that peoples without a state are like people without a father: a 
bastard. Without a state, you’re bullied, massacred. Therefore, you aspire to 
have a state because that this is where liberation lies. As Öcalan went into 
questioning, he realized that was one of  the traps that most of  the Left fell into.  
In 1999, with local elections in Turkey, Kurds began to be active in the 
municipalities for the very first time. They became mayors and council 
members of  the municipalities. Öcalan had told all of  the mayors about 
Bookchin’s Urbanisation Without Cities and instructed them to have this book 
on their table, to study and read it. He also studied The Ecology of  Freedom in 
depth. The title of  Öcalan’s third major volume, Sociology of  Freedom, reflects 
that. The book that most reflects inspiration from Bookchin is currently in 
process of  being translated. It is a huge book and it’s the foundation of  
Manifesto for a Democratic Civilisation, two volumes of  which you see here. This 
book is where he deals with issues of  hierarchy, domination and state theory.  
Öcalan wanted to understand the source of  the problem of  the State in 
the depths of  history. As he got in deeper and deeper, he reached some 
conclusions. He looked at how slavery was built and the basis of  the State 
on three pillars. As Bookchin emphasized, it doesn’t happen through the 
use of  pure violence. Rather, it’s coupled with other things. For example, 
Öcalan says that when violence wasn’t enough, ideological and religious 
narrative had to come into play. So if  you don’t accept what’s going on 
through sheer force, there’s the ideological narrative as well. If  you’re not 
accepting that, then your livelihood and economy are taken away from you, 
so you’re made economically dependent as well. We see all of  this reflected 
in mythology. This is why Öcalan describes his method as interpretive. He 
looks at mythologies and tries to see what they are telling us in terms of  the 
struggle.  
The difference between Öcalan and Bookchin is that Öcalan stretches 
back to the Neolithic period and he associates the issue of  class and nation 
with the loss of  freedom of  women and her system.1 Öcalan doesn’t 
attribute the loss of  woman’s freedom to her biology; he sees it as the loss 
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of  the moral and political society that she founded and guided. He says that 
in order for society to be subdued and dominated, women had to be 
subdued and dominated. The beginning of  state society is the 
institutionalisation of  patriarchy. It’s not to say that there wasn’t any 
hierarchy or domination, but that statist class civilisation as we know it 
begins with the institutionalisation of  hierarchy, and not just hierarchy 
alone. This is very important. 
Öcalan is thus asking what happened to what he calls “moral and 
political society” throughout history. His point of  departure is the Kurdish 
question. Throughout 48 years, throughout asking all of  these questions, 
and throughout the seemingly impossible resolution to the Kurdish 
question due to national, regional, and international issues, he came to the 
point of  trying to understand in depth what is actually happening to us as 
humans. That is why, in the 2000s, when everybody expected him to come 
up with something utterly different, he came out with democratic 
confederalism: a non-state solution for not only the Kurdish question, but 
for the social questions we are experiencing throughout the world. 
Bookchin was very important for Öcalan, especially the several books he 
obtained, and he continually asked for others that had been translated into 
Turkish. 
 
The Present: Where Do the Answers Lie? 
Öcalan looks at it like this. There are three components to how we are 
enslaved: (1) violence; (2) ideology; and (3) economic. Where do the 
answers lie? Firstly, it’s important to remember that we’re not the first in 
this freedom struggle; we are part of  and linked to a chain. But this chain is 
dispersed. It needs to be brought together. Öcalan attempts to do this, 
which he outlines in an essay Sociology of  Freedom, by linking together the 
people, the communities, the women who have struggled for freedom. If  
there is a history of  states, domination, hierarchy, the city/class/state 
civilisation, he argues, then there is another civilisation, which he calls the 
democratic civilisation of  peoples, women, workers, craftspeople, clans, tribes, 
etc. who resist these centralisations. Therefore, he clarifies, “I’m not doing 
anything new, I’m just trying to make visible what is already there”. 
Öcalan’s unit of  history is moral and political society, which I believe 
Bookchin calls organic society. However, Öcalan bases this moral and 
political society on the loss of  women’s freedom, so women are key agents. 
Therefore, he realizes that freedom and revolutionary struggles of  the past 
fell into some traps regarding violence of  the army and the military 
(including the PKK) and he asks, “How do we redefine this?” There’s 
extraordinary violence being applied against the people, even at this very 
moment. It’s not just economic, there’s sheer physical violence at the same 
time. There needs to be what he calls self-defence, to protect yourself—not 
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to attack, but to protect yourself. He feels that there needs to be a force to 
open space for this.  
The second piece is ideology. This is why there is Jineology [a science of  
women], so that women can decide on what their history is and not just rely 
on the history that is given to us. And this is necessary for the history of  
the people as well. 
How do you become independent of  state structures? As we can see, 
states today are grabbing people off  the land and putting them in the mid-
dle of  the road, especially in the Middle East. But this is also happening 
across the world. We are witnessing a reconquering of  these geographies, 
of  their land and riches. Through them, they are making the European and 
Anglo-Saxon world a little bit scared so that they’ll go and embrace the 
State as a “protection” against what’s coming. They’re using populations 
against one another. And they are using economics. So how do we develop 
an independent economics and living from the State in response? This is 
the fundamental point. Öcalan says that you can’t conquer the State and 
then make it useless and have a classless society. No, forget about that. 
What is crucial is to organise the people so that they can organise their 
spaces independent of  the State, which is nothing but a monopoly and the 
peak of  all monopolies that have arisen throughout time: military, ideologi-
cal, cultural, industrial, monetary, etc.  
He’s separating governance from the State and he’s creating tools like 
democratic confederalism that can find a compromise with the State. It 
goes over boundaries; it goes to individuals as well. We cannot expect to 
change the system if  we don’t change ourselves. However, our change 
cannot be on the basis of  the individual; we need to have an organised 
society. We’re seeing capitalism destroy society, not only nature—Öcalan 
calls it societycide, the killing of  society. He believes this is the biggest 
problem at present. What revolutionaries should do is keep these forces off  
of  society so that moral and political society has the space to reawaken and 
to function once again.  
This is the soul of  the matter: whatever format you have, it means 
nothing if  the soul isn’t in the right spot. But the soul must be accompanied 
by tools that can further it. 
The Nation-State defines itself  on a mindset of  nationalism. How do we 
define ourselves, what is our mindset? The same as Bookchin—freedom. 
This is something dynamic. The nation is static. That’s why Öcalan defines 
the democratic nation on two characteristics: freedom and solidarity. It is a 
mutualistic and dynamic identity. 
 
Note 
1. While Bookchin carefully examines Neolithic society in the Ecology of  
Freedom and traces the development of  hierarchical society in Sumer in 
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contrast to the rest of  Mesopotamian society, he does not link 
specifically the loss of  freedom with the loss of  freedom of  women. 
See also Chapter 2, The Emergence of  Hierarchy and Chapter 3, The Legacy 
of  Domination. Similarly, the first chapter of  Urbanization Without Cities 








The History of  Cities in North Kurdistan 
After the foundation of  the Republic of  Turkey, the cities in North (Turk-
ish-occupied) Kurdistan became progressively poorer relative to those in 
the Turkish state. This led to comparatively weak municipalities ruled by so-
called system parties, which were hierarchical, corrupt, and extremely alien-
ated from the population. They also formed part of  the repression 
mechanism. There were no big investments by the colonialist state in North 
Kurdistan (also known as Bakur), except in the three provinces in the west-
ern part of  Bakur with a high non-Kurdish population: Meletî (Malatya), 
Xarput (Elazığ) and Dîlok (Gaziantep). While the biggest city in Bakur, Di-
yarbakir (Amed) was, in the 1920s, the third most important economic city 
within the Turkish state after Istanbul and Izmir, 70–80 years later it be-
came one of  the poorest. However, in terms of  Kurdistan, Turkey, and the 
Middle East we have to consider that municipalities were historically weaker 
than those in Europe. While the smaller cities often had no municipal ad-
ministrations, the mid-sized and large cities were administered directly by an 
appointed governor. Communities organized themselves in large part out-
side of  municipalities—it was different, but not necessarily better. 
In the 1950s a steadily increasing migration wave started from the Kurd-
ish cities and some regions of  Anatolia to the larger cities in the West and 
South of  the Turkish state, particularly Istanbul. Thus Turkish cities grew at 
a faster rate compared with Kurdish cities. Nevertheless, many people also 
moved to the cities of  North Kurdistan. Due to limited financial capacity, 
most new housing buildings were built by the migrating people, leading to 
poor neighbourhoods and slums. In the 1970s strong leftist Turkish and 
Kurdish movements became stronger and won local elections in some cities 
in Turkey and Bakur. Together with social movements some of  these cities 
could be even governed with elements of  direct democracy. However, the 
cities ruled by leftist socialists/communists led to better social services, 
more democratic rights and more cultural opportunities for the people. 
While not used as a term, the right to the city could be realized better this way 
than through the party systems. In these years the Kurdish Freedom 
Movement (KFM), with the PKK in its centre, evolved among other politi-
cal Kurdish and revolutionary movements and gained, within a short time, 
serious support by the proletarian and student youth. PKK candidates 
could also win elections—for example, in Elîh (Batman). 
But the military coup in 1980 eliminated all achieved rights in these cities 
and the whole state of  Turkey established a fascist regime, laying the basis 
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for neoliberalism, which spread, although more slowly than in other 
countries. In Turkish cities life quality fell. For example, almost all social 
and cultural centres, cinemas and theatres were shut down, and the first 
steps of  privatization were initiated—bus lines were the first areas 
dominated by privatization. While in the 1970s villages were more at the 
heart of  the society, in the 1980s migration away from rural areas increased. 
In 1984 the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) started an armed rebellion 
against the colonialist Turkish state. In the beginning of  the 1990s it devel-
oped as a mass movement in several Kurdish provinces. In 1991 and 1992, 
when repression was still not absolutely dominating everything, a short but 
strong civil dynamic evolved in a number of  cities in Bakur. The KFM also 
gained support in cities. In parallel, in some Turkish cities leftist organiza-
tions became a bit stronger, but could not achieve the level prior to the 
military coup of  1980. But in the second half  of  the 1980s the social de-
mocrats won local elections in most big cities, but with absolutely no 
democratic impulse, ending up in corruption and mismanagement. From 
1993 onwards the revolutionary dynamic in Bakur’s cities was oppressed 
completely, ushering in difficult times. In rural areas the Turkish Army de-
stroyed up to 4,000 Kurdish villages and forcibly displaced more than 2 
million people. While some fled to Europe, the majority moved to Turkish 
cities. Still, a significant number moved to the cities of  Bakur. Several cities 
doubled the number of  residents—Amed, Elîh, Nisêbîn (Nusaybin) and 
Cizre. Those cities were totally unprepared and could not cope with the 
sudden mass migration, resulting in serious problems with water supply, 
sewage water, housing, waste and health. The central government did not 
help with anything. An increasing proletarianization of  the cities was the 
result with a high poverty, street children, prostitution and perceivable 
crime. In cities, civil society was either politically and democratically disor-
ganized, or had no capacity. Yet, they were under political pressure to show 
solidarity with refugees, who arrived with almost nothing. It took several 
years to overcome the worst impacts. However in these years, although the 
State implemented broad state terrorism, the KFM could not be defeated; 
rather an equilibrium was maintained between 1994 and 1999. 
An international plot led to the kidnapping of  Abdullah Öcalan, leader 
of  the PKK and central to the KFM, to Turkey in February 1999 in which 
the Greek state was also involved. This led to the cessation of  armed 
struggle in the ensuing months. The KFM commenced fresh discussions 
about a new strategy on a theoretical and practical basis. The political 
struggle in the cities moved into the centre of  the whole struggle. Within 
this approach the municipalities played an important role. Just at the time 
of  the international plot local elections were held in Turkey. 
Ercan Ayboga and Egit Pale 
112 
Cities Under the Governance of  the Kurdish Freedom 
Movement 
The Kurdish Freedom Movement (KFM) has achieved increasing successes 
in local elections since 1999. In a surprise win in 1999, the legal party of  the 
KFM—HADEP (People’s Democracy Party)—won several big cities like 
Amed, Wan, Elîh and Agirî (Ağrı). The KFM was challenged with govern-
ing several big cities and needed to prove it had better social-democratic 
concepts than other parties for the local level. The end of  the war in Bakur 
led to less oppression by the Turkish state and some space to act politically 
at a legal level. While the KFM ruled, some infrastructure and basic ser-
vices experienced significant improvements, but concerning democracy 
and people’s political participation, development was slower and charac-
terized by structural difficulties. Considering centuries of  authoritarianism, 
oppression, assimilation, corruption and a lack of  open democratic relations, 
this was not surprising. A positive aspect in these years was that civil society 
and social movements became stronger in Bakur, becoming important ac-
tors in the cities. They joined the discussions to develop more social and 
ecological cities, and made multiple proposals and requests to the munici-
palities for which they voted too. So the right to the city began to be 
discussed the first time in a broad way in Bakur. 
The KFM discussed generally in these years the new political concept 
until in 2005 democratic confederalism was declared by Öcalan. It was the 
first main step of  systematizing the new approach, which developed over 
the years. Between 2005 and 2008 the PKK Guerrilla and Turkish Army 
clashed briefly because the Turkish AKP government did not take essential 
steps for the solution of  the Kurdish question—it just ignored it and re-
duced the question to individual rights. In 2006 a big uprising occurred in 
Amed and several other cities, leading to the collapse of  the State for some 
days. Proletarian youth were at the forefront of  this revolt. The State was 
shocked and commenced measures to quell the uprisings. 
In 2007, when the framework was discussed for two years, the Democ-
ratic Society Congress (KCD; also named DTK) was founded and many 
KFM members started to reorganize society based on the “paradigm of  a 
democratic, ecological and gender liberated society” as democratic confed-
eralism proclaimed. The KCD is an umbrella of  all organizations close to 
the KFM, with a leftist democratic stand, and is considered a platform with 
a new approach for doing politics. At the same time the KCD is an alterna-
tive to parliamentarian democracy, which is in a structural crisis in both 
Turkey and the rest of  the world. It propagates radical democracy and has 
many structures expressed in its councils and assemblies at different levels. 
There are today 14 sectors, also called political spheres, covering a wide 
range of  focus areas (e.g. politics, women, youth, economy, health, ecology, 
justice, beliefs, education and diplomacy). In other words the KCD is the 
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“council of  councils”. The model it is developing in practice is called “de-
mocratic autonomy”. 
With democratic confederalism the theoretical base of  “free municipal-
ism” has been laid in principal. In this sense the first steps have been taken 
to set up people’s assemblies at the neighbourhood level, as well as women 
and youth councils wherever the KFM had substantial support in Bakur, 
and even in those cities in Turkey where there are significant Kurdish popu-
lations. At higher levels the delegates of  these people’s assemblies meet 
social movements, NGO’s, parties, municipalities, unions and other organi-
zations and sectors in city/district and provincial councils. At the top is the 
general assembly of  the KCD with 501 members. The inclusion of  all will-
ing organizations and players at these higher levels in society is a crucial 
element of  the new political project. 
In 2010 the “First Conference on Ecology and Local Authorities” was 
realized. Its framework stated that municipalities organize society based on 
four pillars: organized society and participative approach; ecological life; 
gender-liberated approach; and participative social economy. Crucially, its 
focus was on cities, considering that the majority of  the population of  Ba-
kur was living in cities—migration never ceased due to economic reasons. 
At the conference, the search for radical democracy and self-organization 
far away from the (nation) State and representative democracy was dis-
cussed in depth with strong emotions. Strengthening the women’s 
movement was considered elementary for successful progress, as the gender 
question is believed to be the main contradiction in society. Without the 
strong involvement of  women and a raised consciousness regarding gender 
relations, emancipative processes can lack substance. 
After the intensive war period of  2011 and 2012, democratic autonomy 
and its related self-organizing structures like the people’s assemblies became 
stronger. In 2013 and 2014 the women’s movement spread to all parts of  
society, leading economics and ecology activists to create real social move-
ments and implement the first projects and campaigns. This was the result 
of  raising critical consciousness in the society of  Bakur. Crucially, the first 
urban struggles came up against some large housing projects, the cutting of  
green areas and forests, the construction of  shopping malls, the transfor-
mation of  state areas in city centres into commercial areas, and 
intervention by the State into city planning. The struggles were a reply to 
increased pressure by the AKP government for gentrification, commer-
cialization and control of  cities with a so-called “security” motivation. The 
AKP wanted to increase profits in all areas and cities of  the country where 
what the DBP (Party of  Democratic Regions, the KFM party within the 
People’s Democratic Party—HDP) considered were an obstacle. The 
HDP/DBP municipalities and several social movements resisted against 
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gentrification and the displacement of  residents of  poor neighbourhoods. 
Some struggles succeeded; some did not. 
But some social movements protested against the HDP/DBP municipali-
ties, where they had (perhaps deliberately) failed to grasp the implications of  
development or the logic of  capitalism and simply followed the market-
based approach of  the State. A serious number of  projects like housing 
estates and parks, as well as some elements of  city planning were oriented 
towards neoliberal capitalist policies. It took years for social movements and 
civil society organizations to have a strong impact against these neoliberal 
projects of  the HDP/DBP municipalities. This was made possible through 
public critique, political actions, face-to-face meetings, as well as the KCD 
umbrella structure. As a whole the KCD took the critique of  municipalities 
seriously and started a broad discussion with all member organizations. In 
the years 2012–2013 the municipalities redirected their policies towards a 
more ecological and socially-oriented direction. 
The KCD has to be understood as a structure where it sometimes re-
quires a long time to make decisions as discussions are requested by many 
organizations and members. When a decision is taken, it is binding on all 
member organizations, although there is no basis for enforcement within 
the Turkish legal system. The people’s council at city level of  the KCD sys-
tem stands over the official city council. If  the city council has a majority 
from the KCD, then they must take decisions in line with the decisions of  
the KCD. Furthermore, the municipalities have to work closely with the 
people’s assemblies at the neighbourhood level. 
The neighbourhood people’s assemblies are key to developing democratic 
and participative cities. People’s assemblies have to be considered the main 
driver, especially considering the existing representative political structures, 
which are not able to develop political solutions to local needs. 
This mechanism allows civil organizations and groups in the city to in-
fluence decisions about the city and is crucial for limiting corruption and 
reducing alienation of  the population. If  there is a critical, social, ecological 
and gender-free awareness in society, decisions will improve and the right to 
the city will be better realized. In the early years the municipalities and city 
councils ruled by the people and parties of  the KFM often failed to follow 
the principles and decisions of  the KCD, but in the last 4–5 years it has 
changed for the better. Nevertheless the contradictions within the system 
remain. 
When the terrorist Islamic State (IS) besieged Kobanî in Rojava in fall 
2014, millions of  people in Bakur and also Turkey revolted in dozens of  
cities. The Turkish state lost control of  many cities and could not hold its 
position without terrorizing the population; many people were systematically 
shot. In three days over 40 civilians were murdered. This strong uprising, led 
by broad masses and joined by many leftist people and other movements in 
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Bakur and Turkey, was a bigger shock for the Turkish state than the upris-
ing of  2006. It showed how weak the base of  the Turkish state in Bakur 
actually was in reality. 
Between 2013 and 2015 people’s assemblies emerged in most urban 
neighbourhoods of  Bakur, partially overcoming the weaknesses of  the first 
years (2007–2011). The internal democratic processes, women’s participation 
and a communal ecological awareness became significantly stronger. The 
people’s assemblies acted more confidently in their cities and society. This was 
an important contribution to democratic culture and decision-making. In 
2015 the foundation of  hundreds of  communes spread to the politically well-
organized cities of  Bakur (e.g. Cizre, Gever, and Nisêbîn). This development 
followed the practice in Rojava, the Syrian part of  Kurdistan liberated in 2012 
in the midst of  the intensifying war, where a social revolution progressed 
quickly towards implementing radical democracy. The reason is obvious: peo-
ple’s assemblies at the neighbourhood level were not enough for a strong self-
organized society and large-scale participation. In the neighbourhoods many 
people remained outside of  the political structures. 
In many cities the declarations of  self-governance in summer 2015 were 
a result of  this strengthening of  the people’s assemblies and the setting up 
of  communes—i.e. the deepening and enlarging of  radical democracy. But 
they were subsequently made instrumental by the Turkish state in its new 
war against the Kurds. 
 
Challenges 
When the KCD was founded, neoliberalism within the Turkish state was 
becoming very strong. The economy policies of  the KFM in the first years 
were too weak to counter the State or capitalism. Neoliberalism created a 
strong pressure on KFM municipalities where decision-makers were often 
politically and ideologically too weak to understand or challenge capitalist 
mechanisms. Neoliberalism also affected many political activists from the 
KFM. Yet in spite of  these forces, the KFM pushed forward and achieved 
some results, including setting up dozens of  cooperatives in 2014. 
However, the constituent actors have a problem in that they are unable 
to balance theory and practice. One of  the main problems in practice is the 
hierarchy within the KFM member organizations, particularly the munici-
palities. While on the one hand a participative democracy and a horizontal 
and decentralized social life is aimed for and developed, on the other hand 
hierarchical and centrist relations between constituent actors continue to 
exist in a hidden way. Within the new organizational structures hierarchies 
continue to exist and even, under certain circumstances, grow from time to 
time. 
The interventions of  the Turkish nation-state against the constituent ac-
tors has led to instability. In 2009 massive arrests started against activists 
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and continued until 2012 as the so-called “KCK operations”, which inter-
rupted the development of  participative structures, bringing numerous 
organizations to existential problems. After the new war commenced in 
2015 arrests and repressions far exceeded those of  prior years, and some 
organizations could no longer function. Since then, municipalities have 
been usurped by the Turkish government and the war has affected many 
cities in a number of  ways. 
 
Urban Warfare and the New Wave of  Gentrification 
When the Turkish government unilaterally recommenced war in July 2015 
against the PKK and Kurds, it was a matter of  a few weeks until the war 
reached the cities of  Bakur. State forces met the strong resistance of  the 
organized population with such heavy and brutal military means that hun-
dreds of  civilians were murdered. However, the massive physical 
destruction of  cities occurred after the cessation of  armed conflict. The 
State blockaded the contested cities, systematically erasing parts of  the cities 
of  Cizre and Gever, most of  Şirnex and Nisebîn, and half  of  the old city 
of  Amed, called Sur. The houses of  more than 200,000 people were de-
stroyed, leaving refugees to disperse to other cities of  Bakur. 
The war has been used by the Turkish state as an opportunity to destroy 
cities or neighbourhoods where the population was very oppositional and 
politically well organized. It continues to punish the population and imple-
ment longstanding gentrification policies. Since 2017 the State has been 
building new houses in the ruined neighbourhoods according to a new plan 
for wide roads. Through a permanent change to the demography it wants to 
destroy forever the social and cultural structures in these cities so that the 
displaced people will be unable to organize themselves again in a political 
way. What the Turkish government calls “urban transformation” can just as 
easily be implemented in neighbourhoods where no armed clashes took 
place—no neighbourhood is safe! 
The war in the mountains of  Bakur between the Turkish Army and the 
PKK guerrilla continues at an intensive level. Political pressure on the 
whole population in Bakur is increasing, particularly through the state of  
emergency declared in July 2016. More than 10,000 public employees have 
lost their jobs, and 10,000 politically active Kurds have been arrested, al-
most all HDP-ruled municipalities have been seized by the State through 
the appointment of  state commissioners. Hundreds of  associations in Ba-
kur have been closed and the oppression on the Kurdish media is so strong 
that all free media has been shut down. 
The State has banned de facto the Kurdish language in cities —signs are 
no longer bilingual, municipal-operated Kurdish kindergartens and theatres 
have been shut down, and Kurdish books have been destroyed. In the 
streets fly tens of  thousands of  Turkish flags. All youth, cultural, social, and 
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women’s centres have been shut down or seized, with new personnel and 
materials replaced with totally contrary content. More than two dozen co-
operatives linked to the municipalities have been shut down. Most social, 
ecological and women-focused developments implemented since 1999 by 
the KFM have been destroyed or reversed. What is being experienced in 
Bakur is open dictatorship—fascism is not far away. 
The larger aim of  the State is to create contradictions among the Kurds 
and marginalize the KFM in Bakur. But it has not worked. Although people 
do not demonstrate much and seldom join protest actions, they are yet to 
support the State. Any suggestion they do is merely Turkish propaganda. 
People still feel close to the KFM, recalling its long struggle for freedom 
and democratic organization since 2000. Kurds who support the AKP are 
still a minority. 
Despite the repressions, the vast majority of  the Bakur people remain in 
their homeland. The number of  refugees in Europe or elsewhere from Ba-
kur is still small—only people faced with arrest leave Bakur. This is a key 
difference compared with the 1990s. The majority of  the population feels 
that the AKP government cannot maintain this level of  oppression in the 
long term, and the day of  its breakdown is close. It seems that an appropriate 






Do We Need a New Theory of  the State?  
Metin Guven 
 
The struggle for the right to the city is growing in different contexts all over 
the world. For example, tens of  thousands of  people rebelled to protect 
Gezi Park in Istanbul in 2013, yet their actual driving motivation was 
resisting the authoritarian government that is trying to control every aspect 
of  citizens’ lives and to suppress every movement that raises concerns. 
Therefore, it is becoming increasingly important to understand how that 
context is changing in a dynamic world that is transitioning into a new 
world order. Old powers are losing their ground and new powers are rising. 
The neoliberal policies of  globalization are adversely affecting the living 
conditions of  people. Because of  these changes, authoritarian governments 
and right-wing populism are becoming more common. 
I will try to explore what kind of  transformation period we are going 
through first, then I will try to explain the historical differences of  
domination among the main civilizations and why I think we would 
understand the outcome of  the current transformation better if  we develop 
a new theory of  the State that includes the various state evolutions, 
especially in Asia.  
 
The Current Transition of  World Leadership 
Fourteen years ago the Iraq war was on the agenda, neocons of  the US 
were planning to take over Iraq in order to establish a friendly government 
and access cheap oil to stop the decline of  the US economy. Within a few 
years it became a debacle; Iraqi resistance increased the cost of  the war to 
trillions of  dollars. It also caused the collapse of  the US hegemony project. 
In 2006 neocons left all positions in the US government. The US entered 
into so much debt that it hasn’t been in a position to start another war 
since. Yet the actual decline of  the US started in 1970s, with the loss of  the 
Vietnam War being an important turning point. Some relief  was provided 
by neoliberalism and monetary policies during the late 1980s, as well as new 
economic and financial expansion in the 1990s. However, these policies 
could not prevent the 2001 recession. The US succeeded in attracting 
capital flow, but manufacturing in the US was too costly and profit rates 
were too low. Most investment went to new technologies, but the expected 
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rate of  consumption was not realized. The recession of  2008–2009 was 
even worse, and the next recession could be the worst of  all given that 
income and wealth imbalances are at a historical high. 
If  we look at the decline of  the US in a historical perspective this seems 
inevitable. Giovanni Arrighi (2007, p.235) explains four systemic cycles of  
capital accumulation:  
 
Recurrent system-wide financial expansions appeared to return, new 
rounds of  inter-capitalist competition, interstate rivalries, accumulation by 
dispossession, and production of  space on an ever-increasing scale 
revolutionized the geography and mode of  operation of  world capitalism, 
as well as its relationship with imperialistic practices. Thus, if  we focus on 
the “containers of  power” that have housed the “headquarters” of  the 
leading capitalist agencies of  successive cycles of  accumulation, we 
immediately see a progression from a city-state and cosmopolitan business 
diaspora (the Genoese); to a proto-national state (the United Provinces) 
and its joint-stock chartered companies; to a multinational state (the 
United Kingdom) and its globe-encircling tributary empire; to a 
continent-sized national state (the US) and its world-encompassing system 
of  transnational corporations, military bases, and institutions of  world 
governance. 
 
One hundred years ago the world was in another transition period, with the 
UK’s global leadership of  capitalism on the decline. Investing in the UK 
was not profitable; capital was flowing to the US for a higher profit. The US 
economy was already the largest in the world. The UK economy had been 
financialized just as the US economy today has been financialized. A 30-
year period, including two world wars, brought the end of  UK leadership. 
For the US, a similar period started with Iraq War. There likely will not be 
another war since the US doesn’t seem to be able to reduce its foreign debt 
and prepare for another war. Also, other opportunities to start a war 
between rivals seems very difficult. However, the period of  the US global 
leadership either has already ended or it will end in the near future 
depending on how that leadership is defined. The US elite are in disarray 
regarding decisions on how to spend limited resources – whether to erect a 
wall on the Mexican border or to develop military capacity to match rivals 
China and Russia (Sonne and Harris, 2018). 
There are many possibilities for the next period. One possibility is a new 
world system with strong global actors including US, EU, China and India. 
But among these powers China might have much more power than others. 
The Chinese economy became the largest economy based on purchasing 
power parity in 2014. It is expected to be the largest in nominal prices 
during next decade and China is expected to be number one in wealth 
Metin Guven 
120 
during the 2030s when India’s economy is expected to catch up to the size 
of  the US economy (pwc.com, 2017). 
If  we witness another big recession due to the current financial bubble it 
may also mean the end of  liberal capitalism. According to Forbes, currently 
four of  the top ten global corporations are Chinese state banks (Forbes.com, 
2018). During the most recent recession China and India were affected the 
least. Even though they promote capitalist development in manufacturing 
and service sectors, they regulate and control their finance sector by state 
banks. For more than a thousand years Chinese bureaucracies have 
maintained a tradition of  controlling capitalist development and preventing it 
if  they think it could be a threat to the Chinese economy or state power. 
On the other hand, elites of  Western countries have started to realize that 
they don’t benefit from globalization anymore. The Trump administration 
has already started implementing a reversal of  globalization by restricting 
imports and other state interventions. The US might be forced to implement 
measures such as universal basic income to reduce social tensions as well. 
 
The Heritage of  Domination 
In short there is a high probability that states will play a more crucial role to 
maintain current domination forms; states may become the main driving 
force to change the balance of  different domination forms in favour of  
themselves. I think the concept of  the heritage of  domination is useful in 
understanding relationships between different domination forms. During 
the nineteenth century, revolutionary thinkers tried to explain social 
relationships based on class domination, as class struggle was mainly 
determining these relationships at that time. Then all other types of  social 
domination and the idea of  domination over nature became critical to 
understanding social contradictions in the twentieth century.  
Social ecology provides a strong framework with which to explain how 
the legacy of  domination and the legacy of  freedom played their roles 
throughout history and brought humanity into the current social and 
ecological crisis. However, since capitalism and Western powers were so 
dominant in determining social change during the twentieth century, the 
focus was mostly on capitalism, even though social ecology advocates the 
end of  all hierarchies and all types of  domination to create a free society. 
We may need to change that focus to the State in the near future if  state 
domination prevails over capitalism. 
Murray Bookchin (1982, p. 95) elaborates state domination: 
 
The State is not merely a constellation of  bureaucratic and coercive 
institutions. It is also a state of  mind, an instilled mentality for ordering 
reality. Accordingly, the State has a long history—not only institutionally 
but also psychologically. Apart from dramatic invasions in which 
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conquering peoples either completely subdue or virtually annihilate the 
conquered, the State evolves in gradations, often coming to rest during its 
overall historical development in such highly incomplete or hybridized 
forms that its boundaries are almost impossible to fix in strictly political 
terms. ...Its capacity to rule by brute force has always been limited. The 
myth of  a purely coercive, omnipresent State is a fiction that has served the 
state machinery all too well by creating a sense of  awe and powerlessness in 
the oppressed that ends in social quietism. Without a high degree of  
cooperation from even the most victimized classes of  society such as 
chattel slaves and serfs, its authority would eventually dissipate. Awe and 
apathy in the face of  State power are the products of  social conditioning 
that renders this very power possible. 
 
The evolution of  the State, Bookchin explained, will not stop and the State 
seems to increasingly manipulate the economy while developing tools to 
enhance the cooperation between the State and lower classes of  population. 
Historically, social theories have concentrated on European states, which 
were formed during cycles of  capitalist accumulation with strong allegiance 
to merchants and bankers. These states became capitalist nation-states at 
the end of  those state-making processes. However, states all over the world 
have been formed in a variety of  ways during decolonization in the 
twentieth century. Also cultural differences have made crucial differences in 
the evolution of  the State in different countries. If  we compare the oldest 
civilizations, states first emerged in Mesopotamia and Egypt more than five 
thousand years ago. These two civilizations had hierarchical social 
structures, leaving remnants of  big temples and palaces. However there is 
no evidence that similar buildings were constructed during Indus Valley 
civilization despite the fact that they built larger cities with better designs 
and more advanced water and sewage systems. Archaeologists haven’t yet 
found any evidence of  kings or military organizations or indications of  a 
hierarchical social organization in the Indus Valley. Some Indian scholars 
suggest that it could have been a democratic society, even though their 
writings haven’t been deciphered (Mayank and Nisha, 2011). It seems that 
the State emerged in India not as a result of  internal social dynamics, but 
was imposed by outsiders, namely Aryan invaders. Also, there is no 
correlation between the level of  civilization and the hierarchical structure 
of  a society. Eventually, the native people of  India accepted the imposed 
institutions, but Jainism and Buddhism—which were against the Aryan’s 
religion and the class system it brought—could have been influenced by 
their earlier civilization, and may have been part of  their culture, yet 
surfaced in a different form. 
The evolution of  the State in China was very different, too. It seems that 
states emerged during the second millennium BCE—with a gap of  more 
than one thousand years between the oldest states, which had different 
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characteristics. The first kings presented themselves as a God, or represen-
tative of  God, to legitimize their rule. However, in China the legitimacy of  
the king or emperor was based on a mandate of  heaven (or cosmos). They 
did not need to be a noble to gain that mandate, but if  they ignored the 
welfare of  the masses, or if  a natural disaster caused widespread misery, the 
people might assume that he had lost the mandate of  heaven. In such cases 
rebellion was seen as legitimate. This pressure on emperors to be just led to 
periods when land was distributed to peasants equally (it was very common 
during the period of  the Warring States). Also, local rebellions were 
monitored and taken seriously by rulers. The Chinese State has evolved with 
its own authoritarianism and rationality over more than two thousand years. 
 
The Axial Age and Later Developments 
The Axial Age is defined as the period between 800 and 200 BCE in which 
the main religions and philosophies were shaped throughout Eurasia. 
Before this period great empires collapsed and small kingdoms and states 
began fighting each other. As opposed to the times when empires lasted for 
long periods, there was uncertainty and insecurity during the Axial Age. As 
a result, many scholars started to think about the meaning of  life and how 
to deal with uncertainties. Then very different new ways of  thinking 
appeared (Graeber, 2011). We can compare these developments in three 
regions where the oldest civilizations emerged. 
In the region of  the Middle East/Europe both the first monotheistic re-
ligion and rational thinking appeared in Axial age. Greek democracy 
emerged based on ethics developed by rational reasoning, while Judaism 
was being shaped in the Middle East. Greek civilization attained peak 
achievements in many areas. However, even though the Macedonian and 
Roman empires later helped spread Greek culture throughout most of  
Europe and the Middle East, the core ideas of  Greek civilization—
democracy and ethics—disappeared. Instead, the Roman Empire adopted 
Christianity as its official religion well after the Axial Age. Philosophy was 
suppressed in favour of  monotheistic thought. Romans ransacked Greek 
cities taking writings and sculptures to Rome, sometimes killing or enslaving 
Greek philosophers and artists. They used the engineering knowledge of  
Greeks and copied their architecture and aesthetics. On the other hand, 
emperor Jovian in 363 CE burned the Royal Library of  Antioch as well as 
the temple since there were pagan writings there. At the end there was no 
continuity in Greek ideals. Those ideals, such as democracy and ethical soci-
ety resurfaced as part of  the heritage of  freedom about two thousand years 
after direct democracy was destroyed in Greece. Europe was under religious 
dogmatism until the seventeenth century while philosophy and science were 
being developed in other parts of  Eurasia. 
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In India both Hinduism and Buddhism appeared during the Axial Age. 
Basic concepts of  Hinduism were defined in the Upanishads written in this 
age. However, this philosophy has been adopted in a variety of  different 
ways. Eventually polytheistic forms of  Hinduism became dominant in In-
dia. Even though Buddhism shares some of  the concepts with the 
Upanishads, there is no worshiping of  any God in Buddhism. It teaches 
that “man can gain deliverance from suffering by his own efforts” (Access-
toinsight.org, 1995). During the late Axial Age, the Maurya Dynasty ruled 
almost all of  the Indian subcontinent. Ashoka was the grandson of  the 
founder of  the Maurya Dynasty and he became a Buddhist after a bloody 
war to conquest Kalinga about 263 BCE. That war converted him to a sta-
ble and peaceful emperor as a result of  the sorrow and regret he felt. He 
became a patron of  Buddhism until he died in 232 BCE. He left a legacy of  
peaceful ruling in harmony and diversity based on ethics he wrote in his 
edicts. These edicts included banning animal sacrifice and elimination of  
meat eating on many holidays. But this legacy did not provide a way of  self-
defence for people in India, nor could it prevent development of  the caste 
system. The history of  India has been mostly the history of  foreign inva-
sions by nomadic nations or imperialists, which were catastrophically worse 
than the former. 
The Axial Age in China was the period of  small kingdoms or states. 
Those states were consolidated into seven main states by 476 BCE. Then 
the Warring States period started. This was also a legalist period in which a 
realistic consolidation of  the wealth and power of  autocrats and the State 
was emphasized while ignoring morality and the goal of  an ideal rule. On 
the other hand, Confucius developed a philosophy based on secular 
morality. His rationality was mostly applied to the conduct of  state rule by 
an elite as opposed to the Greek rationality of  rule by the people. 
Confucian ideas presumed that human nature is potentially good. Rituals 
and self-cultivation provide a means to attain that potential. He emphasized 
leading by virtue rather than enforcing by law. Confucianism became the 
philosophy of  most dynasties during Chinese history starting with the Han 
Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) at the end of  the Axial Age. Starting in 136 
BCE the Han Dynasty sponsored Confucianism and encouraged nominees 
for office to receive a Confucian-based education. During the Han Dynasty 
the total number of  bureaucrats employed by central and local governments 
was estimated to be more than 130,000 in 5 BCE (Keay, 2009). 
Confucian studies were heavily influenced by Daoism and Buddhism 
after the Han Dynasty. Then during the Sui (581–618) and Tang dynasties 
(618–907), Buddhism became widespread and supported by the emperors. 
However, it was crushed between 843 and 848 BCE when Buddhist temples 
had accumulated most of  the available gold, silver and copper as statuary 
while the government was not able to find enough precious metals to mint 
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coins. At the end, superstitious and mystical elements of  Taoism and 
Buddhism were eliminated from Confucian studies and the new orthodoxy 
emerged in the 11th century as Neo-Confucianism. Also in the Tang 
dynasty, the examination system superseded the apprentice/nomination 
alternative, and was formally institutionalised by the Song emperors to 
recruit officers in the years 960–1279 (Watson, 2006). The number of  
candidates taking officer exams in the thirteenth century reached 400,000.  
 
China in the Twenty-First Century 
The Chinese state has evolved in continuity over three millennia. Its huge 
bureaucracy has historical experience controlling the spread of  religion and 
capital accumulation, and mobilizing people for a variety of  goals such as 
education, agricultural projects, and war. We shouldn’t expect that such a 
state would become a capitalist state. On the contrary, such a state with its 
own traditions of  protecting its interests may shape capitalism into a new 
form by using its own rationalism. 
Murray Bookchin (1982, p. 127) warned us about state power: “Like the 
market, the State knows no limits; it can easily become a self-generating and 
self-expanding force for its own sake, the institutional form in which 
domination for the sake of  domination acquires palpability.” 
China had a “century of  humiliation” between the mid-nineteenth and 
mid-twentieth centuries, starting with the Opium Wars and the invasion by 
European states, and then by Japan. Now China is regaining confidence 
under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule, as John Osburg (2013:, p.822) 
explained: 
 
In many ways, the financial crisis of  2008 gave the Chinese leadership 
even more confidence in the superiority of  their form of  state-managed 
authoritarian capitalism to the laissez-faire capitalism of  the United States. 
In the most basic terms, the CCP hopes to maintain the embeddedness of  
the market in state structures that it controls in order to ensure that the 
market is harnessed to serve political goals, such as fostering indigenous 
innovation, maintaining social stability, and preserving CCP rule (not to 
mention the unstated goal of  enriching elite families). As China has 
become less reliant on foreign investment in recent years, it has been able 
to more assertively promote and protect its own companies and interests, 
much to the annoyance of  the Global North. ...Despite the fact that many 
SOE (state-owned enterprises) are publicly traded in overseas stock 
markets, the Chinese state is still the majority shareholder in these 
companies, which are overseen by the State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission of  the State Council (SASAC). Their 
CEOs are appointed by the CCP’s Organization Department, the same 
bureau that appoints all other CCP officials. They control all industries 
deemed of  strategic and national importance: steel, petrochemicals, 
transportation, utilities, and virtually all banking and financial institutions. 
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Apparently the Chinese state seeks “domination for the sake of  
domination” and also revanche for the century of  humiliation. 
 
The Strength of  the Chinese State Model 
The early twenty-first century witnessed a historical transition—the failure 
of  the world hegemony project by the US and the rising power of  
“emerging markets.” This transition can be interpreted in many other ways 
as well: the revival of  Asian states from the destruction of  colonization in 
the nineteenth century; the re-emergence of  China after a century of  
humiliation and taking over its previous role as the largest producer and 
innovator of  the world; the rising old superpower of  Russia after the 
collapse of  “real-socialism” during the 1990s; or all of  them at the same 
time. But one aspect of  this transition is clear: homogenization of  the 
world by globalization is over. Quite to the contrary, cultural differences are 
becoming more effective in shaping the new world order. China doesn’t 
compromise when it comes to state domination of  the economy and India 
didn’t compromise on protecting small farmers during the Bali and Doha 
rounds of  WTO discussions, even the country permits large agricultural 
projects. 
Also, for example, Bookchin (1982, p. 139) commented that: “The 
legacy of  domination thus culminates in the growing together of  the State 
and society—and with it, a dissolution of  the family, community, mutual 
aid, and social commitment.” But, generally, this doesn’t apply to Asian 
societies with their gregarious culture. Confucian authority of  parents in the 
family is still common in China and the CCP is using Confucian ideas to 
strengthen its authority. The fact that 88.4 per cent of  marriages in India 
are arranged by parents shows how family ties are still strong there. 
The capitalist nation-states of  Europe evolved from weak kingdoms in 
the periphery when the production centres of  the world were in Asia. 
Europe didn’t have much to sell to Asia in exchange for tea, spices, silk, 
porcelain and other luxuries at that time. These states had few choices to 
accumulate power other than developing military technologies and 
expanding their overseas colonies, which they plundered. In the end, an 
irrational capitalism dominated Europe since there was no strong State with 
an ethical tradition. On the other hand, the State has evolved in China for 
over four thousand years. Confucian traditions have provided this state an 
authoritarian rationalism with a secular ethic. Today China not only 
provides a model to other states in the developing world, but also finances 
most of  the projects in those countries. Eventually that model may affect 
capitalism in developed countries as well. It is hard to predict how it would 
manifest itself, but we can see some trends as President Trump advocates 
protectionist policies for the US. However, in the long run an authoritarian 
rationalism may become more dominant. 
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A New State Theory for the Struggles to Come 
Neoliberal capitalism destroys safety nets in society, increases inequality and 
makes people more atomized by increasing competition for jobs. On the 
other hand it makes the balance between society and nature more fragile as 
it relentlessly destroys nature. However, all these irrational developments 
may eventually cause the collapse of  modern society—the existence of  
humanity is seriously threatened. An authoritarian rational state may ease 
these policies and make capitalism a less urgent existential threat to 
humanity, presenting itself  as a solution to such a threat.  
The heritage of  domination needs to provide some hope to make 
people’s lives better. Currently neoliberal capitalism claims that new 
technologies, such as driverless cars or artificial intelligence, will make life 
easier. But they will only increase the profit of  corporations while people 
will experience the same difficulties. On the other side of  the world 
hundreds of  millions of  people were lifted out of  extreme poverty as a 
result of  the CCP’s policies, and new reforms are on agenda in order 
provide more people with safety nets. During the nineteenth National 
Congress of  the CCP, President Xi Jinping said, “What we now face is the 
contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the 
people’s ever-growing needs for a better life” (Chinadaily.com.cn, 2017). 
This definition of  the new era shows that the CCP will follow more rational 
policies while strengthening its authoritarian power.  
In the end, a struggle for freedom against such a rational State poses a 
much more difficult challenge than a struggle against an irrational 
capitalism. Current state theories that include only developments in the 
region of  the Middle East/Europe will be of  limited use for this challenge. 
These theories assume that states in other civilization centres would evolve 
in the same way. But the current reality doesn’t show any evidence in that 
direction. Therefore, I think a new state theory that elaborates the differences 
in the evolution of  states and the possibilities for the role of  the State in the 
near future is crucial as we prepare ourselves for new struggles against the 
kinds of  hierarchies and domination we will face in the future. 
This theory should help the Left to understand and foresee how 
authoritarian states have evolved and are likely to evolve and influence other 
states in the future. Such a theory would be crucial for the Left to prepare 
itself  for struggles in the upcoming political environment. Moreover, it would 
provide a perspective such that class reductionism does not blind the Left 
when it is becoming ever more critical to fight against domination by the 
State, so that we might all live in a society free from all forms of  oppression. 
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One could argue that since the dawn of  modernity, humanity has been in a 
situation of  constant crisis. Today we find ourselves amidst a nexus of  crises: 
an economic crisis, a political crisis, and an ecological and anthropological 
crisis where both the human and natural environments are threatened. The 
privatization of  public time and space, under the false identification of  public 
with state, transforms social geography and the public architecture of  life. We 
are also witnessing a rapid transformation of  national politics under the grid 
of  transnational networks of  power, combined with a revival of  nationalistic 
rhetoric as a means for manipulating populations. 
In order to clarify the current crisis—a crisis of  significations—it may be 
useful to delimit, schematically, some areas of  its manifestation. I use the 
term “significations” in the Castoriadean sense, namely, the “pre-eminent 
element in and through which the social-historical unfolds” (Castoriadis, 
1997, p. 201), which includes the dominant norms, purposes and attitudes 
that characterize a specific society. The purpose of  this article is to correlate 
central aspects of  the crisis of  established significations in order to 
highlight the opportunities for social emancipation that emerge through 
collective forms of  direct democracy inspired by social ecology that create a 
free public time. I use the term “public time” as defined by Cornelius 
Castoriadis, as the “dimension where the collectivity can inspect its own 
past as the result of  its own actions, and where an indeterminate future 
opens up as domain for its own activities” (Castoriadis, 1997, p. 281).  
My main point is that the creation of  a free public time implies the 
creation of  a democratic collective inspired by the project of  social ecology. 
The first and second parts of  this article focus on the modern social 
phenomena correlated to the general crisis and the emergence of  the 
Internet Age (Castells, 2012). The third and fourth parts focus on new 
significations that seem to inspire modern social movements and the 
challenges that modern democratic ecological collectivities face. I use the 
term “social ecology” as defined by Murray Bookchin: “Social ecology is 
based on the conviction that nearly all of  our present ecological problems 
originate in deep-seated social problems” (Bookchin, 2006, p. 19). And I 
use the term “democracy” exclusively in the original, true meaning, of  
direct democracy where society is self-governed by the equal participation 
of  every individual to political decisions and functions, as opposed to a 
modern representative democracy or republic, where political decisions rest 
in the hands of  an oligarchy. In this sense, a truly democratic political 
collectivity is a truly ecological collectivity and vice versa. 
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Aspects of  the Global Crisis of  Significations 
The globalization of  power and market mechanisms has spread the net of  
bureaucratic capitalism across the globe and stretched it to its limits, both 
internally and externally. Internally, because capitalism waives the requirement 
to provide a coherent meaning for the populations it dominates. It deregu-
lates processes that are necessary for social cohesion, and ensures a psychical 
internalization of  norms for the purposes of  the system among the majority.  
Externally, because the capitalist political and economic system, which 
was never actually controlled or regulated, is unable to fulfil both its general 
purpose, namely the unlimited dominance of  rationalistic control and 
capital growth, and the specific purposes of  elites and trusts that constitute 
the power network of  globalized bureaucratic capitalism. A fraction of  this 
network was revealed in the Panama papers imbroglio (Obermayer and 
Obermaier, 2016).  
The system has approached its natural limit as available resources, both 
environmental and human, appear close to exhaustion. Besides capitalism’s 
unlimited ambition, there is a destruction limit onto the brink of  which we 
walk blindfolded—the brink of  natural disaster, environmental disaster, 
social disaster, and even nuclear disaster. The whole range of  nightmares 
and dystopias stand like potential realities before us. 
The core values of  Western societies have been reduced to the capitalist 
irrationality of  economic growth. Formerly prosperous civilizations have 
been subdued by imperialism, their cultures destroyed by the advance of  
colonization and capitalization. Both the inner collapse of  communal and 
social values within Western societies and the external destruction of  other 
communities and cultures have resulted in a modern society that is incapable 
of  creating social significations that constitute a positive common meaning 
towards a positive common future. Ultimately, this process has undermined 
the foundations of  social belonging and identification, producing a world 
where the only value afforded any kind of  worth is monetary. Money in itself  
is only a measure of  value and, in this sense, is actually valueless.  
The most recent and visible aspect of  this multifaceted crisis of  
significations is the economic crisis associated with the burst of  the 
subprime mortgage bubble in 2008. However, this process actually began in 
the 1970s during the OPEC oil crisis, which saw the surrender of  North 
American labour unions and the launch of  Reagan and Thatcher’s 
neoliberal doctrine. The main feature of  this doctrine was the triumph of  
closed interest groups that promoted a version of  capitalism even more 
predatory than the New Deal or the European social-democratic versions 
of  post-war capitalism—those at least had provided some degree of  social 
security measures. State authorities swiftly and voluntarily abolished financial 
regulation tools that formally kept multinational private capital in check. 
Society also adopted the “Shock Doctrine”, which Friedman characterized as 
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modern capitalism’s core tactic for the subjugation of  societies and the 
dismantlement of  labour (in Klein, 2007, p. 6).  
The construction of  huge megacities smothered the urban public space 
under a network of  commercial zones. The basis of  societal cohesion, the 
spirit of  community, withered away. When community between people van-
ishes, the communal bond between nature and society is also shattered. The 
privatization of  urban public space began under what can be described as a 
false conflation of  the public and the State. As Murray Bookchin under-
stood, it was a consequence of  the failure of  collective initiatives that had 
“stagnated as moribund relics of  an era washed away by the social reaction 
of  the 1990s, or regrettably, [had] become purely privatized” (Bookchin, 
1995). 
The implementation of  these policies fundamentally altered the social 
geography and the public architecture of  the city. Major cities became dense 
population hubs with energy demands in excess of  the levels formerly 
required by entire countries. Inner-city landscapes became divided into three 
discrete zones with exploitative relations—housing blocks for the majority, 
mansions for the dominant elites, and ghetto jungles for marginalized 
minorities. A vast network of  markets divides and at the same time connects 
these isolated zones under the circulation of  products. As cities expand, the 
foundations of  community and the conditions for democracy narrow, 
transforming cities into hives of  private cells where circulation replaces 
community. 
The transformation of  cities into zoned areas of  product circulation 
stems from the expansive capitalist imagination of  the Industrial Revolu-
tion. The phenomenon of  modern urbanization is distinct from the 
development of  cities as independent political entities—for example, just as 
urbanization had occurred in late Medieval Italy. Modern urbanization 
transforms urban communities into production and distribution hubs with 
little consideration for public human life and public social space.  
Alongside the destruction of  public social space and community, there 
has been large-scale destruction of  the natural environment. The destruc-
tion of  nature that began with the dawn of  industrial capitalism has led to 
the current ecological crisis whose effects are evident in an undeniably em-
phatic way. There is no need to argue here for what everyone knows and 
witnesses in the perturbation of  natural processes, extreme meteorological 
phenomena, and mass extinction of  species. Scientists recently attributed 
the term Anthropocene (Carrington, 2016) to the period since the Indus-
trial Revolution, elevating modern human activity to the level of  geological 
forces. 
These two types of  crisis, economic and ecological, constitute a broader 
crisis of  significations that includes the social, cultural and anthropological 
(Castoriadis, 1982). In the sense that the misguided signification of  unlim-
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ited growth has made a desert of  the human environment itself, and in the 
sense that it seeks to dominate the totality of  society, it has accelerated de-
sertification on both the natural and the cultural dimension. The system has 
failed to legitimize its core impetus for growth, creating a hollow meaning 
that is reducible to bottom-line profitability.  
In my opinion, the full implementation of  the growth doctrine seems to 
be hindered by three main factors: 
 
1) the exhaustion of  natural resources; 
2) the collective resistance of  communities and the psychic resistance 
of  individuals who create new, global networks of  sociality at a 
time when traditional institutions are being dismantled; and 
3) the fundamental contradiction within capitalism itself, which objec-
tifies people while its function is based precisely on the exploitation 
of  human ingenuity. 
 
To the extent that the economic motivation of  unlimited growth and prof-
itability remains the dominant imaginary signification, the tension between 
systemic pursuits and the rapid self-destruction brought about by their 
achievement has resulted in a field of  constant reproduction of  the crisis.  
Currently, the abandonment by the State, not only of  financial regula-
tions, but also of  social services, deprives it of  any social rooting. As a 
result, while a nationalistic propaganda still pervades all modes of  discourse 
from entertainment to politics, the real strength of  the Nation-State is de-
clining. A globalised economy transfers power to international institutions, 
which help elites bypass national constraints. At the same time the use of  a 
nationalistic rhetoric keeps populations under control within those con-
straints. 
This blurs the precise borders between countries, as the distinction be-
tween interior and exterior liquidates, while war fronts multiply. Modern 
warfare and the rise of  “anti-terror” campaigns creates new borders within 
societies, within cities, and across countries. At the same time, there are 
signs of  a deep corrosion of  republican representative politics, revealing the 
ever-present divide of  interests and sentiments between society and the 
State. The Trumpian degradation of  US politics signifies something by sig-
nifying nothingness, the representative void. 
The decline of  nation-state power is indicated not only by the enforce-
ment of  austerity by organizations like the IMF, the World Bank, and the 
European Central Bank on countries like Argentina and Greece,1 but also 
by the emergence of  secessionist movements that have emerged in re-
sponse to international politics (e.g. Cataluña). The local has become 
inextricably linked with the global. Societies are both local and global in the 
sense that everything that happens locally is projected globally, and what is 
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displayed globally is diffused locally. There is no detached place since in-
formation has the ability to exceed geographical boundaries and spatial 
limitations, while satellites map every corner of  the planet. When ecological 
or social disasters are viewed and felt around the world, a consciousness of  
global interdependency seems to be formed in terms of  either common 
despair or common solidarity. 
Murray Bookchin warned us that “unless we realize that the present 
market society, structured around the brutally competitive imperative of  
“grow or die”, is a thoroughly impersonal, self-operating mechanism, we 
will falsely tend to blame other phenomena—such as technology or popula-
tion growth—for growing environmental dislocations” (Bookchin, 2006, p. 
20). Consequently, the project of  ecology cannot be separated from the 
project of  social transformation; social ecology thus implies a need to em-
phasise social equality and democracy. 
In conclusion, it is obvious that the different aspects of  the global crisis 
of  our time are interlinked by the main social imaginary impetus of  capital-
ist globalization, which is expansive growth and total exploitation of  human 
and natural resources. The crisis is self-generated by the expansion of  the 
capitalist system inwards and outwards. As this expansion reaches the limits 
of  the human and natural environments, the political character of  the prob-
lem cannot be concealed, nor can its ecological ramifications. The values of  
human liberation and natural balance remain interlinked with the principles 
of  direct democracy and social ecology, which provide the conceptual 
framework of  a different way of  societal life. 
 
The Problems of  the Internet Age 
We live in the first period in history when the urban population exceeds the 
rural. At the same time the city, as a political and social entity and unity, is 
being dismantled. It is being rebuilt into a set of  segregated functions, with 
respect to public space and public time. Likewise, personal time is sliced 
into distinct occupations defined by production or consumption. Public 
time is also sliced into “zones of  leisure” and “zones of  labour”, both of  
which are exploited for profit. Commodities of  leisure are presented as 
common values while the vast majority of  humanity is excluded from lei-
sure and commodities. The division of  wealth, exploitation of  both workers 
and the unemployed, and the gap between privileged elites and excluded 
populations are now at the widest and deepest points in history.  
Within the current socioeconomic landscape the emergence of  the 
internet has brought a new field of  projection and reconstruction of  public 
and personal identities, enabling almost infinite possibilities. The digital per-
son—fragmentary, but at the same time a multiplicity of  representations of  
the natural person—brings forth a new problematic of  the individual’s rela-
tion to themselves and to society. It offers a worldwide surface for the 
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reflection, projection, and re-creation of  personal preferences and views, in 
a completely disembodied and virtual manner.  
On one hand, the internet seems to provide a medium for even deeper 
personal fragmentation and isolation. Online, the user is at the same time 
invulnerable and vulnerable. Invulnerable as a digital self  materially detached 
from its physical existence, vulnerable as a physical/psychical subjectivity with 
a social identity embedded in the broader social environment. The digital self  
is a patchwork of  images, preferences, comments, trends, and contacts—a 
conscious reconstruction of  the individual projected onto a virtual global 
public platform. Social cohesion of  the personal image, which was formerly 
dependent on the natural presence of  the individual, dissolves within the 
digital multiplicity of  pseudo-personas. Personal identity loses its original 
foundation, the social significance of  the individual’s consistency as a singular, 
actual personality. 
On the other hand, the internet, as a medium for direct and 
simultaneous global communication, has demonstrated many liberating 
capabilities: disseminating knowledge, socializing research, communicating 
societies, overcoming censorship, and overcoming ethnic and cultural 
exclusions. Although it has become an instrument of  widespread control, it 
is also a tool for widespread solidarity and the emergence of  new social 
movements (Castells, 2012). For the first time there is a global public time 
within a virtual space. 
This global temporality that has formed in and through the internet is at 
the same time synchronic and diachronic. Nevertheless, it is not in 
accordance to social time, which is essentially local. Direct accessibility 
flattens the critical significance of  information within its continuous flow, 
where information sets can be articulated into pseudo-narratives, and where 
the quantity of  information ultimately constitutes the quality of  meaning, 
however absurd. The fundamental properties of  the Internet—speed and 
condensation—express precisely this principle of  expansion through 
contraction. 
Without a common criterion of  value or truth, which is offered in the 
non-digital world—at least partially—by the social-historical reality and the 
real limitations imposed by society as the “objective” world (in the sense 
that it transcends subjectivity) or by “nature”, the only criterion of  value 
that remains is popularity. 
At the same time, every marginal idea, whether radical and liberating or 
reactionary and obscurantist, now shares an ability of  propagation 
previously limited to the dominant discourse. Every individual or group 
now shares, at least in theory, the same potential public audience—the 
whole of  digital humanity. Without a mechanism for proof  of  validity, 
validity is gained and lost through the flow of  information itself. New 
online funding tools, such as crowdfunding, are widely visible to the public 
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and offer money for projects that would otherwise be hopeless or even 
non-existent. This visible public surface seems unlimited in range, but is 
actually limited in scope as the majority of  the Internet lies within 
unsearchable areas called the “Deep Web”, which includes the “Dark Web”, 
where black market economies flourish. 
In sum, the internet has created new challenges for direct democracy, 
but one should always keep in mind that a precondition for democracy is a 
community that exists in relation to its natural environment—antithetical to 
the Internet. The emergence of  new significations of  global solidarity, 
liberated knowledge and free community has been augmented by the 
Internet, but in fact needs to take place in actual social reality. 
 
The Emergence of  New Significations 
The twenty-first century has, thus far, been marked by financial crises, the 
implementation of  neoliberal policies on a supranational level, the 
ascension of  international financial organizations to a central decision-
making level, the violent dissolution of  local communities, and the 
fragmentation of  public time. However, this corrosion has been met with 
successive revolts, the awakening of  a universal solidarity and resistance, the 
creation of  imaginary communities, and the spreading of  the concept of  
the commons. The anti-globalism movement, the Occupy Movement, the 
movement of  the Kurdish people in Rojava, and the Zapatistas movement 
as the first groups to use the internet as a means of  global solidarity, are all 
examples of  the dynamic struggle for autonomy and democracy. Although 
the outcome of  these movements and social conflicts remains uncertain, 
the rise of  the internet has meant they are now performed for a global 
audience with variable levels of  involvement. Meanwhile, what is at stake is 
the future itself  in the most comprehensive sense—the existence of  a 
future. 
Against every manifestation of  a given crisis, new possibilities open, new 
significations emerge, and the values of  solidarity and community are 
revived on a broader scale. They emerge within a radical political context, 
into forms of  self-governed communities that aspire to direct democracy. 
What is apparent in recent years is a multifaceted resistance of  societies. 
A resistance formulated not in terms of  electoral representation, but in 
terms of  direct democracy, within communal forms of  life. The refutation 
of  sovereign institutions becomes even more obvious, by the positive 
activity of  social movements, by the creation of  primary institutions of  
direct democracy, social solidarity and local self-government, to some 
extent, like the aforementioned Zapatista communities, the Kurdish 
horizontal assemblies and, temporarily, the occupied factories in Argentina 
and Greece (VIO.ME in Thessaloniki). The VIO.ME factory was occupied 
by its workers in 2011, who decided not only to self-manage their working 
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space, but to transform it into a space of  democratic cooperation and 
political decision. A columnist of  The Guardian described VIO.ME thus: 
 
For a start, no one is boss. There is no hierarchy, and everyone is on the 
same wage. Factories traditionally work according to a production-line 
model, where each person does one- or two-minute tasks all day, every 
day: you fit the screen, I fix the protector, she boxes up the iPhone. Here, 
everyone gathers at 7am for a mud-black Greek coffee and a chat about 
what needs to be done. Only then are the day’s tasks divvied up. And, yes, 
they each take turns to clean the toilets. (Chakraborttya, 2017) 
 
We should also note that the VIO.ME workers organized open assemblies 
with the local community, solidarity actions to immigrants and ecological 
movements. Most importantly they have criticized not only the structure of  
labour, but also the product itself. VIO.ME have decided against chemical 
products and now produce eco-friendly soap and cleaning products. 
Against such examples of  social movements organizing themselves 
using methods of  direct democracy, the crisis of  political representation 
and identity has largely manifested itself  as a revival of  nationalistic 
rhetoric. Still, global networks of  solidarity challenge the validity of  official 
borders, forming nodes of  free social space and free collectivities that 
challenge the jurisdiction of  the State.  
Fukuyama’s doctrine of  the “end of  history” (1992) is a symptom of  the 
crisis of  the association of  public time with subjective temporality—a crisis 
of  our relation to the past and the future, a loss of  the future and a levelling 
of  the past. Yet, social struggles and social movements can create new 
forms of  free public time and an opening to a common future. A new 
ecological consciousness has arisen—democratic, anti-authoritarian, and 
connected to the environment. Pro-environmental protests and political 
struggles, such as the US anti-pipeline movement in Dakota and the anti-
gold movement in Chalkidiki, Greece, provide the seeds for a new sensus 
communis, a new sense of  common good and humanity. 
We are also witnessing the emergence of  new social movements, unrelated 
to traditional trade unions or parties, which do not seek to implement ready-
made plans but to create a new open free public space and time. Besides the 
aforementioned movements, such urban grassroots networks are present not 
only in Western countries, but in many other parts of  the world, including 
South America, Africa, East Asia, and Central/Eastern Europe. 
These are movements without leaders—movements that seem frag-
mented, but which allow for the creation of  free networks and mutual 
complementary structures on many fields and places within the broader 
social-historical narrative, precisely because they have a common project and 
create a common meaning. That is, self-governing direct democracy without 
authoritative power, without party representatives, and without state officials. 
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And this indicates a different answer to both the crisis of  political 
representation, and to the identity crisis of  the individual who finds it difficult 
to identify with national state mechanisms. This is not because propaganda is 
insufficient, or because there is access to a wider world, but because these 
mechanisms themselves have been exposed to signify nothing except empty 
automations deprived of  their original meaning and their old vision. 
Democratic ecological movements redefine private and public relations in 
the sense that they create a free public space that belongs neither to private 
capital nor to the State. And this implies a free public time of  social inter-
action and political decision, like the Nuit debout movement—symbolically 
expressed by the creation of  a prolonged month of  March, and a significant 
example of  the correlation between public time and political action.  
 
The Political Significance of  Public Time 
Following major protests on 31 March 2016, against proposed labour 
legislation and the subsequent loss of  workers’ rights, the Nuit debout 
movement flooded the squares of  French cities. The manifold manifesta-
tions of  this movement can be seen as a symbolic act with deep political 
connotations. The people who participated in the movement defied the 
official calendar by counting the days of  March beyond 31, renaming 1 
April as 32 March, 2 April as 33 March, and so on. This new “Martian” 
revolutionary calendar echoed the proclamation of  Year 1, and the 
replacement of  the official calendar, by the revolutionaries of  1792. The 
renunciation of  the official calendar, however theatrical, is a French revolu-
tionary tradition. It is a public gesture that exposes the deep dependence of  
authorities upon an established social temporality, both daily and historical. 
By symbolically deregulating the official calendar, the movement defined 
itself  as a historical event and widened its temporal horizon with the 
proclamation of  a different social temporality. This symbolic expression 
liberated public space and created a common public time. Of  course, this 
was never going to be enough to radically bend the established domination 
or derail the dynamics of  regularity, but it reveals a certain autonomy and self-
consciousness of  the movement as a creator of  its own free public time. 
If  one looks to the past, one can find many examples that underline the 
close dependence of  political time on public space. Each society is 
structured in three realms: (1) the private sphere; (2) the private/public (i.e. 
the sphere of  communication and culture); and (3) the purely public 
sphere—the field of  political decision-making. In societies where political 
power lies within a state hierarchy, public functions, both cultural and 
political, are subordinate to state power and private space–time becomes 
contracted and isolated. 
The division of  the day into equal hours is not natural (since the length 
of  a natural day varies), but was an achievement of  the monastic movement 
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based on the needs of  common prayer (division of  the day into equal 3-
hour periods). It was also the first disciplinary normality imposed on social 
temporality and the first attempt to measure time, regardless of  the social 
activities of  rural life (Landes, 1983). The bell tower became the regulator 
of  public time, while public space was restricted to ecclesiastical courtyards. 
When political power was transferred to the cities in the late Middle 
Ages, at the time of  the invention of  the mechanical clock (around the 
thirteenth century), the new symbol of  public time first appeared on the 
towers of  the rulers, as power leaned towards the secular sphere. The 
mechanical clock bridged the feudal and proto-capitalist worlds.  
Industrial organization required more accurate measures, while time 
units were diminished to picoseconds (10-12 seconds). The dominance of  
economic activities over other social functions, the dominance of  the 
capitalist imaginary, and the primacy of  production transformed social life 
in terms of  functionality. Conflict between the State and society meant 
conflict over public time and public space. 
The mechanical watch, when it became a portable pocket or wrist watch 
did not mean an inconceivable personalization of  social time, but the 
colonization of  personal time by regulatory mechanisms that already 
organized productive public time. 
The recent neoliberal attack on nature and society marks the concession 
of  state-managed public space to private capital, granting its full privatization. 
It also signifies the transformation of  private time in terms of  productivity, 
since the equation of  time with money, a fundamental principle of  capitalist 
production, is rooted in the equation of  the user with the product. The 
globalization of  information and product circulation organizes the 
regulation of  private time on a global level, under a variable but unified 
timetable of  financial procedures.  
On the other hand, the global diffusion of  information produces cracks 
in the dominant social temporality and regularity, offering opportunities for 
the creation of  social networks beyond the dominant constraints. Under 
these conditions political time becomes “dense”, and seems to expand and 
contract depending on the social occupation and recreation of  free public 
space. 
But the social background of  modern human existence—the urban 
landscape of  megacities—is a problem in itself. The modern city is not an 
ancient democratic polis, but rather, as Aristotle would claim, Babylon. 
Modern collectivities create, within the urban network, new and free 
egalitarian social spaces, like Nosotros in Athens or Micropolis in 
Thessaloniki. They are self-managed and open to anybody, hosting a wide 
range of  social and self-educational activities. They utilise a form of  direct 
democracy at the levels of  individual participation and collective decision-
making. Nosotros was founded in Athens in 2005, in the centre of  
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Exarcheia, by an anti-authoritarian initiative, while Micropolis was founded 
in Thessaloniki in 2008 amidst the December riots. Both are based on 
principles of  direct democracy, equality, and actual creative participation.  
Since their inception, a constellation of  free social places have emerged 
in other neighbourhoods and in smaller Greek towns such as Ioannina, 
Larisa, and Komotini. They form a network of  political, social and cultural 
activities without any exclusions or separations. Seeds of  new democratic 
forms of  life, perhaps, but against the dominant paradigm they face 
tremendous pressure and depend upon remaining open to the broader 
society. They alter the social landscape of  the city through their activities. 
These are not self-referential, but refer to society, interacting with and 
acting on the city. They embody the project of  a democratic ecological 
society, albeit in a limited but inspiring manner, both by their activities and 
their presence, which depend on individuals interacting with mutual respect 
for one another. 
Democratic ecological collectivities, which explicitly combine the project 
of  social ecology with the project of  direct democracy, must move beyond 
the collegial and create institutions of  education and communication 
marked by cohesive political activity across a wider social-historical field. 
We may, perhaps, schematically designate four moments of  political time to 
autonomous collectivities. They all involve and presuppose a public conflict 
with established authorities. 
The first moment, when the collectivity first opens up to society, 
involves the initial creation of  a broader social environment. The creation 
of  free social spaces seems to be the limit of  this moment. If  this limit is 
not exceeded through connection with broader society, free social spaces 
can become self-referential and, sooner or later, collapse internally. 
If  this limit is exceeded, then we proceed to the next moment, which 
can only occur within society—that is, beyond the collective since the 
activity of  the collectivity exceeds the collectivity itself. It involves the co-
creation of  networks of  solidarity, communication and action on local, 
regional and global scales. It involves the creation of  free open public 
spaces. It means creating a limited public space–time for communication 
and a limited public space–time for political decisions. 
Opening a free public space presupposes a break with state and capitalist 
mechanisms. It is an initial step. The second step is explicit self-determination 
to enact institution-building through direct democracy and public 
deliberation, in order to realize autonomy in terms of  social functions and a 
complete rupture with the State. I use the word “autonomy” not in reference 
to the Italian “autonomia” or to the Kantian concept, but as defined by 
Castoriadis: “the self-positing of  a norm, starting from some content of  
effective life and in relation to this content” (Castoriadis, 1997, p. 401). In this 
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sense, social autonomy is direct democracy as it is essentially linked to the 
autonomy of  the individual and enabling society to create its own institutions.  
We can imagine explicit self-determination if  we consider a self-
sufficient local network that is not subject to state or capitalist taxation or 
oversight. It constitutes a fundamental division between free communities 
and the State. However, it is not yet an autonomous society until a complete 
public space is established along with a public time for free communication, 
yet with limited public space–time for political decision-making. 
In order for social autonomy to be realized, society must have the power 
to explicitly re-create its central institutions, namely politics, justice, and 
education, in a democratic and egalitarian manner. The people, as free 
individuals, must be able to establish laws by means of  open public 
deliberation and through the establishment of  direct democracy. This would 
presuppose abolishment of  the State and subordination of  the economy to 
democratic politics. But it also presupposes the psychical transformation of  
the individual to an autonomous, reflective and deliberative subjectivity. It 
presupposes a democratic education that cannot be separated from the 
experience of  direct democracy in practice, via a praxis of  autonomy. It also 
means establishing a complete public space and time for free communication, 
and a complete public space and time for political decision and action.  
Back in 1969, Ecology Action East—a collective that included Murray 
Bookchin—published a statement that asserted, “We hope for a revolution 
which will produce politically independent communities whose boundaries 
and populations will be defined by a new ecological consciousness.” It is 
now evident that this ecological consciousness is also a political 
consciousness that demands a self-reflecting direct democracy against 
hierarchy and economic growth— one that combines ecological and social 
struggles within the project of  building a democratic ecological society. 
Under the global threat of  disaster, this is the challenge facing communities 
and societies today; for the future remains, as always, open for societies 
themselves to determine. 
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The Present is Pregnant with a New Future 
Olli Tammilehto 
 
A key focus in social ecology has been the bringing about of  profound so-
cietal change. This has been thought to mean a period of  groundwork after 
which there would be a rapid revolutionary transition. Social movements, 
especially in cities, are seen as agents of  change to a decisively more democ-
ratic and ecological society. This article contributes to an understanding of  
the dynamics of  major societal shifts and the role of  movements. It devel-
ops a theory of  a pre-existing world—a “shadow society”—which enables 
societal transition, and makes a “societal phase shift” possible. 
The first section of  this article sketches out western thinking about 
gradual versus abrupt change in nature and society. The following section 
describes historical and recent instances of  abrupt social change. The third 
section introduces the concepts of  “shadow society” and “shadow person-
ality” and delineates how they help to understand the dynamics of  societal 
phase shift. The fourth section outlines how abrupt changes have been 
theorized in biology and asks if  this theory can be applied to society and 
how it relates to the theory based on shadow society. The last section exam-
ines the implication of  the societal phase shift perspective for social 
movements and their strategies. 
 
Gradual versus Abrupt Change in Western Thought 
The paradigm of  gradual change has been very influential in western 
thought. In this view, real change only happens little by little (Brinkmann, 
1974; Scoville, 2017). To force abrupt change is dangerous. Since Aristotle’s 
time the principle “nature does not make jumps” (in Latin, “natura non facit 
saltus”) has been widely accepted in natural philosophy (Franklin, 1986). 
Also in social and political philosophy, and in social sciences, gradualism 
and its variation, reformism, have been popular. Social evolution has usually 
been interpreted as occurring bit by bit, in contrast to the notion of  revolu-
tionary change. Revolutions are considered to be normal in technology, but 
not in society. Technological revolutions are thought to come about because 
of  the inner logic of  scientific research and market competition. They are 
something to which society and people must just adapt. However, according 
to the cultural lag hypothesis, social structures follow technical change only 
gradually (see e.g. Wilterdink and Form, 2009). On the other hand, if  social 
revolutions occur, they are doomed to fail. Since the French Revolution, the 
phrase “the revolution devours its children”1 has been repeated frequently. 
After the revolts of  1968 and after the postmodern turn, it has been 
common to think that even aspirations to a revolutionary change are 
inherently dangerous. They contain a totalizing view on society which—if  
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the movement in question is successful—is bound to lead to a totalitarian 
state (see e.g. Best and Kellner, 1997). 
Yet, as a matter of  fact, even nature does make jumps. This is most 
obvious in phase shifts. For example, ice turns into water at 0oC without 
any intermediate stage. Ice does not become softer and only then liquid. 
There is a clear-cut jump in the constitution of  H20.2 
Leaps also take place at the macro scale. For example, a clear shallow 
lake can abruptly become turbid or muddy, even though the flow of  
nutrients to the lake has been constant for a long time (see e.g. Scheffer et 
al., 2001). Also, the global bio-geophysical system has experienced many 
rapid shifts during its aeons. A geological period may end and a new one 
begin very rapidly—even in just one year (see e.g. Masson-Delmotte et al., 
2013). Human-induced climate change may also leap to a new state in the 
near future (e.g. due to the disappearance of  the summer ice sheet in the 
Arctic). Such jumps can be expected to produce catastrophic consequences 
(see e.g. Collins et al., 2013). Thus, gradual change is only one possible 
pattern exhibited by nature.  
 
Abrupt Social Changes in the Past and Present 
Rapid and extensive social changes are also common as a consequence of  
wars, collapses of  stock exchanges, etc. Yet, societies usually remain 
structurally the same after such changes. Therefore, you cannot speak about 
a societal phase shift or a change in the basic functioning of  society. 
However, in some cases, local or wider society may abruptly alter course 
through a fundamental change. 
When an earthquake, destructive flood or other natural disaster destroys 
the physical infrastructure of  a locality, it also knocks down social hierar-
chies and market relations. However, according to many empirical studies, 
social chaos or general panic does not usually ensue. Only elites panic 
because they lose their power (Solnit, 2009; Quarantelli, 2001; Clarke and 
Chess, 2008). The rest of  the population immediately organizes itself  
horizontally; they form grassroots rescue teams and arrange food, shelter, and 
other support for survivors (Solnit, 2009; Fritz, 1996; Stallings and 
Quarantelli, 1985). Thus, new egalitarian social structures arise in a moment. 
Fundamental structural changes also happen during social revolutions or 
insurrections. In the Finnish language “revolution” is vallankumous, which 
literally means abolishing power (in the sense of  domination). This gets 
close to what often has really happened in the first stages of  historical 
revolutions. Various hierarchies and many kinds of  domination (power over) 
dissolves. In their place, councils, factory committees, assembles and other 
entities pursuing direct democracy are created. These organizations certainly 
have a lot of  power or capability to get things done co-operatively, but 
power over or domination is severely restricted. Unfortunately, this stage 
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usually only lasts a short time, and old domination structures are restored or 
new ones created (Bookchin, 1996; Bookchin, 1998; Foran, 2002). 
Many examples of  such grassroots organization during revolutions 
include the following:  
 
x sectional assemblies of  the French Revolution in 1790–1793 
(Bookchin, 1996; Tønnesson, 1988);  
x factory committees, city and district councils, village assemblies and 
soldiers’ councils flourishing in Russia from February until October 
1917, maintained until the Bolsheviks consolidated their power 
(Voline, 1990; Brinton, 1975; Bookchin, 2004);  
x the 2,100 councils established in 12 days during the Hungarian 
revolution of  1956 before the Soviet invasion destroyed these 
councils (Gutiérrez, 2004; Arendt, 1958; Kosuth, 2007);  
x shoras (workers' councils) during Iranian revolution of  1978 
(Landy, 1981);  
x neighbourhood and workplace assemblies during and after the 
economic crisis that hit Argentina in 2001 (Sitrin, 2012; Fifth 
Estate, 2002); and  
x the network of  communes and councils which were put together in 
2011, the development of  which currently continues in Rojava, 
northern Syria (Knapp et al., 2016; Strangers in a Tangled 
Wilderness, 2015). 
 
Thus, as in nature, gradual change is only one of  the ways that society 
modifies itself. In certain situations abrupt structural changes can occur in 
societies.  
 
Shadow Society and Abrupt Change 
How is it possible for society to change abruptly? One explanation is that 
society is never a fully integrated whole. In any society there are always 
conflicts, fractures and undercurrents. These are so widespread that you can 
speak about the shadow society that exists side-by-side the official society.3 
An essential part of  the shadow society is the shadow economy. It com-
prises the production and distribution of  goods and service that are not 
recognized in the official economy, and thus not usually taken into account 
when calculating Gross National Product (see e.g. Bennholdt-Thomsen and 
Mies, 1999; Gibson-Graham, 2006). This economic field is referred to by 
many terms with partially overlapping meanings: unofficial, informal, social, 
autonomous, post-capitalist, expolary, community, solidarity, subsistence, tra-
ditional, unregistered, indigenous, underground, family, black, grey, lumpen-
bourgeois, or third sector (Shanin, 1999). Examples include: unpaid service 
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production in households; unofficial exchanges of  goods and services among 
friends, acquaintances and neighbours; and unpaid peer support in solving 
various technical problems. The shadow economy is huge, especially in 
poor countries, but even in western Europe it is about as big as the official 
economy when measured in working hours (Stiglitz et al., 2009 p. 127). 
The shadow economy has been conceptualized in terms of  flows—
production, distribution and consumption—as is common in economic 
discourse. However, it can also be perceived in terms of  reserves or accu-
mulated resources. From this perspective it is easy to see that both the 
official and shadow economies are based on resources that are neither paid 
for nor included in economic calculations. Part of  this common wealth is hu-
man-made, such as our cultural heritage. Most of  these reserves are, 
however, created by nature over millennia and aeons. When a resource is 
taken care of  by a local, regional or global community, we can speak of  a 
commons. Commons play an essential role in the shadow economy and many 
popular movements have risen to defend them against encroachment by the 
capitalist economy (see e.g. Bollier and Helfrich, 2012; Berkes, 1989). 
These movements belong to a large body of  social movements that at-
tempt to create and change the rules under which they live.4 They are 
important political actors. Yet political discourse usually ignores these actors 
and keeps silent about them. Accordingly, there exists a kind of  shadow polity 
alongside the shadow economy. A part of  this shadow polity includes their 
internal decision-making processes. In many cases, these processes try to 
prefigure democratic decision-making in a hoped-for future society (Day, 
2005; Graeber, 2013). In situations where open movements or social action 
groups are too hard or impossible to organize, the shadow polity takes the 
form of  an invisible resistance, which can include loitering, disobedience 
and sabotage. These kind of  activities have been widespread in peasant so-
cieties and in state-socialist—a.k.a. state-capitalistic—countries (Scott, 1985; 
Filtzer, 1996; Kopstein, 1996). 
The shadow society carries on the traditions of  countless movements, 
and former less hierarchic and more democratic societies that attempted to 
turn the course of  history. Bookchin calls this important history “the legacy 
of  freedom”, knowledge of  which can lessen control of  the future5 by the 
powers-that-be (1982). The use of  the concept of  “democratic civilisation” 
by the imprisoned Kurdish leader, Abdullah Öcalan, has similar meaning 
(see Öcalan, 2016). 
Human beings are social creatures and, as such, social conditions are re-
flected at the individual level. Like society, hardly any human mind or 
personality is a fully integrated whole. In different social circumstances we 
think and react differently and make different value judgements. This idea 
has been common during recent decades in post-structural thought: in dif-
ferent discourses the same person takes different subject positions (see e.g. 
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Foucault, 1982; Henriques et al., 1984). Also, it has been widespread in 
Buddhist philosophy (see e.g. Kvaløy, 1992). Yet, the idea of  the normality 
of  a mildly divided self  has appeared occasionally also in mainstream west-
ern philosophy ever since Aristotle. It appears whenever the phenomena of  
self-deception and weakness of  will or akrasia (Aristotle, 1925 bk. VII; 
Rorty, 1988) are discussed.  
Accordingly, we can speak about a shadow personality that manifests itself  
when people act in a shadow society. We can include with it many traits that 
are repressed in present social circumstances. They exist only as desires and 
dreams, often only on a subconscious level.6 This sphere of  the unfulfilled 
and subliminal constitutes a hidden potentiality in any human being. 
We can now put forward an explanation for rapid and profound societal 
change: In natural or human-caused disasters and revolutions all the functions 
of  the prevailing society weaken or stop working altogether. This side of  
society moves to the background. At the same time the repressed, under-used 
or underestimated functions of  shadow society become essential. The other 
side of  society gets stronger and moves to the fore. The roles of  these social 
spheres are swapped. The same happens on an individual level: the shadow 
personality comes to the fore and the former normal personality must go by 
the wayside.  
Yet if  the new situation stabilizes it is conceivable that in the new shadow 
society qualitative changes will occur. It no longer only represents the former 
dominant society but, in part of  it, develops seeds and seedlings of  new 
social forms ready to come to the fore in the next societal phase shift. The 
process of  social change may have a dialectical character, as many thinkers 
have proposed (see e.g. Marx, 1996; Bookchin, 1990; Bhaskar, 1993). 
In a sense, the theory of  shadow society is a generalization or extension 
of  the theory of  dual power in social ecology (Bookchin, 2000; Biehl, 1998, 
pp. 123–124). Dual power theory deals with the best case scenario, where 
social movements have been able to organize a strong counter-power based 
on a confederation of  municipalities before any societal phase shift. This has 
not proved the case in most historical revolutions—most organization occurs 
during and after the shift. The theory of  a shadow society tries to explain why 
the shift was, and will be, possible in these bad cases. 
 
Regime Shift Theory in Biology and its Relevance to Society 
We could simply leave our pursuit of  understanding abrupt social change at 
this. However, it would be good to develop a more nuanced picture of  
societal phase shift, especially of  the social dynamics during periods of  
approaching rapid change. Therefore, it might be useful to look at how 
rapid structural changes are understood in biology, and attempt to apply 
those ideas to society. 
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In ecology, regime shift theory has been popular during recent decades. It 
developed from complexity theory, which originated in mathematics as a 
description of  non-linear systems. Complexity research tries to understand 
how complex systems exhibit simple, system-wide behaviour.  
A regime is a certain behaviour pattern or an oscillation range of  an 
ecosystem. Regime shift theory tries to understand, on the one hand, how a 
certain regime is maintained or why normally the variability of  the system is 
within certain bounds and, on the other hand, how a rapid shift to another 
regime is possible (Scheffer and Carpenter, 2003; Stockholm Resilience 
Centre, 2015) 
The key is the existence of  negative and positive feedback mechanisms 
or loops. These exist where the “output” of  the system has an effect on its 
“input”. Negative feedbacks maintain a system in its present regime. For 
example, when an influx of  nutrients increases the amount of  turbidity 
causing algae in a lake, the number of  daphnia (small plankton animals) that 
eat them also increases and the clear-watered regime is maintained. 
Positive feedbacks, instead, try to move the system to a different regime. 
For example, a small increase in turbidity kills some big water plants that 
protect daphnia. Fish then catch daphnia more easily, allowing algae to 
grow. The following turbidity increase kills more plants, which means that 
more daphnia get caught—causing more turbidity, and so on (Scheffer and 
van Nes, 2007; Jeppsen, 1998). 
In normal circumstances, negative feedback loops dominate and the re-
gime is preserved. Yet, in situations where the system reaches a tipping 
point, negative feedbacks may weaken and/or positive feedbacks may be-
come so strong that the system rapidly moves to another regime. 
Could this model be applied to society? What were the feedbacks that 
maintain the present order or try to change it? We could categorise as nega-
tive feedbacks all processes that gain strength when social order is 
endangered. For example, when a social change movement grows, there are 
attempts to undermine its influence by two opposite processes. On the one 
hand, a part of  the movement is marginalized by labelling it violent and 
extremist, something from which ordinary people should keep at a distance. 
On the other hand, another part of  the movement is integrated into the 
powers-that-be. It then seems that the movement proper is no longer 
needed because it has gained representation in the power structures (Mathi-
esen, 1982; Neocosmos, 2018). 
Positive feedbacks, on the other hand, could be conceptualised as proc-
esses that potentially get stronger when the present order is challenged. For 
example, a social movement may encourage new people to join a movement 
or form new ones. A stronger and more versatile movement scene may en-
courage still more people to join, and so on. The same applies to many 
other things that happen in the shadow society. For instance, experiences in 
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the shadow economy may provoke thoughts about alternatives, delegitimiz-
ing the prevailing order, and stimulating other activities in the shadow 
society, and so on. 
One could further adapt the language and evidence of  regime shift and 
complexity theory, but the scope of  this essay is limited. Complexity theory 
forms part of  systems theory, to which Bookchin and many other thinkers 
maintained an aversion because of  its mechanistic approach (Bookchin, 
1990 p. 149). Such an aversion is justified in regard to much of  system dis-
course. However, complexity research goes beyond mechanistic models and 
tries to understand entities with memory, history, evolution and “revolu-
tions” (Ernst, 2009; Ramalingam, 2013 p. 142). In fact, it has much 
common with dialectical thinking (Ernst, 2009). 
Nevertheless, complexity theory uses many of  the same concepts as the 
rest of  the systems approach, such as feedback loops. This is a significant 
problem if  it results in forgetting the uniqueness of  life and human society. 
One solution is to take some relevant ideas from regime shift theory but 
reformulate them. For example “positive feedback loop” could be called 
“self-reinforcing social process” and “negative feedback” could be called 
“self-attenuating social process”. 
 
Societal Phase Shift and Social Movements 
So, what is the relevance of  all of  this? If  this theory of  shadow society 
helps to adequately explain abrupt social changes, what are the conse-
quences? 
First of  all, this view can provide hope in our seemingly hopeless situa-
tion. Climate change, biodiversity loss, and other dangerous trends will lead 
to a global catastrophe if  they are not stopped soon (see e.g. Steffen et al., 
2015). It is easy to see that the reasons for inaction are the structures of  our 
society. Yet, social change is usually thought to be very slow. This contradic-
tion creates hopelessness. Therefore, seeing that, in principle at least, society 
can change very rapidly brings hope. 
However, within this chain of  thoughts lurks a danger. It can create a 
complacent attitude. Our analysis shows that revolution happens anyway. 
We don’t have to do anything—just wait and relax. This would be a wrong 
conclusion: the counter currents or positive feedback loops upon which 
societal phase shifts or revolutions are based are precisely our activities. If  
we are not active, counter currents will be too weak and there won’t be any 
revolution or, if  it starts, it will fail quickly. 
Although this analysis does not weaken the importance of  movements 
and alternative projects, it provides another perspective for them. Making a 
systemic change in society is not building a new society one block at a time. 
Movements and projects cannot do it because no one knows which of  their 
achievements will remain, and under present circumstances it is probable 
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that many of  them will falter. Instead, a reason why these activities are im-
portant is that they defend the existing shadow society and prefigure what 
society should and could be after a phase shift. Another reason is that they 
advance and work out processes—which can be called positive feedbacks—
that, when a suitable situation arises, shift society to another phase. In other 
words, they can contribute to a revolution. 
So far, in societal phase shifts, the “grassroots regime” has lasted only a 
short period of  time. There are many reasons for the restoration of  the 
hierarchical order. Outside pressure or even war has enforced their return. 
But often inside forces play an important role. For example, in the Russian 
revolution Lenin, Trotsky and the Bolshevik party were instrumental in suf-
focating the grassroots democratic institutions that sprang up all over the 
country in 1917 (Bookchin, 2004; Brinton, 1975). 
For many it is difficult to believe that the grassroots democratic regime 
is the real thing upon which a future society could be built. They think that 
this is just a party after which the party takes over and surpasses the “ineffi-
cient” grassroots structures. Indeed, real democracy is very different from 
the present governance with its hierarchical structures.  
However, for most people it is not so strange because, in its embryonic 
form, it has been widely exercised in the shadow society. Keeping in mind 
the utter destruction and misery caused by the existing order and the bleak 
or non-existent future it is promising us, one may wonder if  we are under a 
spell of  some sort when we regard the predominant form of  society as 
normal. Perhaps the feeling that this is normal and there are no alternatives 
is an effect of  the distorted mirror that the prevailing society and its cultural 
machinery keeps in front of  us. Shadow society and its blossoming in crisis 
situations may show us a more adequate image of  what we are, and what 
future society could be.  
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1. Originally in French (du Pan, 1793 p. 80): “A l’exemple de Saturne, la 
révolution dévore ses enfants”. 
2. An abrupt change takes place if  the solid is crystallized. Some solids—
e.g. glass—are not crystallized and they turn into liquid gradually. These 
solids are called amorphous (see e.g. Complex Systems Group, 2015). 
3. I have developed this thesis earlier in Tammilehto (2010; 2012). A 
similar theory is presented in De Angelis (2007). 
4. Heywood, in his widely used textbook, defines “politics” as “the 
activity through which people make, preserve and amend the general 
rules under which they live” (Heywood, 2013 p. 2). 
5. As George Orwell writes in his novel Nineteen eighty-four: “‘Who controls 
the past,’ ran the Party slogan, ‘controls the future: who controls the 
present controls the past.’” (Orwell, 1955). 
6. The situationists hinted at revolutionary desires that are repressed but 
exist in the subconscious (Baumeister and Negator, 2005, pp. 38–40; 







Squatting as Claiming the Right to the City 
Diana Bogado, Noel Manzano and Marta Solanas 
 
Introduction 
The phenomena of  squatting and occupying currently constitute global meth-
ods of  resisting the “neoliberal” dynamic of  the global metropolis. We use 
the term occupy to refer to housing occupations that seek to guarantee shel-
ter for populations without resources, and the term squat to allude to 
occupation processes that try to generate spaces for public meetings and 
political discussions. In Brazil and Spain, both kind of  spaces push towards 
claiming social rights. Some essential similarities and differences between 
them will be described in this article. 
The neoliberal city is built on a new form of  “entrepreneurial” urban 
management, whose consequences are, among others, the accentuation of  
territorial segregation (Harvey, 2005, 2011). In the current global context, 
the action of  civil society culminates in movements demanding the accom-
plishment not only of  basic needs, but also the quality of  urban life: the 
right to the city (Lefebvre, 1968). This right is under constant threat by the 
gradual imposition of  financial interests in global cities (Sassen, 2001). 
However, insurgent social networks make possible to endorse local strug-
gles on a global scale. Both local and global trends, occupying and squatting 
have been described together as a single phenomenon, a product of  compa-
rable economic and institutional processes, in both the global North and 
South (Aguilera and Smart, 2016). This essay presents the hypothesis that 
the similarities between occupying and squatting in Spanish and Brazilian 
metropolises are the counterpart to the homogeneous processes of  trans-
forming housing and the city into speculative objects (Rolnik, 2016; Harvey, 
2005; 2011), with specific, but equivalent, popular reactions.  
In recent years, significant success has been achieved by the public space 
squatting and occupy movements in both countries, in their struggles for the 
right to decent housing and to the city, but along different dimensions. In 
Spain, the so-called 15M movement, starting in May 2011, contributed to the 
birth of  the PAH,1 the main housing movement in Spain. In Brazil, the 
demonstrations of  June 2013, known as the June Days, began in Rio de Janeiro 
and spread throughout the country and other Latin American countries, 
inspiring a whole generation to engage in socio-political struggles. These 
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movements represented key moments in each location, and a new cycle of  
social revindications, with significant political consequences and global 
impacts, and appeared related to the global wave of  popular resistance 
movements that began in Tunisia (2010) and Egypt (2011) known as the Arab 
Spring, with further manifestations in Europe and Latin America. These 
movements also represented a variation of  traditional occupational forms by 
occupying public spaces instead of  buildings (Erensü, Karaman, 2017). 
Furthermore, they claimed shared roots—the struggle for fundamental urban 
rights. 
Related to these, a process of  legitimizing housing occupation occurred 
in a context of  accelerated dispossession processes (Harvey, 2005), both in 
Spain and in Brazil. In this text, we will compare their similarities and differ-
ences, studying the explicitly political occupy and squatting movements. 
Our purpose will be to contextualize the global transformations in hous-
ing and city rights, both in Brazil and Spain, relating them to “the era of  
finance” (Rolnik, 2016), and the occupying/squatting patterns that emerged 
as reaction to it.2 In the context of  financial capitalism, housing policies, 
housing complexes, public spaces and their idiosyncrasies become affected 
by the political process of  financializing life. Public space becomes specula-
tive and housing becomes a luxury item, transformed by speculation and 
gentrification, both in Brazil and in Spain, as a consequence of  the com-
modification of  cities for the global market (Rolnik, 2016). Such a 
management model leads to violations of  civil rights, particularly with re-
spect to the right to decent housing.3 Precarious populations were expelled 
to the extreme metropolitan periphery, threatening the right to the city both 
in Rio de Janeiro and in Spain.  
These urban changes lead us to address the following issues: How have 
cities threatened the popular classes in both countries by transforming the 
city to allow the attraction of  international speculative capital? How have 
local populations reacted in order to maintain their rights to the city? 
 
Methodological Frame 
This article is based on the personal and activist experiences of  its three 
authors, as well as on materials collected during their respective academic 
trajectories. The methodology includes direct and participant observation 
(Becker, 1993; Whyte, 1943), or observant participation (Wacquant, 2000) in the 
occupy and squatting movements. At the same time, militancy and research 
were carried out in occupations for the right to housing and to the city 
(Lefebvre, 2001) in Rio de Janeiro, Seville and Madrid. In addition, at 
various moments, over the last few years, free conversations and structured 
interviews were conducted in different “squats” as part of  the master’s and 
doctoral theses of  the authors. 
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Diana Bogado’s (2011) master’s thesis was entitled The Okupa movement: 
Resistance and autonomy in occupy buildings in central urban areas. This text, written 
between Seville and Rio de Janeiro, comprises a theoretical analysis of  
occupying and squatting, using the existing literature and developing 
hypotheses linked to the experiences of  the author-activist in squats and 
occupations in Brazil and Spain. She then wrote a Ph.D. thesis about the right 
to the city. The author participated in the 15M movement, in Spain, and in 
the demonstrations of  June 2013 in Brazil, among other manifestations, and 
participated intensely in the fight against eviction and removal of  the 
“favelas” in Rio de Janeiro from 2013 to 2016. The author built a museum of  
popular resistance with the community of  the Vila Autódromo favela in Rio 
de Janeiro: The Museu das Remoções (Eviction Museum). 
Noel Manzano’s (2015) master’s thesis in sociology was entitled People 
without houses, houses without people: Urban financialisation and housing appropriation 
in the new Madrilenian periphery. His research was carried out between Paris, 
Madrid, and Rio de Janeiro, and contains a strong empirical component 
based on a participative immersion in the social housing movements of  
Madrid, and 68 semi-structured interviews with urbanists, activists and 
members of  informal occupations. 
Marta Solanas’ doctoral thesis, Uruguayan housing cooperatives as a system of  
social production of  habitat and neighborhood self-management, examined the 
horizontal and self-organized forms of  popular housing in Latin America, 
with fieldwork in Montevideo. This experience was put into practice in 
spaces such as the “Corrala Utopia” in Seville—a building occupied by 
squatters at the beginning of  the Spanish economic crisis (2012–2014). 
This article is born, therefore, from the crossroads of  theoretical 
research, fieldwork, and transnational experiences on the right to the city of  
the three authors. The activism practice within social movements permitted 
the authors to observe the squats’ dynamics, as well as enabling access for 
interviews. In an action-research process, practical actions constitute the 
initial provision of  inputs, as well as a base with which to verify conclusions 
(Tripp, 2005). Dealing with the debate of  subjectivity and objectivity, and 
also about the illusion of  scientific neutrality, the path adopted is an 
exercise of  objectification—not of  objectivity—(Bourdieu, 1977), which 
does not treat reality as objective and admits that it can be treated as in 
search of  objectification. In this way, the scientific principle upon which the 
methodology is grounded is not objectivity, but reflexivity. Our academic 
production is based on the theory of  “ecology of  knowledge” (Boaventura 
de Sousa Santos, 2010), which proposes the fusion of  popular and scientific 
knowledge.  
For this reflection we considered the everyday micro-processes that 
developed in the heart of  the case studies, adopting them as key elements 
for understanding and explaining complex global macro-processes. We have 
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considered squatting, and its logics, as spaces of  struggle for the right to the 
city and conflict against neoliberal interests. This assessment was based on 
the regressive-progressive method, as designed by Lefebvre (1949, 1953, 
1960, 1968), which allows for sketching the historicity of  social processes, 
from a look at daily life and the spatialization of  social dynamics (Lefebvre, 
1991).  
Our hypothesis is that the processes of  exclusion— the consequence of  
market management of  cities—generates new dynamics of  struggle in 
social movements, and explains the plurality of  forms of  occupation and 
emerging squatting practices. In other words, new forms of  entrepreneurial 
management and their impacts require the creative re-articulation of  social 
movements, which subsequently leads to the emergence of  different claims 
to the right to the city. 
 
Financial Urban Management and the Right to the City in 
Brazil and Spain 
The current era differs from other moments of  the capitalist system lifecy-
cle by some unique characteristics related to economic and financial 
dynamics. During the last decades, urban life has been increasingly mediated 
by the consumption of  urban life, turning relationships and spaces into 
spectacles (Debord, 1969) and pressing them into competition. Competi-
tiveness is not only restricted to the sphere of  individual relations; it also 
becomes the predominant hegemonic logic that justifies itself  (Santos, 
2011). Within this logic fit the cities—they compete among themselves to 
become more attractive. 
Urban planning, theoretically responsible for providing basic infrastruc-
ture, is managed as a tool for transforming spaces into international 
showcases. The emergence of  the entrepreneurial protagonist within the ur-
ban management landscape is determined by its direct relationship with 
international financial capital, highlighting the speed of  business processes 
and the presence of  authoritarianism by a state of  emergency in the execution of  
measures that serve corporate interests (Agamben, 2005; Aguilera and 
Naredo, 2009).  
In Brazil, the traditional context of  the chronic housing deficit was ag-
gravated by initiatives trying to position the Brazilian metropolis as a 
priority focus for speculative real estate investments: the organization of  
macro-events, mainly the 2014 World Football Cup and the 2016 Olympic 
Games. Commuting global capital into local real estate projects, the increase 
in real estate prices produced, as a consequence, an urban policy of  “evic-
tions”,4 which was undertaken in several informal urbanizations (favela), 
such as the famous “Vila Autodromo” of  Rio de Janeiro (Bogado, 2017). 
Producing both an alarming increase in rates of  eviction and expulsions of  
low-income families (Azevedo and Faulhaber, 2015), the gentrification of  
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already built areas, such as the port area of  Rio de Janeiro,5 and the specula-
tive construction of  new buildings, which remain currently empty. This 
process was accompanied by a violent eviction policy to occupations and 
favelas. 
In Spain, entry to the Eurozone in 2001 facilitated the raising of  inter-
national capital and, as a result, the generation of  a colossal real estate 
bubble. The national urban planning frame was transformed, deregulating 
the whole country by the national Land Law of  1997, which declared suit-
able to build on any land not specifically protected. In Madrid, the 
modification of  the General Plan of  Urban Planning, foresaw since 1995 
the construction of  new speculative neighborhoods and infrastructure, fre-
quently (as in the Brazilian case) justified by unsuccessful applications to 
host the Olympic Games. Allowing local and regional housing companies, 
EMVS6 and IVIMA,7 to speculate on residential land prices. 
The explosion of  the real estate bubble, linked to the global subprime 
crisis in 2008, led to the privatization of  a large part of  social housing, and 
to a great number of  evictions, producing a “housing emergency” (PAH, 
2013) that remains today. 
Faced with the rational use of  housing, the massive non-payment of  
debts provoked a “promotion of  high levels of  indebtedness that reduced 
the whole populations to a condition of  credit slavery” (Harvey 2005, 
p.173–174), thanks to the coercive mechanism of  “mortgage evictions”. At 
the “macro” level, various financial speculative mechanisms privileged the 
maintenance of  empty houses in the whole country to increase market 
prices of  real estate, forbidding their social use (Manzano, 2015). This con-
tradiction was visible in the most part of  Spanish cities by the presence of  
abandoned urbanizations and empty blocks (Observatorio Metropolitano, 
2013) being illegally, but rightfully, used both by social housing movements 
and individuals as a shelter solution. 
In Spain, the sudden arrival of  global capital to the real estate market, 
and the further dramatic capital outflow produced a huge economic crisis, 
stopping social housing programs and accelerating asset accumulation 
through a dispossession process (Harvey, 2005). The absence of  a public 
housing park for rent (Naredo, 2013) forced the use of  empty buildings as a 
precarious alternative to social housing. 
In Rio de Janeiro, the construction of  the neoliberal city is characterized 
not only by the commercialization of  urban territory, but by the absence of  
public power in the construction of  adequate housing units, as well as the 
lack of  distribution to those who really need them. Although in Brazil there 
are programs focused on social housing, they are not efficient due to a 
range of  factors: the dramatic housing shortage; the existence of  a large 
stock of  empty buildings for speculation; abandonment of  central areas by 
the State; tourism; gentrification; the absence of  social housing in or close 
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to the central areas (with employment opportunities); and real estate interests 
in areas earmarked for social housing. Entrepreneurial public management is 
responsible for intensifying the production of  urban segregation, a situation 
that, when combined with the inefficiency of  social housing programs, has 
led to a gradual increase in the occupation of  idle buildings and informal 
constructions in the great metropolis (Bogado, 2011).  
 
Squats and Occupations 
Squatting and occupying, both in Spain and Brazil, are booming practices. 
Although originating from very different socioeconomic realities, the 
problems from rampant real estate speculation and the lack of  public 
housing forces people to use empty buildings as a precarious alternative to 
social housing. The basic difference is that a squat is an empty building used 
as common space to claim social rights. We refer to occupied buildings as a 
practice with the direct purpose of  using a building as a dwelling, and 
afterwards developing other claims. 
These different forms of  occupation, squat and occupy, are alternatives to 
access the use of  space, and claim the right to housing and the right to the 
city. The phenomenon of  occupation of  empty buildings is the direct 
response to the reproduction of  “exceptions” and lack of  access caused by 
real estate speculation and urban sprawl in large metropolises. We consider 
occupying the public space as one more face of  the squat and occupy 
movements. To illustrate it, we point out that the “reclaim the street” in 
London and the “Ocupa Minc”, held in Rio de Janeiro in 2016, are demands 
that, besides the right to housing, presented guidelines on urban social 
rights and the rights to cities. All forms of  occupation contradict the tenets 
of  the neoliberal and commodified city (Harvey, 2005). 
The emergence of  social organizations that use occupation or squat as a 
means to claim the use value of  buildings is a process with parallel instances 
and historical evolutions between the two countries. From the emergence 
of  the first “Centros Sociales Okupados” (Squatted Social Centers), in 
Spain in the late 70s (García, Martinez, 2014), through the “Movimento 
Nacional de Luta pela Moradia” [National Movement for Housing Struggle] 
(MNLM), initiated in the main Brazilian capitals in the early 1980s (Martins, 
2011), this method of  reaction against the speculative logic of  the real 
estate market has been increasing until today. 
The squats movement is different from housing movements, and essentially 
questions the behavior established by the language of  the capitalist econ-
omy and proposes another language, an alternative language to consumer 
behavior, presenting other perceptions and community organizations for 
everyday life. The squats proposals resemble many other proposals brought 
by other movements, such as the movement of  occupation of  real estate in 
central areas and, especially, the principle of  autonomous society. We ob-
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serve the affinity of  the squats movement with the principle of  autonomy in 
its most fundamental aspect: the conference of  autonomy to the subjects 
through the passage of  knowledge that confers the possibility of  discern-
ment and criticism, fundamental factors for a self-managed social 
organization, as proposed by different kinds of  squatters. The squatter phi-
losophy is not an exclusive claim to the process of  gentrification and 
maintenance of  the local population of  a neighborhood, but a claim against 
the kind of  segregation produced by neoliberal economic logic, which puts 
the capital and exchange value variable above the value of  use and all other 
variables of  the social life equation. 
The interest of  the squats movement is not to become the dominant lan-
guage, it is to encourage people to decide on their own reality. The 
movement organizes its action as an open system—one that seeks to mod-
ify the performance of  the subjects in society towards social 
transformation. In Spain, the links between occupation and squatting is a 
traditional dichotomy, identified by the terms “okupa” and “ocupa” 
(Bogado, 2011). The first occupy buildings mainly as a tool to establish social 
centers, which are open to the neighborhood, in central and peripheral areas 
to vindicate the common use of  the buildings and the city. The second refers 
to housing squats used mainly as a shelter to impoverished populations 
(Manzano, 2015), frequently opened or supported by popular housing social 
movements. In Brazil, although squatted social centers also exist, most of  
the squatting initiatives are housing occupations, comparable with the Span-
ish “ocupa” houses, using empty buildings, as a pragmatic housing solution 
and claim for the right to the city. 
Facing the already described speculative logic, social movements have 
acquired, in the last years, a double role. Firstly, they constitute platforms 
for the expression of  discontent and pressure to change the regulatory 
framework. The fight for the Urban Reform, the control of  capitalist urban 
logics in the Brazilian case, and the demands for modifying the Law Against 
Evictions in Spain, have been conveyed by social movements and are part 
of  the current political debate in both countries, fighting the local conse-
quences of  the global-financial economy. Moreover, it presents disobedient 
resources and practices to circumvent the model dictated by the theory of  
consumption, or “tyranny of  money in its pure state”, according to Brazil-
ian geographer Milton Santos (2013). 
Secondly, sectors of  these same movements in both countries promote, 
support and organize collective occupations as a temporary solution for 
families without resources. In the face of  militant squatting, which develops 
squatted social centers frequently open to citizenship, “collective occupa-
tions” would be generalized as a direct and pragmatic action whose study is 
still embryonic. 
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The Struggle for Housing in Spain 
In Spain, the chronification of  the “crisis” in the popular classes and the 
desperate situation of  many families provoked a popular reaction, both in 
Madrid and the whole of  the State. It took shape under several housing 
rights initiatives—La Corrala in Seville, the 15M groups of  housing and, 
mainly, Plataforma de Afectados de la Hipoteca [Affected by the Mortgage 
Platform] (PAH). Originally born in Barcelona, in the same days that gave 
rise to the movement of  15 May 2011, this movement took place in a de-
centralized way, spreading rapidly throughout Spain. The platform is based 
on mutual legal and psychological assistance among its members. The ex-
perience of  older members, having learned all the legal mechanisms and 
passive resistance techniques to stop an eviction, allows it to incorporate 
new members. The PAH also organizes an occupation movement called the 
“Obra Social” (Social Work).8 Heir to the protesting tradition of  militant 
squats, the okupa movement (Martinez, 2002), and based on squats dedi-
cated exclusively to housing, the “Social Work” of  the PAH promotes the 
use of  buildings owned by the financial sector, and kept empty for specula-
tive reasons. Their appropriation makes it possible to publicize their 
demands for legislative change and to negotiate “social rentals” from a 
strong position when they confront the financial owners. 
Spanish occupations are generally undertaken by families weakened by 
the crisis, perhaps facing foreclosures or claims for the non-payment of  
rent. Spanish legislation makes it difficult to expel squatter families after 48 
hours following their entrance into an empty building, with long judicial 
procedures, often more than one year, producing a “legal limbo”. This al-
lows a large number of  precarious people to live in housing squats, even 
though they may periodically need to change houses. In contrast, PAH “So-
cial Work” fights for families to stay permanently in houses and buildings 
belonging to banks “rescued” by the Spanish state, or the SAREB,9 the na-
tional “bad bank”, that purchased—with public money—unprofitable 
houses and buildings for the financial and real estate sectors. 
For this purpose, activists promote two types of  squats: individual and 
collective. Individual squats begin with the entry of  a family into an empty 
dwelling, supported in this case by one or more activists. Once housed, 
however, it is relatively independent of  the PAH assembly, being supported 
in particular at the legal level. PAH also helps to regulate individual squats 
opened by individuals, as long as they are housed in bank properties (previ-
ously cleared out after evicting a family that was unable to continue paying 
their mortgage). Collective squats are directly opened by experienced mem-
bers of  the PAH and serve as a home to households in need of  emergency 
shelter. The buildings occupied are often small, and generally the selection 
of  candidates requires previous assembly work to prepare the entrance and 
create common links, making easier the adaptation of  households to their 
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new life in the collective squat. Involving neighbors is a key element to 
avoid an early denunciation, reducing enormously the risk of  eviction. 
Sympathy towards PAH in the media also minimizes the risk of  expulsion. 
 
The Social Housing Movements in Brazil 
In Brazil, movements such as the MNLM10 and the MTST (Movement of  
Homeless Workers),11 frequently occupy empty buildings located in central 
areas. An important amount of  organizational work is usually needed to 
cope with the creation of  collective infrastructures within the housing 
complexes, such as gardens, libraries, soup kitchens, etc., and to deal with 
external risks such as police action and infiltrations. 
In this country, the occupy phenomenon has strengthened, multiplied 
and gained more visibility from the various initiatives and forms of  occupa-
tion carried out over recent years. Faced with the institutional bills approved 
by the current president, Michel Temer (2016–2018), and the retreat of  the 
social rights they imply, the various manifestations and forms of  occupation 
have become fundamental political actions (e.g. the occupied schools 
movement). The episode “Occupy Minc” stands out as a symbol of  plurali-
zation among the occupation forms and is responsible for spreading the 
phrase “Fora Temer” throughout Brazil. 
Movements of  occupation of  empty buildings in Brazil are opposed to 
the interests of  the real estate market and seek to provide access to housing 
for all as an universal right. Opposing the idea of  housing as a commodity, 
occupying empty buildings in central areas, in addition to promoting aware-
ness-raising activities. The National Movement for Housing, the MNLM, 
and the MTST demand observation of  Article 6 of  the Brazilian Constitu-
tion, which establishes housing as a social right. Moreover, they represent 
the protest for the right to live and enjoy the city. The slogan of  the move-
ment, expresses the government’s disregard for housing provision: “If  
living is a right, occupying is a duty”, justifying civil disobedience for the 
exercise of  the social function of  property. The MNLM organized itself  as 
an entity in the period of  the promulgation of  the Federal Constitution, 
although previously its founders already militated in the National Move-
ment for Urban Reform (MNRU). Before the military dictatorship in Brazil 
(1964–1985), the militants of  the struggle for urban and agrarian reform 
were linked to the Catholic Church (Souza, 2009). The Central de 
Movimentos Populares (CMP), together with the MNLM, linked to discus-
sion forums and debates promoting popular mobilization to occupy public 
buildings (Souza, 2009).  
The CMP, which is national in scope and operates in several areas, 
selects abandoned public buildings available for occupation, although they 
also organize the occupation of  private properties indebted to the 
municipality. These debts sometimes exceed the value of  the property, and 
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in some situations belong to the State (Souza, 2009). The lack of  public 
commitment to housing is the trigger for the action of  social movements, 
which arbitrarily enforce the rights described in the Constitution. However, 
this action is severely repressed by the police. In attempting to evict families 
and dismantle the movement the authorities cut the electricity and water 
supplies and threaten members. The occupation movements in Brazil act 
against the advance of  real estate speculation in the central lands, and 
represent a radical route of  action of  re-appropriation of  the city through 
civil disobedience. The existence of  innumerable organized occupations in 
the metropolitan urban centers, mainly in the southeast of  the country, 
testifies to the representativeness of  the movements in the struggle for 
realizing the right to housing. Occupy movements exert significant pressure 
on governments to enforce the right to the city, although, in recent years, 
state action has focused more on evicting families than on regulating 
occupied housing. This conduct of  the State is directly related to certain 
mega-events—the World Cup, 2014 and the 2016 Olympics—and with the 
troubled political scenario with the appointment of  the country’s president 
without elections, accompanied by measures that prioritize individual 
interests to the detriment of  public and collective interests. 
 
A Transnational Comparison between Brazilian and Spanish 
Practices of  Occupation and Squatting  
An in-depth comparison of  struggles for the right to housing in Brazil and 
Spain is a project still to be carried out. However, we can point to some 
schematic similarities and differences between Brazilian and Spanish squats. 
Predominantly organized or related to housing movements, but also 
informally executed by individuals, in both countries squatting and 
occupations are a pragmatic answer to the speculative dynamics that have 
produced empty buildings. In this way, inhabitants claim their rights to the 
city. Used as a tool of  hard negotiations, in both countries squats and 
occupied buildings are inhabited for several years, with few expulsions. 
Some differences, however, can be pointed out. Firstly, the kind of  
buildings used and their ownership characteristics. Spanish housing occu-
pations used to be of  a small size, re-using empty residential buildings owned 
by the financial sector, mainly in peripheral areas, to provide individual flats. 
Brazilian housing social movements frequently occupy much bigger build-
ings, usually reconfiguring the spaces to provide individual apartments, but 
also installing basic infrastructure and creating common spaces of  collective 
management. 
Secondly, the origin of  populations presents some differences. While the 
Spanish housing squats provide single flats to impoverished populations 
due to the economic crisis, the Brazilian equivalents house historically 
disadvantaged and precarious populations, with a more shared ideological 
Squatting as Claiming the Right to the City 
165 
background than the Spanish ones. Thirdly, these kinds of  social initiatives, 
linked to the PAH movement, seem to enjoy huge popular support in Spain. 
In Brazil, the informal occupation of  housing has historically been subject 
to stigma (Gonçalves, 2012) and, since around 2013, evictions accompanied 
by stigmata have accentuated—mainly during sports mega-events, when 
inappropriate housing practices were consciously linked, by authorities and 
the private sector, to marginal populations. 
The Brazilian and Spanish legal frames are also different. In Spain, there 
is no institutionalized regulation to allow squats or occupations to obtain a 
long-term right to occupy empty buildings, being an object of  case-by-case 
negotiations with public authorities and building owners. The Spanish 
“okupa” movement, whose motto is “un desalojo, otra ocupación” (one 
eviction, a new squat) is based on a continuous process of  eviction–
resettlement. The “ocupa” practices, not related to housing movements, are 
founded in a situation of  high precarity and inhabitants are able to stay just a 
few months in their occupied houses—the time needed to get a new eviction 
court order. Although lacking empirical evidence, we estimate that a huge 
population is currently moving through the empty real estate housing stock, 
in a continuous process of  fighting for survival (Manzano, 2015). 
In Brazil, different legislation, such as the “City Statute” (Estatuto da 
Cidade) and the “usucapião” law, allow for the regularization of  individual 
and collective occupations after some years of  pacific, goodwill use of  
abandoned buildings and lands. In the last years, programs such as “MCMV 
Entidades” have provided public funds to housing movements, allowing the 
renovation of  occupied buildings in collaboration with architects. Despite 
these legal advancements in relation to the right to housing, there is still 
much to be improved, as shown by the frequent evictions of  organized 
occupations.  
 
Conclusion: Towards an Internationalization of  Urban Social 
Movements 
Considering this comparative analysis, we believe that the popular answers 
to speculative processes in both countries are convergent. In spite of  cul-
tural differences—and the different positions at the core and periphery of  
the global economic system—global capitalist mechanics have strongly re-
invigorated the “housing problem” in different contexts. The accumulation 
by dispossession process (Harvey, 2005) has, in both Brazil and Spain, in-
duced massive forced evictions, strengthening the feeling of  plunder and a 
generalized financial “revanchism” (Smith, 2012). As a consequence, the 
rise of  urban social movements has been observed, constituting or support-
ing autonomous housing alternatives. The motto “people without houses, 
houses without people” is equally valid and used as a claim on both sides of  
the Atlantic. 
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The consolidation of  communities generated by social movements is 
not without difficulties. Although the historical trajectories and the social 
reality of  both countries are very different, the comparison of  the 
respective processes of  financialization, and the social reactions that have 
emerged from it, invite us to propose the existence of  a convergence 
process, both in the commodification of  popular urban areas and in the 
responses of  social movements. 
On the one hand, financial capital uses the urban space as an object of  
change, through speculative investment, attacking local populations that 
would not benefit in any way from these global investment transfers. This 
makes the “housing problem” (Engels, 1872 [1997]) reappear with force, in 
contexts characterized by enormous urban and real estate growth. The 
processes of  uncontrolled real estate valuation carried out in both coun-
tries, such as the beginning of  a crisis of  extreme consequences, currently 
suffered in Brazil seven years after the start of  the crisis in Spain, in 2008, 
could be part of  the same process of  violent global investment–divestment 
carried out a few years apart. 
On the other hand, the social struggle against the process of  
financialization of  housing and urban management, concretized by the 
occupy and squatting initiatives, share common elements in northern and 
southern global contexts, exemplified in the cases of  Brazil and Spain. The 
fact that the struggle for the right to the city and to housing has emerged 
with force in both countries validates the hypothesis of  the emergence of  
autonomous, self-regulated spaces that overflow the regulation frames and 
real estate logic of  capital gains. Thus, these movements are attacking the 
core of  the global, financial accumulation process with the eruption of  
popular solidarities by appropriating empty buildings.  
Occupying and squatting insert alternative ways of  urban life (Castells, 
Caraça et Cardoso, 2012), which allow populations excluded from the right 
to the city to become strong and reconquer it. In that sense, occupying and 
squatting practices are directly rooted in the original sense of  Lefebvre’s 
Right to the City. As Souza (2010) points out, the original sense of  the right 
to the city goes far beyond the fight against the main manifestations of  the 
neoliberal urban economy, reducing the amount of  “horror” of  its logics to 
a “tolerable level”. The Lefebvrian purpose was not a fight against the 
superficial consequences of  a capitalist market, but to support a deep 
transgression of  the urban and systemic logic, founded in a subaltern re-
appropriation of  the city. The common appropriation of  public spaces and 
buildings is materialized by a large range of  practices, not only in our cases 
of  study, but in very different countries. This constitutes a historical 
popular and middle class reaction against the dramatic capitalist exploitation 
of  the city. 
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The current increase of  successful squatting and occupy experiences, 
and the awareness of  the population of  the need to build a democratic 
appropriation of  empty buildings, is currently under threat by the rise of  
conservative forces, both in Brazil and in Spain. However, the current 
reinforcement of  repressive legal frames against self-organized housing 
initiatives, without providing public housing alternatives, is not sustainable 
for the hegemonic powers because, as history showed us (Leontidou, 1990; 
Aguilera, 2017) people need houses, and they will organize to obtain them. 
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Rights Begin in the Small Places Closest to 
Home: A Story from Constitution Street 
Jemma Neville 
 
I live on Constitution Street in the Leith area of  Edinburgh, northeast 
Scotland, United Kingdom. Maybe you know the street, maybe you don’t. 
That doesn’t particularly matter for the purpose of  the story I want to share 
with you. For certain, you will know another street well. Maybe it’s the street 
where you live or work in your part of  the world. Your street too will likely 
have a beginning, middle, and an end, like all streets and all stories do. One 
street among many streets in the city. A wee story within another wee story, 
as we would say here in Scotland. Hear me to the end of  the road. 
Where to begin the story? Stories are about hospitality, about the giving 
and receiving of  experience, so I’ll begin with a welcome. Make yourself  
right at home. We’ve heard a lot on this street and streets up and down 
Scotland, and the UK, about our differences of  late. The Yes and the No. 
The Leave and the Remain. The them and the us. Binary positions in 
referendums. Some neighbours displayed posters in their windows. Others 
closed the curtains. Some sang protest songs or wrote plays. Some felt 
anxious. Some felt excited. It is time for new conversations and new ways 
of  considering the distribution of  power, land and resources.  
If  it sounds a revolutionary sort of  a place that’s because it is. Or it once 
was, what with a name like Constitution Street, built in the late eighteenth 
century amidst the radical thinking of  the Scottish Enlightenment and the 
overthrow of  monarchies elsewhere in the world. You may know though that 
the UK doesn’t have a written constitution. Rather, there are constitutional 
conventions and principles based on case law developed over centuries. 
There is an ongoing debate amongst legal scholars about whether or not it 
is time to write a constitution to better safeguard the country against exces-
sive executive power, particularly in light of  the UK leaving the European 
Union and its safeguards regards employment, social security and environ-
mental law. Some consider whether Scotland, as a devolved nation within 
the UK, or perhaps as an independent country of  its own one day, could 
draft a written constitution based on a human rights framework.  
The Universal Declaration of  Human Rights, adopted in 1948, is the 
most revolutionary document of  the international human rights framework. 
It is hard to imagine the international community of  nations in the present 
day agreeing to respect, promote and protect social, economic and cultural 
rights along with civil and political rights. Head of  the drafting committee 
for the Declaration, Eleanor Roosevelt, famously remarked that human 
rights begin in the small places closest to home. So small and so close that 
they cannot be seen from any world map. They are the farmyard, the 
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factory, the playground and the community garden. Like the neighbours 
living side by side as a neighbourhood community on a street, human rights 
are universal, indivisible, interdependent and must be interpreted for the 
context of  the times in which we are living.  
The economic, human and environmental wreckage in the world we live 
in today has shaped an age of  anxiety in this, a liminal land. Liminal times 
and places are those that are in-between, in transition, on a threshold of  
change. And the anxiety resulting from liminal times and places can make 
us sensitive and curious about ourselves, making us want to search out new 
ways of  being and doing in the world. In search of  these new ways, I set out 
on a long walk along my street in the city of  Edinburgh. I wanted to find 
the common ground that overrides division and difference.  
I began the long walk by interviewing some of  my neighbours and local 
business owners about their lived experiences of  the rights to health, 
housing, education, culture, food, the environment and so on. My 
“methodology” began with recorded conversations with those neighbours I 
know well and then I asked each of  them to recommend someone new that 
I should speak to. In this way, the conversations rippled outward in 
concentric circles like everyday human contact does, rather than following 
any linear structure like the chronological addresses of  a street. My interview 
consent forms were approved by an Edinburgh University research ethics 
committee, but fundamentally the exploration relies on trust and it was 
really important to me that participants—my neighbours—were kept 
informed about the Constitution Street learning. I have invited everyone who 
took part to a communal meal to say thank you.  
People were not shy in the conversations and talked to me for hours 
about local history and neighbourhood gossip. We laughed and cried. There 
were confessions about how and why people voted in the recent referenda. 
I then asked my neighbours to imagine that, as residents of  one street in 
one city, we could draft a new written constitution by, for, and with 
ourselves as rights holders. I asked them to imagine what rights we should 
include. People said nothing. Their faces were blank. I elaborated with 
props like a parchment scroll and quotes from other constitutions and 
human rights declarations around the world. Still nothing. Neighbours 
complained that it all sounded like legalese. It seemed a bit dry and boring. I 
needed to reframe the question. I needed to go in close and local and ask 
about how we want to live together in common, about how we practice the 
old saying of  love thy neighbour. This is love in its true meaning, with 
acceptance of  vulnerability and flaws, and as a verb, a doing-word. 
I love my next door neighbour, Flora. She is ten years old. An in-between, 
liminal sort of  an age. Not quite an adult and no longer a young child. She 
has lived her whole life on Constitution Street. Her mother, a Scotswoman, 
voted No to Scottish independence. Her father, an Englishman, voted Yes. 
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These are the ambiguities and complexities of  our many identities shaped by 
life experience and the people we meet. 
Come with me and Flora to an Autumn day in our community garden 
next to Constitution Street. The garden is called the Community Croft and 
is organised by a group of  local volunteers. Croft is an interesting old Scots 
word. It comes from traditional settlements or smallholdings where people 
kept enough animals and grew a few crops to feed their own family. Crofts 
have a little bit of  everything. Enough and no more. No fences, no walls. 
Traditional crofting was hard, physical work in a harsh climate and shouldn’t 
be overly romanticised, but the principle of  growing and sharing still 
holds true. 
Right now, it’s a Sunday morning in the first quarter of  the twenty-first 
century in postmodern, post-referendum Scotland. Flora is blowing the 
seeds from a dandelion flower. These are the wispy stems made up of  small 
circular flowers. The number of  puffs it takes to scatter all the petals is a 
game said to be a way to tell the time. We both have our backs pressed flat 
onto picnic table benches and we are blinking up at the big, shuffling sky. 
An upside down kaleidoscope of  kinetic colour and shape. The season is 
only hinting at the changes to follow. The green foliage of  chestnut trees 
shows glimpses of  racy yellow and orange at their corners—frayed, delicate 
edges where leaves will soon disintegrate, fall and land at our feet and in our 
laps like garments made of  antique lace that have shrunk in the wash.  
We have been daydreaming for some time when I ask Flora if  she has 
any homework before school the next day. She tells me about a recent 
school trip to the devolved Scottish Parliament to learn about the 
separation of  powers and about the social contract. She and her classmates 
have been tasked with preparing a short presentation about power. I ask her 
what she thinks about the commons. 
You mean the House of  Commons? 
No. The Commons. As in community. Sharing. Common land and 
participation and food. Establishing a pattern of  active participation and 
assembly. It’s quite a hard thing to articulate, but you know it when you see 
it. It’s when a group of  people share resources or goods for a common 
purpose, for the benefit of  all.  
A resource? 
A thing. Like, like—the slide over there in this garden that we’re sitting in is 
a thing. It’s a play thing.  
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My brother got a climbing frame last Christmas and because it was a much bigger present 
than the one I got, Mum and Dad say that he has to let me have a go on it sometimes. 
Well, good luck with that! Imagine that the climbing frame has a slide and 
swings and that you share it equally with the other children of  the street. 
Who gets to go down the slide first? 
That’s for you two or more to negotiate and agree upon. 
Who else is here playing? 
Erm. It’s just a metaphor. Imagine there are all your childhood friends and 
neighbours, including some that you don’t know well but would like to 
know. If  someone gets tired or is unwell, you can help one another stay safe 
on the climbing frame. A team game! Home ground. Common ground. 
Cooperation rather than competition. The city and the world itself  are 
round, a sphere that looks like a circle when drawn, so all the streets 
eventually join up. There is no gain in always being first on the slide and 
leaving others behind.  
It sounds fancy. Can we sell it to spend the money on other things? 
No. You don’t actually own the climbing frame in that sense.  
But I thought you said that it was ours? 
Yes, it is. Until you want to pass it onto other children when you get bigger 
or while you’re not using it. It’s a public amenity, not a private wealth. 
Ok. Is it a rusty old thing or brand new? 
It could be either but you’ll take good care of  it so that it lasts a long time. 
One of  you can oil the bolts. Another paint the frame. And so on. Making 
use of  different skill sets and materials. A dynamic mix. 
I’m still not sure if  my brother and I could share that well together. 
You’ll probably fall out. Siblings usually do because of  how you know and 
love one another so much that it can hurt. You must agree between you 
how to resolve any disputes and if  one of  you should damage the climbing 
frame deliberately or steal part of  it or something so that other children 
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can’t play on it, there will be graduated sanctions that you’ve agreed to abide 
by in advance. It’s one of  Ostrom’s principles for commoning.  
Ostrom? 
Nobel Prize Winner for Economics. A smart woman. 
Seems common sense. 
Exactly. 
But will it be safe to play alone in the park and what about when it gets dark? 
 
Ok. Good points. All of  you that are playing together, and with the support 
of  the city authorities, will agree safe lighting and maybe restrict car parking 
nearby. It’s your right to play. And when you’re hungry, maybe you can 
organise a picnic together. Did you know that the word companionship 
comes from the Latin to eat bread? Eating is best done in company.  
And when you’re out playing on the climbing frame in the park, you will 
see birds and animals and plants. Everything is involved and interconnected. 
Without the plants, the trees, the grass, the seeds and so on, there would be 
no soft ground on which to land from a jump, no water to drink when you 
get thirsty after playing. No sound of  birds singing to make your heart soar 




Trust me. You already know it. You’re doing it. Here, now, in the garden, 
having this conversation with me, your neighbour. It’s social ecology. People 
in nature. Bookchin. Read some Murray Bookchin. I’ve got a book from a 
conference in Greece. Have I told you all about that? Inspiring people. I’ll 
pass the book on when you’re a bit older. And then I want you to pass it 
onto another neighbour. So, you see, commoning, social contracts, power, 
constitutions. We have lots in common already. And the power to find out 
more. 
End of  conversation, back to the street garden and the quiet 
observation in community. Small children are heard stamping out an angry 
path behind us in the far edges of  the Community Croft. Mini street gods, 
they test the boundaries by wrestling then embracing one another and 
quarrelling once more, flinging large handfuls of  what Aristotle referred to 
as organic matter at one another. 
Jemma Neville 
176 
There is a fresco hanging in the Vatican by the Italian Renaissance artist 
Raphael. The fresco is called the School of  Athens and depicts Plato and 
Aristotle in conversation at the centre of  a semi-circle filled with other 
ancient Greek philosophers. Plato is concerned with matters spiritual and 
looks up towards the Heavens while Aristotle casts his gaze down to Earth. 
Sitting apart from the others and appearing to daydream with his head 
resting in his hands is Heraclitus. He is best known among contemporary 
environmentalists for his insistence that no one ever steps into the same 
river twice and that the path up and the path down are one and the same 
because of  the ever-present flow of  nature.  
The Raphael fresco also depicts a paradoxical tension: humans are 
intrinsically part of  the natural world—we breathe the same air and eat the 
same plants and animals as our fellow creatures, but humans have also 
developed the reasoning and technological skills with which to debate with 
one another in a semicircle. Humans are both natural and social beings. 
This is what Murray Bookchin referred to as our second nature. 
The Croft here is common ground, hard-fought by the young families 
of  the neighbourhood. Unlike other areas of  Edinburgh, few of  our flats 
have communal back gardens; such was the pressure on available land for 
housing during the overcrowding of  the Leith area of  Edinburgh in its 
seafaring heyday when the Port was the busiest in Scotland and 
Constitution Street was first laid out in 1790. Old maps from the archives 
of  the National Library of  Scotland hint at market gardens extending from 
the back of  the original dwellings, but traces of  these have long since been 
replaced by car parks and budget supermarket chains. More on that another 
time. 
Here ends one wee story within another wee story. You are welcome to 
visit our street anytime, but you probably have your own street in your own 
city to be getting back to. Our streets and our cities could even link up and 
become more streetwise! Meanwhile, I will be having more conversations 
about the lived experience of  human rights in practice on Constitution 
Street. Right here, right now.  
I have told this long, sort of  circular, conversation to bring to mind my 
learning from the TRISE conference in Thessaloniki, 2017. I learnt that the 
commons in the city might provide a way through the wreckage of  nation-
state politics at a time when national borders and realpolitik is limiting our 
full potential as human beings to live in peaceful, sustainable communities 
with full rights to housing, health, the environment, and so on. I learnt that 
local, active participation is where democracy and the meaningful 
distribution of  power can most flourish. Conversations with activists and 
researchers from around the world, who are passionate about this and 
more, felt, to me, like coming home. 
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Back home in the city of  Edinburgh, I will continue to walk up and 
down Constitution Street every day, paying attention to the extraordinary 
detail in our ordinary places and encounters so that I might come to know 
the street, my neighbours, and indeed myself  better. To be in conversation 
like this—constantly negotiating our boundaries and realising our human 
rights—is a form of  living constitution.   
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sketches the historical and philosophical context 
in which these ideas are grounded.  
Paperback ISBN: 978-1-55164-100-3 $19.99 
Villages in Cities: Community Land 
Ownership, Cooperative Housing, and 
the Milton Parc Story 
Dimitrios Roussopoulos and Josh Hawley 
“There were so many rules in the way of what you 
could do and what you could not do, and this is a 
great lesson that if you really believe in 
something and really fight for it, it happens. I've 
ordered 25 copies of the book to give to people. 
That tells you how much I think about it." 
– PHYLLIS LAMBERT, founder of the Canadian
Center for Architecture and Heritage Montreal 
Paperback ISBN: 978-1-55164-687-9 $22.99 
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Participatory Democracy: 
Prospects for Democratizing Democracy 
George Benello, Dimitrios Roussopoulos, 
eds. 
A completely revised edition of the classic and 
widely consulted 1970 version 
First published as a testament to the legacy of 
the concept made popular by the New Left of the 
1960s, and with the perspective of the intervening 
decades, this book opens up the way for re-
examining just what is involved in democratizing 
democracy.  
With its emphasis on citizen participation, 
here, presented in one volume are the best argu-
ments for participatory democracy written by some of the most relevant 
contributors to the debate, both in an historic, and in a contemporary, sense. 
This wide-ranging collection probes the historical roots of participatory 
democracy in our political culture, analyzes its application to the problems 
of modern society, and explores the possible forms it might take on every 
level of society from the work place, to the community, to the nation at 
large. Part II, "The Politics of Participatory Democracy," covers Porto Alegre, 
Montreal, the new urban ecology, and direct democracy. 
"The book is, by all odds, the most encompassing one so far in revealing the practical 
actual subversions that the New Left wishes to visit upon us. 
– WASHINGTON POST
“It is good to be reminded of the origins of this yeasty rebelliousness…and to that 
end, editors Dimitrios Roussopoulos and the late C.George Benello have produced…a 
volume that is part inspiration and part reference work for a generation of earnest 
social reformers…Our democracy desperately needs more democracy, and a reflection 
upon these essays is a credible place to start the process” 
– COLLEGE QUARTERLY
Apart from the editors, contributors include: George Woodcock, Murray 
Bookchin, Don Calhoun, Stewart Perry, Rosabeth Moss Kanter, James Gilles-
pie, Gerry Hunnius, John McEwan, Arthur Chickering, Christian Bay, Martin 
Oppenheimer, Colin Ward, Sergio Baierle, Anne Latendresse, Bartha Rodin, 
and C.L.R. James. 
Paperback ISBN 1-55164-224-7 $24.99 
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Green Politics, Green Economics: 
The Basics of Ecology 
M. Athena Palaeologu 
Given the world-wide ecological crisis, to what ex-
tent do the current economic systems of production 
and consumption need to change? To make substan-
tial changes to the dominant economic system as 
the author proposes, area new politics required? 
What are the relations between economic and po-
litical changes? M. Athena Palaeologu’s lucid and 
engaging analysis offers concrete proposals for 
moving beyond our current social and environ-
mental impasse. 
In market-driven economies around the world 
ecological crises are creating major problems of supply and distribution. The 
inability of governments to manage these environmental problems both do-
mestically and internationally has led to widespread contradictions between 
public rhetoric and political practice. A growing number of contemporary 
publications respond to these crises by advocating a successful marriage of 
the corporate marketplace with the goals of environmentalism, in a market-
ing landscape where large and small corporations are tripping over each 
other to present their “green”credentials. M. Athena Palaeologu’s timely 
work Green Politics, Green Economics examines these apologetic responses to 
broach an uncomfortable but fundamental question–is long-term and sus-
tainable development really possible under market capitalism? 
Palaeologu develops two alternative approaches to these environmental 
challenges: (i) a“green politics”that places major importance on achieving 
ecological goals through grassroots participatory citizen involvement, draw-
ing heavily on values shared with feminist and social movements, and; (ii) 
a“green economics”that address the dynamic and spatial interdependence 
between human economies and the natural ecosystems which sustain them. 
M. Athena Palaeologu is a long-time researcher and activist. An organiser of 
alternative movements for social change, she is editor of The Sixties in Canada: 
A Turbulent and Creative Decade (Black Rose Books). She holds a PhD in politics 
and economics, exploring political and economic alternatives through social 
ecological movements.  
Paperback ISBN 978-1-55164-332-8 $19.99 
